Abstract
A lot of research has been devoted to understanding the technical properties of amplification DDoS attacks and the emergence of the DDoS-as-a-service economy, especially the so-called booters. Much less is known about the consequences for victimization patterns. We profile victims via data from amplification DDoS honeypots. We develop victimization rates and present explanatory models capturing key determinants of these rates. Our analysis demonstrates that the bulk of the attacks are directed at users in access networks, not at hosting, and even less at enterprise networks. We find that victimization in broadband ISPs is highly proportional to the number of ISP subscribers and that certain countries have significantly higher or lower victim rates which are only partially explained by institutional factors such as ICT development. We also find that victimization rate in hosting networks is proportional to the number of hosted domains and number of routed IP addresses and that content popularity has a minor impact on victimization rates. Finally, we reflect on the implications of these findings for the wider trend of commoditization in cybercrime.
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Acknowledgements
This work has been enabled through the support of NWO Pr. Nr. CYBSEC.12.003/628.001.003, SIDN, the Dutch National Cyber Security Center and Beatriu Pinos BP-A-214. We would like to thank Dr. Paul Vixie and Farsight Security for providing our pDNS data. In addition we would like to acknowledge the support of the MEXT (Program for Promoting Reform of National Universities) and PRACTICE (Proactive Response Against Cyber-attacks Through International Collaborative Exchange) programs.
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Noroozian, A., Korczyński, M., Gañan, C.H., Makita, D., Yoshioka, K., van Eeten, M. (2016). Who Gets the Boot? Analyzing Victimization by DDoS-as-a-Service. In: Monrose, F., Dacier, M., Blanc, G., Garcia-Alfaro, J. (eds) Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses. RAID 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9854. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45719-2_17
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