The Republic of Korea: No Longer a Small ‘Shrimp Among Whales’

Fels, Enrico

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-45689-8_10

Enrico Fels¹¹

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

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Abstract

Some scholars recently noted that South Korea (like Australia) comes closest to meeting the middle power ideal. Seoul is a “natural starting point for new middle power theorizing based on responses to the rise of China”, because it is “a particularly ambitious middle power” as well as a “strategically consequential middle power that lies at the epicentre of Asia’s continental and maritime divide”. Moreover, middle power diplomacy (jung-gyun-guk) has been present in South Korea’s foreign policy discourse for quite some time and following the words of Sung-han Kim, ROK Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul “is actively practicing middle-power diplomacy”. Notably, in 1991 President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993) declared South Korea would seek new roles as a regional middle power. Further, the k-means clustering in Chap. 6 has shown that Seoul has continuously made it into the middle power group since 1992. Moreover, the CIAP demonstrated the rise of South Korea’s aggregate power relative to the position of other regional states. South Korea has consolidated the position of an influential regional state, whose foreign policy elites have understood their nation to be a regional middle power since the 1990s. Scholars have likewise pointed to South Korea as a “middle-level power”. Before analysing the development of Seoul’s relations with Washington and Beijing since the end of the Cold War, whether South Korea justifies the middle power criteria outlined in Chap. 4 will be assessed, i.e. sufficient control over resources, exercising responsibility in regional affairs and military self-sufficiency.

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Notes

1.
Gilley, Bruce/O’Neil, Andrew (2014): ‘China’s Rise Through the Prism of Middle Powers’, in: ibid. (eds.): Middle Powers and the Rise of China. Washington: Georgetown University Press, pp. 1–22, p. 15.
2.
Kim, Tong-fi (2014): ‘South Korea’s Middle Power Response to the Rise of China’, in: Gilley, Bruce/O’Neil, Andrew (eds.): Middle Powers and the Rise of China. Washington: Georgetown University Press, pp. 84–103, p. 84.
3.
O’Neil, Andrew (2015): ‘South Korea: Middle Power Ambitions and Geopolitical Constraints’, CfR Internationalist, 30th June 2015, http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2015/06/30/south-korea-middle-power-ambitions-and-geopolitical-constraints/ (07.07.2015).
4.
Lee, Chung-min (2011a): ‘Coping With Giants: South Korea’s Responses to China’s and India’s Rise’, in: Tellis, Ashley J./Tanner, Travis/Keough, Jessica (eds.): Strategic Asia 2011–2012. Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers China and India. Seattle and Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, pp. 161–192, p. 161.
5.
Lee, Sook-jong (2012): ‘South Korea as New Middle Power. Seeking Complex Diplomacy’, EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper, No. 25, September 2012, http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/2012091211454078.pdf (01.07.2015), p. 14.
6.
Kim, Sung-han (2013): ‘Global Governance and Middle Powers: South Korea’s Role in the G20’, CfR Report, February 2013, http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/global-governance-middle-powers-south-koreas-role-g20/p30062 (02.07.2015).
7.
Kim (2014): 85.
8.
Robertson, Jeffrey (2013): ‘Middlepowerism & Continuity in South Korean Foreign Policy’, The Diplomat, 29th May 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/middlepowerism-continuity-in-south-korean-foreign-policy/?allpages=yes (05.06.2015). In fact, Tong-fi Kim argues that the development of South Korea provides a telling case for the overall validity of a capability-based approach towards middle powers in contrast to a behaviour-based definition. Kim (2014): 85. In other words, in this line of reasoning behaviour follows capabilities or at least depends on them.
9.
Chung, Jae-ho (2011): ‘China’s Place in South Korea’s Security Matrix’, in: Kim, Byung-kwan/Shin, Gi-wook/Straub, David (eds.): Beyond North Korea. Future Challenges to South Korea’s Security. Stanford: Shorenstein APARC, pp. 137–153, p. 149.
10.
IMF (2014): World Economic Database. October 2014, http://tinyurl.com/pdmbhcm (18.03.2015).
11.
World Bank (2015b): ‘Republic of Korea Overview’, Country Profile, emphasis added, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/korea/overview (04.06.2015).
12.
World Bank (2014): ‘Gross National Income per Capita 2013, Atlas Method and PPP’, World Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GNIPC.pdf (04.06.2015).
13.
