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Formal Techniques for a Data-Driven Certification of Advanced Railway Signalling Systems

  • Alessandro FantechiEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9933)

Abstract

The technological evolution of railway signalling equipment promises significant increases in transport capacity, in operation regularity, in quality and safety of the service offered.

This evolution is based on the massive use of computer control units on board trains and on the ground, that aims at improving the performance of rail transport and maintaining high safety figures.

A brief review of possible innovation trends of signalling systems shows that they will be more and more based on the exchange of accurate and secure complex information, in order to ensure safe operation.

For this reason we want to advocate the adoption of a novel, data-driven safety certification approach, based on formal verification techniques, focusing on the desired attributes of the exchanged information. A discussion on this issue is presented, based on some initial observations of the needed concepts.

Keywords

Vital Information Fault Tree Analysis Vital Data Track Circuit Movement Authority 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work is based on an invited presentation made at a workshop funded by the PART project of DTU Compute (Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, Technical University of Denmark), and has been conducted while on leave from University of Florence, thanks to a grant of the Villum Foundation.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.DTU ComputeLyngbyDenmark
  2. 2.University of Florence - DINFOFlorenceItaly

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