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Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? pp 341–364Cite as

Determining the (Almost) Intangible: Measuring Relational Power

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Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

Abstract

Following the analysis of aggregate power in Chap. 5, it is now important to more closely evaluate the alleged power shift between Washington and Beijing based on a relational understanding of power. Grounded on the insight that gaps in the material (and non-material) national elements of power might lead to power differences in nation states’ bilateral relations, it is clear that researchers also have to look at this aspect when trying to identify a potential power shift. Taking the results of Chap. 5 as a confirmation that China’s aggregate power vis-à-vis the United States has indeed been rising since the end of the Cold War, the basic assumption of this part of the study’s analysis is that if China had managed to win the allegiance of middle powers in Asia-Pacific between 1992 and 2012 with regards to security and/or economic cooperation, this would have represented a relational power shift as long as the United States were unable to improve its ties to the regional middle powers simultaneously.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Baldwin (1985): 22.

  2. 2.

    Baldwin, David (2000): ‘Power and International Relations’, in: Carlsnaes, Walter/Risse, Thomas and Simmons, Beth A. (eds.): The Handbook of International Relations. Thousand Oaks: Sage, pp. 177–191, p. 181.

  3. 3.

    This latter point connects to the interesting work of Pustovitovskij and Kremer, who rightly emphasize the importance of having an ‘outside option’ in inter-state negotiations in their (micro-economic) theory of international power (which they—somewhat oddly—label to deal with ‘structural power’ although it clearly has a relational power understanding at its heart (which the two authors admit)). See Pustovitovskij and Kremer (2012): 65–68 & 71.

  4. 4.

    See Keohane (1984): 187 and Lijphart (1971): 690. Lijphart explicitly criticized Lasswell on this matter.

  5. 5.

    Ibid.

  6. 6.

    On the distinction between operationalisation and measurement (and their validity and reliability in this context) as well as latent variables see Miller (2011): 85f.

  7. 7.

    For his comprehensive critique on structural power research see Gu (2012): 264.

  8. 8.

    See on the problems of measurement in this context and the question of determinism when it comes to deciding for either deterministic or probabilistic explanations Mahoney (2003): 338–360.

  9. 9.

    Miller (2011): 86.

  10. 10.

    Ibid. Miller even states that “virtually all measures” are derived measures as not many variables are observable. Ibid.: 86 & 89. Clearly this is also the case for the CIs on aggregated power in the previous section. On variables as a way to organize data see King et al. (1994): 47f.

  11. 11.

    Dür, Alexander (2011): ‘Discriminating among Rival Explanations: Some Tools for Small-n Researchers’, in: Gschwend, Thomas/Schimmelfennig, Frank (eds.): Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice What They Preach. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 183–200, p. 184 and Mahoney (2003): 354. As has been noted by Gu, this is also a key challenge when trying to identify and determine structural power. See Gu (2012): 262.

  12. 12.

    Miller (2011): 88.

  13. 13.

    Note that given this section’s small-n research design the problem of unit homogeneity will be addressed by relying on a statistical selection procedure (which will be explained in greater detail later), by considering a long time-frame (1992–2012) and by keeping constant as many background variables as feasible (i.e. relying on the literature’s and the data’s understanding of middle powers). On the challenges of unit homogeneity and the ways for researchers to deal with them see King et al. (1994): 201–206. On the benefits of small-n cases studies and CHA as well as a comprehensive critique of claims made towards small-n studies’ limitations see Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (2003): ‘Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?’, in: Mahoney, James/Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (eds.): Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 305–336.

  14. 14.

    King et al. (1994): 46f.

  15. 15.

    Lijphart (1971): 690.

  16. 16.

    See on this Miller (2011): 93. On the linkage between theory and case studies’ research design see the useful discussion in Yin (2009): 35–40 & 130f. For a more general discussion on the value of theory and causal inference see Roberts Clarke, William/Golder, Matts (2015): ‘Big Data, Causal Inference and Formal Theory: Contradictory Trends in Political Science’, PS: Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 65–69, 68f. The interplay of theory with the problem of causality and causal configurations is also very well addressed in Blatter, Joachim/Blume, Till (2008): ‘In Search of Co-variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understanding of Case Studies’, Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 315–356.