World Bank (2015a): ‘GDP 2013’, World Bank Database, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf (07.05.2015).
14.
IMF (2014).
15.
Ibid.
16.
Hahn, Jason (2014): ‘South Korea is About to Make the World Even More Jealous With 10 GBPS Broadband’, Digital Trends, 19th October 2014, http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/south-korea-make-world-even-jealous-10gbps-broadband/ (04.06.2015).
17.
UNDP (2013): ‘Korea (Republic of)’, Human Development Report 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/KOR.pdf (04.06.2015).
18.
Ibid.: 3.
19.
Sudo, Yoko (2014): ‘South Korea Tops Japan in UN Human Development Ranking’, The Wall Street Journal, 25th June 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2014/07/25/south-korea-tops-japan-in-u-n-human-development-ranking/ (04.06.2015).
20.
See for instance Glosserman, Brad (2014): ‘Dueling Dinosaurs? Demographics in South Korea and Japan’, CSIS PacNet, No. 69, 26th August 2014, http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-69-dueling-dinosaurs-demographics-south-korea-and-japan (02.07.2015).
21.
Lee (2012): 1.
22.
Shim, David (2009): ‘A Shrimp Amongst Whales? Assessing South Korea’s Regional-power Status’, GIGA Working Papers, No. 17, August 2009, p. 15.
23.
Cossa, Ralph A./Oxley, Alan (2000): ‘The US-Korea Alliance’, in: Blackwill, Robert D./Dibb, Paul (eds.): America’s Asian Alliances. Cambridge & London: MIT Press, pp. 61–86, p. 74.
24.
Kim (2014): 85.
25.
Interests for these fields can probably be attributed to Seoul’s ongoing conflict with the Communist dictatorship in Pyongyang.
26.
Community of Democracy (2015): Who We Are, http://www.community-democracies.org/The-Community-of-Democracies/Our-Community (04.06.2015).
27.
UN Democracy Fund (2015): Status of Contributions by Cumulative Account, 26th May 2015, http://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/Contributions-2015_4.pdf (04.06.2015).
28.
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015a): Promotion of Democracy, http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/humanright/overview/20110920/1_25420.jsp?menu=m_20_60_10 (04.06.2015).
29.
Emmerson, Donald K. (2012): ‘Regional Efforts to Advance Democracy and Human Rights in Asia: APID, the PG20, and a Possible GGAIN’, Asan Institute Issue Brief, No. 12, 31st October 2012, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/issue-brief-no-32-regional-efforts-to-advance-democracy-and-human-rights-in-asia-apid-the-pg20-and-a-possible-ggain/ (04.06.2015).
30.
See also Robertson (2013).
31.
Lee, Shin-wha/Park, Joon Sung (2014): ‘Contributor Profile: South Korea’, Providing for Peacekeeping, http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/03/30/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-south-korea/ (04.06.2015).
32.
Hwang, Balbina Y. (2012): ‘Peacekeeping’, in: Snyder, Scott (ed.): The US-South Korea Alliance. Meeting New Security Challenges. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 173–194, p. 177.
33.
Heo, Uk/Roehrig, Terence (2014): South Korea’s Rise. Economic Development, Power, and Foreign Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 176.
34.
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015b): ODA/Development Cooperation, http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda/index.jsp?menu=m_20_110 (04.06.2015).
35.
Teo, Sarah/Singh, Bhubhindar/Tan, See Seng (2013): ‘South Korea’s Middle Power Engagement Initiatives: Perspectives from Southeast Asia’, RSIS Working Paper, No. 265, 28th November 2013, part. p. 7.
36.
Kim (2014): 96.
37.
See Reed, Edward P. (2012): ‘Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid’, in: Snyder, Scott (ed.): The US-South Korea Alliance. Meeting New Security Challenges. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 209–238, p. 227.
38.
Menon makes the important point that in raw numbers Pyongyang’s armed forces seem to have the military advantage, yet underlines that the vast qualitative differences between the militaries of the economically ailing Stalinist regime and the thriving Western-oriented democracy more than compensate for the DPRK’s strength in numbers. He moreover outlines that polls have shown that North Korea has been ranked second (after the US) in terms of countries viewed positively by South Koreans during the mid-2000s. Menon, Rajan (2007): The End of Alliances. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 158–162.
39.
SIPRI (2015a): Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database (19.03.2015).
40.
IISS (2015): The Military Balance 2015. London: Routledge, p. 264.
