Abstract
We study how margin requirements in the collateralized borrowing affect banks’ risk exposure. In a model where a firm’s asset value and margin requirement follow correlated geometric Brownian motions, we derive analytic expressions for firm’s default probability and debt value. Our results show that variations in margin requirements, reflecting funding liquidity shocks in the short-term collateralized lending market, can lead to a significant increase in firms’ default risks, in particular for those firms heavily relying on short-term collateralized borrowing. Moreover, our results imply that reducing margin in liquidity crises can be very effective to restore market lending confidence.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
Former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke provided a definition in April 2012 at the 2012 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets Conference: “Shadow banking, as usually defined, comprises a diverse set of institutions and markets that, collectively, carry out traditional banking functions–but do so outside, or in ways only loosely linked to, the traditional system of regulated depository institutions. Examples of important components of the shadow banking system include securitization vehicles, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, money market mutual funds, markets for repurchase agreements (repos), investment banks, and mortgage companies”.
- 2.
This transformation facilitates the analysis and will make the drift parameter redundant in the numerical experiments. However, with drifts present, the semi close-form solutions are still achievable and it causes no loss of efficiency in the simulations.
- 3.
This result can already be found in [19].
- 4.
Rolling over short-term debt is common practice as firms can reclassify short-term debt as long-term according to the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards.
- 5.
See, e.g., “International banking and financial market developments”, BIS Quarterly Review December 2011, or “The role of margin requirements and haircuts in procyclicality”, CGFS Papers, No 36.
- 6.
Be aware that we use \(n_0=1-m_0\) in our simulations not \(m_0\) directly.
- 7.
There is no authoritative data on the use of haircuts/initial margins in the repo market in either Europe or the US. Table 1 in the research report published by Committee on the Global Financial System Study Group shows margin data in bilateral interviews in various financial centers with various market users, including banks, prime brokers, custodians, asset managers, pension funds and hedge funds. For reference see http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs36.pdf.
References
Acharya, V.V., Schnabl, P., Suarez, G.A.: Securitization without risk transfer. J. Financ. Econ. 107(3), 515–536 (2013)
Adrian, T., Shin, H.S.: Procyclical leverage and value-at-risk. Rev. Finan. Stud. 27(2), 373–403 (2014)
Black, F., Cox, J.: Valuing corporate securities: Some effects of bond indenture provisions. J. Financ. 31, 351–367 (1976)
Blanchet-Scalliet, C., Patras, F.: Structural counterparty risk valuation for credit default swaps. In: Brigo, D., Bielecki, T., Patras, F. (eds.) Credit Risk Frontiers: Subprime Crisis, Pricing and Hedging, CVA, MBS, Ratings, and Liquidity. Wiley (2011)
Cai, N., Kou, S., Liu, Z.: A two-sided Laplace inversion algorithm with computable error bounds and its applications in financial engineering. Adv. Appl. Probab. 46, 766–789 (2014)
Chen, H.: Macroeconomic conditions and the puzzles of credit spreads and capital structure. J. Financ. 65(6), 2171–2212 (2010)
Chen, L., Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R.: On the relation between the credit spread puzzle and the equity premium puzzle. Rev. Finan. Stud. 22(9), 3367–3409 (2009)
Covitz, D., Liang, N., Suarez, G.A.: The evolution of a financial crisis: collapse of the assetbacked commercial paper market.The. J. Financ. 68(3), 815–848 (2013)
Custódio, C., Ferreira, M.A., Laureano, L.: Why are US firms using more short-term debt? J. Financ. Econ. 108(1), 182–212 (2013)
Geanakoplos, J.: Solving the present crisis and managing the leverage cycle. Fed. Reserve Bank N.Y. Econ. Policy Rev. 101–131 (2010)
Gorton, G., Metrick, A.: Securitized banking and the run on repo. J. Financ. Econ. 104(3), 425–451 (2012)
He, Z., Xiong, W.: Rollover risk and credit risk. J. Financ. 67(2), 391–430 (2012)
Huang, J., Huang, M.: How much of the corporate-treasury yield spread is due to credit risk? Rev. Asset Pricing Stud. 2, 153–202 (2003)
Kou, S., Zhong, H.: First passage times of two-dimensional Brownian motion. Working paper (2015)
Metzler, A.: On the first passage problem for correlated Brownian motion. Stat. Probab. Lett. 80(5), 277–284 (2010)
Patras, F.: A reflection principle for correlated defaults. Stochast. Process. Appl. 116, 690–698 (2006)
Schroth, E., Suarez, G.A., Taylor, L.A.: Dynamic debt runs and financial fragility: Evidence from the 2007 ABCP crisis. J. Financ. Econ. 112(2), 164–189 (2014)
Zhang, B., Zhou, H., Zhu, H.: Explaining credit default swap spreads with the equity volatility and jump risks of individual firms. Rev. Finan. Stud. 22(12), 5099–5131 (2009)
Zhou, C.: An analysis of default correlations and multiple defaults. Rev. Finan. Stud. 14(2), 555–576 (2001)
Acknowledgements
This work was jointly supported by the German Research Foundation through the project Modelling of market, credit and liquidity risks in fixed-income-markets and the UTS Business School Research Funds. The financial support is gratefully acknowledged by the authors.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
We first calculate the value of short-term debt \(D_S\),
The first term is
where the survival probability \(P(\tau >T)\) and the default density function are given in (4) and (5). The second term can be computed as
The last term is
where the joint default density is given in (6) and (7). For the default time \(v<u\), we know
and for \(u<v\)
The long-term debt value will be the same by replacing principal and coupon. The total firm value is the unlevered firm value plus tax shields minus bankruptcy costs
Finally, equity value is calculated as total firm value net the debt value
\(\square \)
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Lütkebohmert, E., Xiao, Y. (2016). Collateralized Borrowing and Default Risk. In: Kallsen, J., Papapantoleon, A. (eds) Advanced Modelling in Mathematical Finance. Springer Proceedings in Mathematics & Statistics, vol 189. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45875-5_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45875-5_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-45873-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-45875-5
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)