  17. 17.

    Zartman (2009): 4.

  18. 18.

    Sieberer (2011): 163. Notably, while constructing the CIAP the author of this study has faced the same challenge.

  19. 19.

    King et al. (1994): 41.

  20. 20.

    Leuffen, Dirk (2011): ‘Case Selection and Selection Bias in Small-n Research’, in: Gschwend, Thomas/Schimmelfennig, Frank (eds.): Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice What They Preach. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 145–160, p. 145. See on this also King et al. (1994): 46.

  21. 21.

    Rueschemeyer (2003): 333.

  22. 22.

    Dür (2011): 198.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.: 198f.

  24. 24.

    Lustick, Ian S. (1996): ‘History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 3, pp. 605–618, p. 615.

  25. 25.

    Dür (2011): 199.

  26. 26.

    See on the importance of self-critique next to inter-subjective critique De Bièvre (2011): 206f. Also Yin mentioned that in order to have as much explanatory power as possible, when doing cases studies researchers should account for different perspectives and reflect on these potential alternative views. See Yin (2009): 187f.

  27. 27.

    Furlong and Marsh (2010). Accordingly, this study has followed the realist ontology of its author while constructing the CIAP.

  28. 28.

    Sieberer (2011): 167 & 181 as well as Gu (2009): 5.

  29. 29.

    King et al. (1994): 45.

  30. 30.

    Lijphart (1971): 690. Sieberer furthermore argues that control variables make no sense in outcome-centric research as they have the same logical status as independent ones. See Sieberer (2011): 173f.

  31. 31.

    King et al. (1994): 42. They were very much aware of the threat of oversimplification and omitting significant aspects of the situation, but saw it as a sheer necessity of the scholarly work.

  32. 32.

    Sieberer (2011): 180.

  33. 33.

    King et al. (1994): 44.

  34. 34.

    Ibid.: 44f, emphasis added.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.: 84.

  36. 36.

    On the use of theory to measure causality in qualitative research see ibid.: 99–114, for the relation between measurement error and a study’s theoretical structure see ibid.: 153.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.: 174.

  38. 38.

    This is not only related to classical and structural realists’ emphasis on political entities’ quest for power, security and ensuring survival. Following Mearsheimer, the impact of great powers’ competition in the field of security can hardly be overstated when it comes to the system’s configuration. Mearsheimer (2001): 49. This strongly concurs with Gilpin (1984): 290f.

  39. 39.

    According to Robert K. Yin, case studies can be exploratory, descriptive and/or explanatory. Given the already mentioned inherent problem of making causal inferences in social sciences, this research project will particularly address the first two purposes, while also trying to be as explanatory as possible. See Yin (2009): 7f & 19f.

  40. 40.

    Dür (2011): 185–188.

  41. 41.

    See King et al. (1994): 54 as well as George and McKeown (1985): 35.

  42. 42.

    Morgenthau (2006 [1948]): 4.

  43. 43.

    Note that data does not necessarily have to be at the same level of analysis. See King et al. (1994): 48.

  44. 44.

    DeSilva-Ranasighe, Sergei (2013): ‘The Interview: Admiral Samuel J. Locklear’, The Diplomat, 13th January 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/the-interview-admiral-samuel-j-locklear/?allpages=yes (06.02.2015)

  45. 45.

    Pheakdey, Heng (2012): ‘Cambodia-China Relations: A Positive-sum’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 57–85, p. 65.

  46. 46.

    Lancaster, Carol (2008): ‘Foreign Aid in the Twenty-first Century. What Purposes?’, in: Picard, Louis/Groelsema, Robert/Buss, Terry F. (eds.): Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. Lessons for the Next Half-Century. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 39–60, p. 43.

  47. 47.