41.
Reuters (2014): ‘South Korea to Buy 40 F-35 Jets for $7 Billion’, Business Insider, 24th September 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-south-korea-to-sign-deal-this-month-to-buy-40-f-35-jets-for-7-billion-sources-2014-9?IR=T (05.06.2015).
42.
The three ships of this class feature the Aegis Combat System that increases interoperability with US forces. Only five non-US countries operate this system: Japan, Australia, Norway, Spain, and South Korea.
43.
It should be noted that Dokdo is also the Korean name of the Liancourt Rocks, which have been a source of tension between South Korea and Japan, where the islets are called Takeshima. South Korea has been controlling the islets since the end of the Second World War and refused a Japanese proposal in 2012 to find a final settlement of the territorial dispute via the International Court of Justice. See Miller, J. Berkshire (2014): ‘The ICJ and the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute’, The Diplomat, 13th May 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-icj-and-the-dokdotakeshima-dispute/ (05.06.2015).
44.
IISS (2015): 264ff.
45.
Stangarone, Troy (2013): ‘Why South Korea Won’t Develop Nuclear Weapons’, The Peninsula, 13th May 2013, http://blog.keia.org/2013/05/why-south-korea-wont-develop-nuclear-weapons/ (05.06.2015) as well as Balachandran, G./Gupta, Rukmani (2013): ‘Examining the Prospects of South Korea ‘Going Nuclear”, IDSA Issue Brief, 01st May 2013, http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/ProspectsofSouthKoreaGoingNuclear_gbalachandran_01052013.html (05.06.2015).
46.
Pinkston, Daniel A. (2010): ‘North and South Korean Views of the US-Japan Alliance’, in: Arase, David/Akaha, Tsuneo (eds.): The US-Japan Alliance. Balancing Soft and Hard Power in East Asia. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 117–130, p. 125.
47.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 50.
48.
Zeihan, Peter (2014): The Accidental Superpower. The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder. New York & Boston: Twelve Hachette Book Group, p. 175.
49.
Stueck, William (2012): ‘Power and Culture: The Origins and Durability of the Korean-American Alliance’, in: Yeager, Melissa P./Carter, Charles (eds.): Pacts and Alliances in History. Diplomatic Strategy and the Politics of Coalitions. London & New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 11–36, p. 11.
50.
Stueck (2012): 12.
51.
Suh Jae-jung noted that in 1949 alone more than 100,000 people were arrested and over 130 political organizations and parties disbanded by the US in Korea’s southern part as they opposed US policies to form a separate state in South Korea. Suh, Jae-jung (2007): Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 113.
52.
Snyder, Scott (2014): ‘The US-ROK Alliance and the US Rebalance to Asia’, in: Tellis, Ashley J./Denmark, Abraham M./Chaffin, Greg (eds.): Strategic Asia 2014–2015. US Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power. Seattle and Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, pp. 61–65, p. 61.
53.
Cossa and Oxley (2000): 61.
54.
This fact becomes even more interesting (and more supportive to the Realists’ take on international affairs) if one considers that Washington denied proposals from South Korea’s then President Syngman Rhee (1948–1960) for forming an official or unofficial security partnership only a year before the North attacked because the US leadership wanted to concentrate their resources on strengthening the US position in Japan and Western Europe. The same can be said for the continuing support of Jimmy Carter (1977–1981), a US president with a strong public emphasis on human rights, and Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) to South Korea despite the dictatorial actions of General Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1988), which also involved the killing of hundreds of democracy-supporting civilians during the Gwangju Massacre in May 1980 (on a sidenote this massacre also led to a spike in anti-Americanism in South Korea because US officers gave the authorization that allowed ROK armed forces to move to the city of Gwangju in order to ‘deal’ with the protesters).
55.
Snyder, Scott (2012a): ‘Expanding the US-South Korea Alliance’, in: ibid. (ed.): The US-South Korea Alliance. Meeting New Security Challenges. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1–20, p. 3.
56.
Menon (2007): 146.
57.
Menon (2007): 148.
58.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 50.
59.
IISS (2015): 267.
60.
Menon (2007): 156.
61.
Cossa and Oxley (2000): 76. For the 1994 nuclear crisis between the DPRK and the US see Sigal, Leon V. (1997): ‘The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding the Failure of the ‘Crime-and-Punishment’ Strategy’, Armscontrol, 1st May 1997, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/sigal (22.06.2015).
62.
Stueck (2012): 23.
63.
Suh (2007): 112.
64.
Scholars have noted that these US actions formed a generation of South Koreans that became very critical towards the US presence in the ROK (the so-called ‘386 generation’). See Snyder (2012a): 4 and Stueck (2012): 23.
65.
Ibid.: 25.
66.
Snyder (2012a): 4f. Other scholars have argued that due to its high institutionalisation it was actually unlikely that the US-ROK alliance would fall apart during this time. Thus, while the domestic situation created tensions, these might in their essence not have been existential ones. See Cha, Victor D. (2003): ‘America’s Alliances in Asia: The Coming ‘Identity Crisis’ with the Republic of Korea?’, in: Boose, Donald W./Hwang, Balbina Y./Morgan, Patrick/Scobell, Andrew (eds.): Recalibrating The US-Republic of Korea Alliance, May 2003, Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 15–34, p. 22ff, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB53.pdf (27.06.2015).
67.
Stueck (2012): 25.
68.
Snyder (2012a): 5.
69.
The talks involved the PRC, the US, the ROK and the DPRK.
70.
Snyder (2012a): 5.
71.
Ibid.
72.
Stueck (2012): 26.
73.
Cossa and Oxley (2000): 71f.
74.
For more on the Sunshine Policy see Kim, Keun-tae (2001): ‘The Korea-United States Relationship under Kim and Bush: A Common Approach to North Korea’, Bulletin of the Atlantic Council, Vol. 12, No. 3, May 2001, p. 3.
75.
Stueck (2012): 29.
76.
Suh, Jae-jung (2004): ‘Bound to Last? The US-Korea Alliance and analytical Eclecticism’, in: Suh, Jae-jung/Katzenstein, Peter/Carlson, Allen (eds.): Rethinking Security in East Asia. Identity, Power, and Efficiency. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 131–171, p. 136.
77.
Suh (2007): 165.
78.
Glosserman, Brad/Snyder, Scott (2015): The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash. East Asian Security and the United States. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 130.
79.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 63.
80.
Cossa and Oxley (2000): 63.
81.
Snyder (2012a): 6.
82.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 67.
83.
Ibid.: 130.
84.
Snyder (2012a): 7 and Snyder (2014): 67.
85.
Stueck (2012): 29.
86.
Bandow, Doug (2003): ‘Time for a Korean Divorce’, National Review, 6th January 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/205407/time-korean-divorce-doug-bandow (22.06.2015).
87.
Kim, Dong-shin (2003b): ‘The ROK-US Alliance: Where is It Headed?’, Strategic Forum, No. 197, April 2003, p. 2f.
88.
Nicholas Eberstadt cited in Shin, Gi-wook (2010): One Alliance, Two Lenses. US-Korea Relations in a New Era. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 79.
89.
Stueck (2012): 28f.
90.
Ibid.: 30.
91.
Ibid.
92.
Ibid.
93.
Rhem, Kathleen T. (2003): ‘US to Transfer 10 Missions to South Korean Military’, American Forces Press Service, 19th November 2003, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=27755 (22.06.2015).
94.
Snyder (2012a): 7f.
95.
Stueck (2012): 31. Note that Suh has argued that it was actually Seoul who favoured a speedy process that led to the transfer of command. See Suh (2007): 202.
96.
Stueck (2012): 32.
97.
Len, Samuel (2004): ‘South Korea Approves 3,000 Troops or Iraq’, The New York Times, 4th February 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/14/news/14iht-cobre_0.html (22.06.2015) and Funabashi, Yoichi (2003): ‘Japan, South Korea Agonize Over Troop Dispatch to Iraq’, Japan Focus, 10th December 2003, http://www.japanfocus.org/site/make_pdf/1593 (22.06.2015).
98.
Lee (2012): 14.
99.
Stueck (2012): 33.
100.
Cha, Victor D. (2009): ‘Outperforming Expectations: The US-ROK Alliance’, in: Campbell, Kurt M./Cha, Victor D./Ford, Lindsey/Schriver, Patel/Singh, Vikram J. (eds.): Going Global: The Future of the US-South Korea Alliance. Report of the Center for a New American Security, February 2009, pp. 7–32, p. 12, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09.pdf (30.06.2015).
101.
Ibid.: 15.
102.