    Information Office of the State Council (2011): China’s Foreign Aid. http://english1.english.gov.cn/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913.htm (10.02.2015).

  48. 48.

    Shambaugh (2013): 202.

  49. 49.

    Shimomura, Yasutami/Ohashi, Hideo (2013): ‘Why China’s Foreign Aid Matters?’, in: ibid. (eds.): A Study of China’s Aid. An Asian Perspective. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3–15.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.: 13.

  51. 51.

    Shambaugh (2013): 204

  52. 52.

    On the importance on military and economic aid see Knorr (1975): 166–206.

  53. 53.

    Lancaster (2008): 43.

  54. 54.

    Information Office of the State Council (2014): China’s Foreign Aid. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/10/c_133474011.htm (10.02.2015).

  55. 55.

    Kitano, Naohiro/Harada, Yukinori (2014): ‘Estimating China’s Foreign Aid 2001–2013’, JICA-RI Working Paper, No. 78, June 2014, p. 2, http://jica-ri.jica.go.jp/publication/assets/JICA-RI_WP_No.78_2014.pdf (10.02.2015).

  56. 56.

    Santikajaya, Awidya (2014): ‘Indonesia’s Aid Unclear Without Aid Agency’, The Jakarta Post, 02nd December 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/12/02/indonesia-s-aid-unclear-without-aid-agency.html (10.02.2015)

  57. 57.

    Reveron, Derek S. (2014): ‘From Confrontation to Cooperation. Weak States, Demanding Allies, and the US Military’, in: Adams, Gordon/Murray, Shoon (eds.): Mission Creep. The Militarization of US Foreign Policy? Washington: Georgetown University Press, pp. 60–73, p. 68.

  58. 58.

    Research suggests that security interests and/or international power concerns seem to be more prevalent in the foreign aid of great and middle powers, while small powers have been basing their aid calculations primarily upon humanitarian concerns. See Hook, Steven W. (2008): ‘Foreign Aid in Comparative Perspective. Regime Dynamics and Donor Interests’, in: Picard, Louis/Groelsema, Robert/Buss, Terry F. (eds.): Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. Lessons for the Next Half-Century. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 86–105.

  59. 59.

    Korb, Lawrence (2008): ‘Foreign Aid and Security. A Renewed Debate?’, in: Picard, Louis/Groelsema, Robert/Buss, Terry F. (eds.): Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. Lessons for the Next Half-Century. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 27–38, p. 36.

  60. 60.

    Diamond, Larry (2008): ‘Foreign Aid in the National Interest. The Importance of Democracy and Governance’, in: Picard, Louis/Groelsema, Robert/Buss, Terry F. (eds.): Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. Lessons for the Next Half-Century. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 61–85, p. 85. On the rationales for US economic and military assistance see also North, W. Haven/North, Jeanne F. (2008): ‘Transformations in US Foreign Economic Assistance’, in Picard, Louis/Groelsema, Robert/Buss, Terry F. (eds.): Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. Lessons for the Next Half-Century. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 263–301, part. pp. 265–269.

  61. 61.

    Lancaster (2008): 47.

  62. 62.

    Ibid.: 43.

  63. 63.

    See Mearsheimer (2001): 67.

  64. 64.

    Morgenthau (2006 [1948]): 128. See also his discussion of industrial capacity: ibid.: 131ff.

  65. 65.

    Ibid.: 173f.

  66. 66.

    Ibid.: 128f.

  67. 67.

    Waltz (1979): 131 & 14.

  68. 68.

    Ibid.: 142. For his discussion of FDI see ibid.: 147ff. Kim uses FDI as a means to investigate the influence of a great power over a middle power. Kim (2014): 89.

  69. 69.

    Taylor, Brendan (2007): ‘Panel IV Chairman’s Introduction’, in: McCausland, Jeffrey D./Stuart, Douglas T./Tow, William R./Wesley, Michael (eds.): The Other Special Relationship: The United States and Australia at the Start of the 21st Century. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 181–188, p. 181.

  70. 70.

    Waltz (1979): 147.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.: 159.