Hanns Günter Hilpert noted that the dilemma the ROK is facing as a junior alliance partner of the US has been exemplary in terms of realist thinking. See Hilpert, Hanns G. (2007): ‘Südkoreas außenpolitische Dilemmata’, SWP-Studie, No. 6, February 2007, p. 21f, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-studien-de/swp-studien-detail/article/suedkoreas_aussenpolitische_dilemmata.html (23.06.2015).
103.
Snyder (2012a): 8.
104.
Choi, Kang (2013): ‘The ROK-US Alliance: Past, Present, and Future’, in: Baker, Carl/Glosserman, Brad (eds.): ‘Doing More and Expecting Less: The Future of US Alliances in the Asia Pacific’, CSIS Issues and Insights, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 41–54, p. 44.
105.
White House (2005): ‘Joint Declaration on the ROK-US Alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula’, Media Note by the US Department of State, 17th November 2005, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/57075.htm (23.06.2015).
106.
McCormack, Sean (2006): ‘United States and Republic of Korea Launch Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership’, Media Note by the US Department of State, 19th January 2006, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59447.htm (23.06.2015).
107.
Ibid.
108.
Stueck (2012): 32.
109.
Sanger, David E. (2006): ‘North Korea Say They Tested Nuclear Device’, The New York Times, 9th October 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/09korea.html?pagewanted=all (22.06.2015).
110.
Cloud, David S./Schmitt, Eric/Shanker, Thom (2006): ‘Rumsfeld Faces Growing Revolt by Retired Generals’, The New York Times, 13th April 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/washington/13cnd-military.html?_r=0 (22.06.2015).
111.
Meredith Woo cited in Kim (2014): 90.
112.
Williams, Brock R./Manyin, Mark E./Jurenas, Remy/Platzer, Michaela D. (2014): ‘The US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implementation’, CRS Report for Congress, 16th September 2014.
113.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 64f.
114.
Shin (2010): 208.
115.
Schriver, Randy (2009): ‘The US-ROK Alliance: Regional Challenges for an Evolving Alliance’, in: Campbell, Kurt M./Cha, Victor D./Ford, Lindsey/Schriver, Patel/Singh, Vikram J. (eds.): Going Global: The Future of the US-South Korea Alliance. Report of the Center for a New American Security, February 2009, pp. 33–56, p. 50, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09.pdf (30.06.2015).
116.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 68.
117.
Shin (2010): 208.
118.
Bush famously forgot to mention the ROK in a State of the Union address and instead thanked many other nations that provided much less support than South Korea. See Schriver (2009): 50.
119.
Lee cited in Kim, Yon-se (2007): ‘President Elect Vows Creative Diplomacy’, Korea Times, 19th December 2007, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2007/12/113_15851.html (22.06.2015).
120.
Lee cited in ibid.
121.
Lee cited in Arvizu, Alexander A. (2008): ‘A New Beginning for the US-South Korea Strategic Alliance’, Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, 23rd April 2008, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/04/103976.htm (22.06.2015).
122.
Lee cited in N.N. (2008): ‘Lee, Bush Agree to Forge ‘21st Century Alliance”, The Chosun Ilbo, 21st April 2008, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/04/21/2008042161010.html (22.06.2015).
123.
Singh, Vikram J./Patel, Nirav (2008): ‘US-South Korea Relations: Rekindling an Alliance Flame’, CNAS Policy Brief, April 2008, p. 3, http://www.cnas.org/publications/policy-briefs/u-s-south-korea-relations-rekindling-an-alliance-flame (22.06.2015).
124.
Lee (2012): 15.
125.
Choi (2013): 45.
126.
Obama, Barack/Lee, Myung-bak (2009): Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, 6th June 2009, emphasis added, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/joint-vision-alliance-united-states-america-republic-korea/p19643 (22.06.2015).
127.
Snyder (2012a): 11.
128.
Snyder (2014): 63 as well as Snyder, Scott (2008): ‘Sino-South Korea Strategic Partnership’, Korea Times, 28th May 2008, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/05/116_24904.html (26.06.2015).
129.
Snyder, Scott (2012b): ‘Will the Current Joint Vision Hold?’, in: ibid. (ed.): The US-South Korea Alliance. Meeting New Security Challenges. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 239–250, p. 242 & 245.
130.
Cha (2009): 18f.
131.
Young, Sun Ha (2009): ‘Assessment and Future Challenges of the US-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of ‘Coevolution”, EAI Security Net Commentary, 17th June 2009, http://eai.or.kr/type/panelView.asp?bytag=p&catcode=+&code=eng_report&idx=8354&page=7 (01.07.2015).
132.
See Snyder, Scott (2012c): ‘Overview’, in: ibid. (ed.): Global Korea. South Korea’s Contributions to International Security. New: Council of Foreign Relations, pp. 1–12 as well as Olbrich, Philipp/Shim, David (2012): ‘Südkorea als globaler Akteur: Internationale Beiträge in Entwicklung und Sicherheit’, GIGA Focus, No. 1, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publication/südkorea-als-globaler-akteur-internationale-beiträge-in-entwicklung-und-sicherheit (01.07.2015).
133.
Hwang (2012): 180.
134.
Cha (2009): 31, emphasis added.
135.
Campell, Kurt M./Ford, Lindsey/Patel, Nirav/Singh, Vikram (2009): ‘Going Global: The Future of the US-South Korea Alliance’, in: Campbell, Kurt M./Cha, Victor D./Ford, Lindsey/Schriver, Patel/Singh, Vikram J. (eds.): Going Global: The Future of the US-South Korea Alliance. Report of the Center for a New American Security, February 2009, pp. 57–83, p. 83, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09.pdf (30.06.2015).
136.
Lee (2012): 15.
137.
Ibid.: 16.
138.
Snyder, Scott (2012a): ‘Expanding the US-South Korea Alliance’, in: ibid. (ed.): The US-South Korea Alliance. Meeting New Security Challenges. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1–20, p. 10.
139.
Shepard, Kevin (2012): ‘Counterterrorism’, in: Snyder, Scott (ed.): The US-South Korea Alliance. Meeting New Security Challenges. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 43–69, p. 55.
140.
Finnegan, Michael (2012): ‘Postconflict Stabilization and Reconstruction’, in: Snyder, Scott (ed.): The US-South Korea Alliance. Meeting New Security Challenges. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 195–207, pp. 204f.
141.
The findings of the South Korean-led international investigation (next to the ROK also the US, the UK and Sweden were involved) of the incident are disputed and remain a matter of controversy. Despite some considerable efforts, the issue has not sufficiently been solved so far. North Korea was reportedly denied the right to view the evidence. Not only did Russian and Chinese experts, whose countries were not part of the investigation team (apparently because it was assumed that they had not supported findings that truly incriminated Pyongyang), heavily dispute the findings with challenging arguments (e.g. regarding the age and technology of the presented torpedo fragments), but also the Swedish delegation in the investigation team “distanced itself from the conclusion that the explosion was an act of sabotage by the North Koreans, while some prominent South Koreans went public with their doubts”. Murphy, R. Taggart (2014): Japan and the Shackles of the Past. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 339. Moreover, large segments of the South Korean population do not trust the official explanation (depending on the polls between 24 and 40 % with stronger shares among the young and better educated). See also the interesting extensive overview provided by Beal, Tim (2011): Crisis in Korea. America, China and the Risk of War. London: Pluto Books, pp. 79–113.
142.
McDevitt, Michael (2012): ‘The Maritime Relationship’, in: Snyder, Scott (ed.): The US-South Korea Alliance. Meeting New Security Challenges. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 21–41, p. 29.
143.
Ibid.: 30.
144.
Suh (2007): 196f.
145.
Shepard (2012): 57, emphasis added.
146.
Snyder (2012a): 1.
147.
Clinton, Hillary (2010): ‘America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific’, 28th October, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/150141.htm (08.11.2011).
148.
Cha, Victor D./Katz, Kathrin (2011): ‘South Korea in 2010’, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 54–63, p. 55ff.
149.
Manyin, Mark E./Chanlett-Avery, Emma/Nikitin, Mary B./Taylor, Mi Ae (2010): ‘US-South Korea Relations’, CRS Report for Congress, 3rd November 2010, 12ff.
150.