  72. 72.

    King et al. (1994): 121.

  73. 73.

    The term FPE connects to yet is not based on a neoclassical realist ontology. See Lobell (2010): 43f.

  74. 74.

    Bismarck (1919): 99.

  75. 75.

    Carr (2001 [1939]): 102.

  76. 76.

    Morgenthau (2006 [1948]): 161f.

  77. 77.

    Note, however, that the available data on China’s voting behaviour only allows for a facial analysis of statistics and the results will subsequently be much weaker in their explanatory power than those derived by a case-by-case analysis (as the data for the United States’ voting behaviour).

  78. 78.

    Gilley, Bruce (2011): ‘Middle Powers during Great Power Transitions. China’s Rise and the Future of Canada-US relations’, International Journal, Vol. 66, No. 2, pp. 245–264, p. 255. However, Gilley rightly emphasises Canada’s “splendid isolation”, i.e. its ability to refrain from bandwagoning with a stronger China and to not follow a policy of disalignment from the US due to geographic proximity. Ibid.: 259. Obviously, having such isolation is not the case for most countries in Asia-Pacific. Fittingly, however, some ethnic Chinese Canadian scholars have already called for reorientating the country’s identity by de-emphasising its European identity and becoming more Pacific. Yu, Henry (2009): ‘Global Migrants and the New Pacific Canada’, International Journal, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 1011–1026.

  79. 79.

    Kurlantzick (2007): 76ff.

  80. 80.

    With regards to the structured-focused approach the share of US population is not documented because numbers of US immigrant to the six countries are very low. Additionally, it is important to emphasise that there is no direct causality between a large specific ethnic population within a country and a policy supporting another country that has members of the same ethnicity. However, it is likewise necessary to understand that employing ethnic minorities as a means of political penetration has long been discussed in the literature and there are multiple examples in history were countries tried to exploit ethnic linkages in order to justify own policies (see for instance the fate of the Sudeten Germans or the German Silesians). See Knorr (1975): 15f. Moreover, as comments by Turkey’s strongman President Recep Erdogan have repeatedly shown (he has repeatedly described Turks living in Western Europe as “our power in foreign countries”) also in modern-day politics ethnicity is perceived by political leaders as a source of national power in international affairs. DPA/AFP (2015): ‘Erdogan sieht ‘Auslandstürken als Macht außerhalb des Landes”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10th May 2015, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/auftritt-in-karlsruhe-erdogan-sieht-auslandstuerken-als-macht-ausserhalb-des-landes-13585415.html (10.05.2015). Research moreover suggests that inter-ethnic solidarity is quite often stronger than inter-society solidarity, further supporting the relevance many humans seem to attach to ethnicity. See Putnam (2007). The fact that Russia has used ethnic linkages in order to justify its intervention in the internal affairs of Ukraine, e.g. by incorporating the mainly Russian-populated Crimean Peninsula in early 2014 into the Russian Federation, or that many Kurdish people all over the world rallied in support of the besieged Kurdish city of Kobani in late October 2014 underlines the continuing political relevance of ethnic (as well as cultural) linkages in international affairs.

  81. 81.

    As one interesting study shows, China is indeed trying to win the allegiance of small nations in the South Pacific via “politics of aid”. See Lanteigne, Marc (2012): ‘Water Dragon? China, Power Shifts and Soft Balancing in the South Pacific’, Political Science, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 21–38, part. pp. 30–38.

  82. 82.

    Thus, both China and the United States may very well try to closer cooperate with other great powers in the region (which they do at the moment)—but as the question of relative gains among great powers is much more pressing than among great powers and middle powers (see Chaps. 2 and 4), there are certain limitations to great power cooperation. Moreover, studies have shown that the two great powers are indeed competing over influence in regional middle powers. See Tow and Rigby (2011), Gilley, Bruce (2014): ‘China’s Discovery of Middle Powers’, in: Gilley, Bruce/O’Neil, Andrew (eds.): Middle Powers and the Rise of China. Washington: Georgetown University Press, pp. 45–62, Gilley and O’Neil (2014) as well as (though with a certain caution about middle powers as a conceptual focal point of US elites) Cooper, David A./Yoshihara, Toshi (2014): ‘US Responses to Middle Powers and China’, in: Gilley, Bruce/O’Neil, Andrew (eds.): Middle Powers and the Rise of China. Washington: Georgetown University Press, pp. 63–83.