Yoo, Hyon Joo (2012): ‘Do Domestic Processes Prevent Effective Balancing? Alliance Policies by Japan and South Korea’, EAI Fellows Working Paper Series, No. 36, p. 13f, http://www.eai.or.kr/type/panelView.asp?bytag=p&code=eng_report&idx=11155&page=1 (01.07.2015). Indeed, when the US began to openly push in mid-2014 Seoul officially backed down because of China and in early 2015 for the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) missiles in South Korea, Beijing reportedly voiced strong criticism in talks with South Korean defence officials. See Snyder (2014): 71, Lee, Samuel Songhoon (2014): ‘Why wouldn’t S. Korea want US Missile Defenses?’, CBSNews, 3rd June 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-proposes-advanced-missile-defense-system-in-south-korea/ (01.07.2015) and AFP (2015): ‘China Voices Concern About US Missile Defence in South Korea’, Defense News, 4th February 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2015/02/04/china-voices-concern-us-missile-defense-south-korea/22869879/ (01.07.2015).
151.
Denmark, Abraham/Hosford, Zachary M. (2010): Securing South Korea. A Strategic Alliance for the 21st Century. Report by the Center for a New American Security, December 2010, p. 6, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_South%20Korea_DenmarkHosford.pdf (01.07.2015).
152.
Ibid.
153.
Cha and Katz (2011): 60f.
154.
Choi (2013): 46.
155.
Manyin, Mark E./Chanlett-Avery, Emma/Rinehart, Ian E./Nikitin, Mary B./Cooper, William H. (2014): ‘US-South Korea Relations’, CRS Report for Congress, 12th February 2014, p. 22.
156.
Rowland, Ashley (2012): ‘Korea-based US soldier gets 3 years in prison for rape conviction’, Stars and Stripes, 10. February 2012, http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/korea/korea-based-u-s-soldier-gets-3-years-in-prison-for-rape-conviction-1.168182 (22.06.2015). Already in 1992 Bush had altered the SOFA in order to allow the South Korean government to control US soldiers who committed crimes while being off duty. See Stueck (2012): 24.
157.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 91.
158.
Snyder (2012a): 11.
159.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 63.
160.
Menon (2007): 157, emphasis added.
161.
Denney, Stephen (2014): ‘South Korean Politics Drive OPCON Transfer’, The Diplomat, 28th October 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/south-korean-politics-drive-opcon-transfer/ (19.06.2015).
162.
Whyte, Leon (2015): ‘The Evolution of the US-South Korea Alliance’, The Diplomat, 13th June 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-evolution-of-the-u-s-south-korea-alliance/ (19.06.2015).
163.
Beal (2011): 14f, emphasis added.
164.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 50.
165.
The qualitative advantage has been plaguing the DPRK already at the time the Cold War ended and has only widened since then. Moreover, the quantitative Northern advantage has further shrunken since the economic progress of the RKO. See Suh (2004): 138f and Suh (2007): 46ff.
166.
Snyder (2014): 70.
167.
Park gained 51.6 % of the public votes, her challenger Moon Jae-in (former President Roh Moo-hyun’s chief of staff) followed with a very close 48 %. The election results again show the political division of the ROK and support the notion that the ROK-US alliance might again face a rocky period in the future. Also important in this context is the fact that Moon had a clear majority among South Koreans in their 20s (65.8 %), 30s (66.5 %) and 40s (55.6 %). Indeed, he probably had won the elections, if the voting rates of those in the younger age groups had not been considerably lower compared to those in the older cohorts (e.g. only 65.2 % of people in their 20s and 72.5 % in their 30s voted compared to 89.9 % in their 50s). For the numbers see Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 77.
168.
Ibid.: 70f.
169.
Harold, Scott W. (2013): ‘Obama-Park Summit a Critical Opportunity for the US-Korea Alliance’, CSIS PacNet, No. 25, 17th April 2013, p. 1, http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-25-obama-park-summit-critical-opportunity-us-korea-alliance (02.07.2015).
170.
White House (2013): Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America. 7th May 2013, emphasis added, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/07/joint-declaration-commemoration-60th-anniversary-alliance-between-republ (02.07.2015).
171.
Snyder (2014): 76f.
172.
Manyin et al. (2014): 3.
173.
Yoon, Sukjoon (2013a): ‘The ROK-US Alliance at Sixty: Vigorous, But Vigilance Required’, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 236, 22nd October 2013, p. 1, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/the-rok-us-alliance-sixty-vigorous-vigilance-required (02.07.2015).
174.
IISS (2015): 266.
175.
White House (2014): Press Conference with President Obama and President Park of the Republic of Korea, 25th April 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/04/25/press-conference-president-obama-and-president-park-republic-korea (02.07.2015) and Manyin et al. (2014): 4.
176.
See on the issue also Snyder (2014): 72ff.
177.