  83. 83.

    A similar argument on a research study’s constraints in terms of time, money and effort can be found in King et al. (1994): 47.

  84. 84.

    Roy (2013): 262. Note that according to Roy, Washington and Beijing may also agree on joint maintenance of regional responsibilities, effectually leading to distinctive spheres of influences, which would also encompass certain leverages over the regional states within these spheres. While such a scenario is not taking place at the moment, it would still imply changing patterns in regional middle powers’ allegiance towards either China or the United States.

  85. 85.

    Ibid. Obviously, timing is of particular importance here: Hedging might be an attractive strategy for some time, before balancing (or one of the other strategies) becomes necessary.

  86. 86.

    According to an interesting study, this seems—at least so far—to be the case with Canada (which many scholars depict as a middle power). See Gilley (2011).

  87. 87.

    Mearsheimer (2001): 139.

  88. 88.

    Roy (2013): 262. Next to bandwagoning behaviour also appeasement would fall into this category. See Mearsheimer (2001): 139.

  89. 89.

    Mearsheimer (2001: 140) claimed that in a Realist world only buck-passing and balancing are viable options. Also Walt (1985: 46) held that we are living in a balancing world. While this might be right when it comes to great powers (which both are mostly concerned about), it is not true when it comes to middle powers as bandwagoning might very well be a necessary strategy of survival for them due to the fact that their aims (e.g. they do not seek regional hegemony) and means are more limited than those of great powers (something Walt, but not Mearsheimer admitted).

  90. 90.

    Both patterns would also relate to Walt’s reasoning already outlined in Sect. 2.4 according to which particularly non-great powers are prone to bandwagoning strategies for reasons of geographical proximity and doubt about the credibility and strength of alternative alliance partners. Walt (1985): 16–21.

  91. 91.

    As noted earlier while for other issue areas this might be different, when it comes to international security zero-sum thinking prevails for realists. See also Jervis (1982).

  92. 92.

    See for instance Medcalf and Mohan (2014): 7.

  93. 93.

    To my knowledge, only one other study has used this approach for identifying middle powers. However, the respective study focused on the global level and used only a single indicator (total GDP PPP) in order to identify middle powers for a single year (2010). See Gilley and O’Neil (2014): 5. Following the discussion in Chaps. 3 and 5 on the complexities of aggregate power and the fact that countries can lose their middle power position over time, whereas other states may rise to become a middle power based on aggregate power, it seems to be advisable not only to consider a longer time frame for a cluster analysis in this regard, but also to rely on a more sophisticated indicator base that goes beyond a single economic measure.

  94. 94.

    Nick Cox has even argued that “cluster analysis with a single variable makes perfect sense whenever there is some dimension along which values can be arranged”. Cox, Nick (2007): ‘Cluster Analysis—cluster kmeans’, The STATA Listserver, 13th May 2007, http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2007-05/msg00428.html (05.12.2014).

  95. 95.

    On avoidance of selection bias see King et al. (1994): 128–149.

  96. 96.

    Geddes cited in Leuffen (2011): 145, emphasis added. This is something that has plagued much of the middle power literature.

  97. 97.

    Lijphart (1971): 687f.

  98. 98.

    A valuable overview is provided in Nardo et al. (2005): 28–34. They mention that cluster analysis is “something of an art”. Ibid.: 34.

  99. 99.

    Ibid.: 32. Emphasis in original.

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

  101. 101.

    This method was also applied for clustering a composite indicator in OECD and JRC (2008): 77.

  102. 102.

    Type: k-means clustering; standardised data.

  103. 103.

    OECD and JRC (2008): 77.

  104. 104.

    This is the case both for researchers working on middle powers and those that dismiss this type of nation state (i.e. have a typology based on a duality of great powers and ‘the rest’).

  105. 105.

    As Matthias Lehnert outlines, ideal typologies are deductively derived constructions (which Weber called ‘mental images’), while extracted typologies are inductively derived based on empirical observations (therefore they are sometimes called empirical typologies). Classificatory typologies group nations to an exact type, while continuous typologies establish a continuum on which nations are placed. Lehnert argues that typology and theory are complementary. Moreover, as the study at hand has an outcome-centric research design, this also fits to Lehnert’s observation that an extracted typology is a very useful instrument for case selection in outcome-centric approaches. Lehnert, Matthias (2011): ‘Typologies in Social Inquiry’, in: Gschwend, Thomas/Schimmelfennig, Frank (eds.): Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice What They Preach. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 62–79, p. 63f, 66 & 69f.

  106. 106.

    Of course, this also supports the basic relational nature of the middle power conception.

  107. 107.

    The cluster analyses for CIAP I, III and IV basically lead to pretty similar final results with those of CIAP II (see appendix) for 2012. Only two differences can be noted for the middle power grouping of the final year: Vietnam is ranked as a middle power in CIAP I and IV, while New Zealand becomes a middle power in CIAP IV. Thus, the clustering results for CIAP II and III are identical for 2012 (and often in the other years as well). Due to the importance the literature awards to military strength, CIAP II is the reference scenario for this study’s middle power analysis. Still, the very similar results for the four differently weighted CIAPs supports the robustness and validity of the composite indicator’s construction and increases the reliability of the final results (i.e. the six countries identified as middle powers). Moreover, even though there are some minor deviations, all four CIAPs identify a similar overall trend when it comes to certain countries ‘rise’ or ‘persistence’ in the different annual clusters. This not only also strengthens the methodological robustness, but on a theoretical level also underlines the relativity and time dependence of states’ international rankings. See Tables A.76–A.79 in Appendix.

  108. 108.

    Note that the number of six cases considerably increases the statistical significance of this work’s analysis following conventional methodological assumptions. See Mahoney (2003): 350f.

  109. 109.

    It might be argued that the first and third criteria have already been sufficiently included by using CIAP II as the base for clustering, yet a closer analysis of these two criteria will be done for further increasing the study’s validity.

  110. 110.

    See for instance Schlesinger, Jacob M. (2014): ‘How Many Great Powers Can Asia Handle?’, Wall Street Journal, 18th July 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/18/how-many-great-powers-can-asia-handle/(22.02.2015), Haass, Richard N. (2007): ‘Asia’s Overlooked Great Power’, Op-Ed at the Council of Foreign Relations, 20th April 2007, http://www.cfr.org/japan/asias-overlooked-great-power/p13144 (22.02.2015), Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs (2009): ‘Japan—Asia’s Great Power: George Friedman’, Clipping from a speech at the Carnegie Council, 28th January 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u02jyYZ7Fxc (22.02.2015). It is interesting to note that a comparative analysis found that the overwhelming majority of Chinese media does not depict Japan as a great power. See King, Amy (2014): ‘Where does Japan Fit into China’s ‘New Type of Great Power Relations”, Special Forum of the ASAN Forum, 20th March 2014, http://www.theasanforum.org/where-does-japan-fit-in-chinas-new-type-of-great-power-relations/#1 (22.02.2015).

  111. 111.

    See Morgenthau (2006 [1948]): 213–220 & Organski (1968): 110. Moreover, Rose reminded his readers that “[t]he link between objective material power capabilities and policymakers’ subjective assessment of them remains murky”. Rose (1998): 168. See also ibid: 147. This can probably also be extended to the subjective assessments of the wider public towards the capabilities of nations.

  112. 112.

    Heimann (2015).

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    Enrico Fels

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Fels, E. (2017). Determining the (Almost) Intangible: Measuring Relational Power. In: Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific?. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45689-8_6

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