Park, Geun-hye (2011): ‘A New Kind of Korea. Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/northeast-asia/2011-09-01/new-kind-korea (02.07.2015). After she became president, Park initiated a Trustpolitik towards the ROK’s northern neighbour in order to increase stability on the peninsula. See Manyin et al. (2014): 9ff.
178.
Yoon (2013a): 1.
179.
Yonhap News Agency (2014): ‘US Presses S.Korea For More Defence Burden’, Korea Times, 05th January 2014, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/01/116_149174.html (02.07.2015) and Haggard, Stephen (2014): ‘The Alliance Burden Sharing Agreement’, Report from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 24th January 2014, http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=12816 (02.07.2015).
180.
Snyder (2014): 78.
181.
Manyin et al. (2014): 16.
182.
White House (2014).
183.
Manyin et al. (2014): 1.
184.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015).
185.
Choi (2013): 50.
186.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 143ff as well as White House (2014).
187.
Lee (2012): 16. See also Yeo, Andrew (2013): ‘China, Japan, South Korea Trilateral Cooperation: Implications for Northeast Asian Politics and Order’, Report of the East Asia Institute, 18th June 2013, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=165008 (07.07.2015).
188.
Park, June (2011): ‘Korea-Japan Relations Move Toward Co-evolution’, SERI Quarterly, January 2011, pp. 57–65, p. 58 as well as Snyder, Scott (2012d): ‘South Korean Public Opinion and the US-ROK Alliance’, CfR Asia Unbound, 17th October 2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/10/17/south-korean-public-opinion-and-the-u-s-rok-alliance/ (02.07.2015).
189.
Kerry, Robert E. (2013): ‘US-Japan Alliance Sparks Korean Grand Strategy Debate’, The Diplomat, 11th December 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/us-japan-alliance-sparks-korean-grand-strategy-debate/ (02.07.2015).
190.
Snyder (2014): 78.
191.
Harold (2013): 2.
192.
Kerry (2013).
193.
Bong, Youngshik/Kim, James J. (2014): ‘The ROK-US Summit: Why Beat a Dead Horse When You Can Move Mountains?’, CSIS PacNet, No. 27, 2nd April 2014, http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-27-rok-us-summit-why-beat-dead-horse-when-you-can-move-mountains (02.07.2015).
194.
Cossa and Oxley (2000): 83. Notably, reunification of Korea has been a joint goal of Washington and Seoul since the 2009 Joint Vision.
195.
Lee, Harry W.S. (2015): ‘America’s Frustration With South Korea’, The Diplomat, 10th March 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/americas-frustration-with-south-korea/ (02.07.2015).
196.
Lee (2011a): 173.
197.
Kim (2014): 84 & 87 as well as Scalpino, Robert A. (2001): ‘China and Korean Reunification – A Neighbor’s Concern’, in: Eberstadt, Nicholas/Ellings, Richard J. (eds.): Korea’s Future and the Great Powers. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, pp. 107–124, p. 124.
198.
Stueck (2012): 15. See also Kelly (2013).
199.
Kim (2014): 84.
200.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 77f.
201.
Essentially, Seoul’s version of the Hallstein Principle was borrowed from the foreign policy of West Germany and meant that just like Bonn’s approach towards East Berlin also Seoul would not establish diplomatic relations with states that recognised Pyongyang as being the legitimate representative of the Korean nation. In 1973, Seoul replaced the Hallstein Principle with the ‘6.23 Declaration’ in order to trade with countries from the communist block (the only exception being the DRPK and Cuba). See ibid.: 78.
202.
Kim (2014): 88.
203.
Chung (2011): 138f.
204.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 79.
205.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 77.
206.
Chung, Jae-ho (2009): ‘China’s ‘Soft Clash’ With South Korea: The History War and Beyond’, Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 468–483, p. 470.
207.
The chaebol have continued to be the most important source of Korean FDI to China. See Heo and Roehrig (2014): 81f.
208.
Holslag, Jonathan (2015): China’s Coming War With Asia. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 72.
209.
Kim (2014): 84f.
210.
Lee (2011a): 162.
211.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 132.
212.
Diplomatic Access (2015): ‘South Korea’, The Diplomat, 25th March 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/diplomatic-access-south-korea/ (02.07.2015). The FTA between South Korea and China was signed in June 2015.
213.
Kim (2014): 89.
214.
Williams, Martyn (2001): ‘Garlic Row Threatens Korean Cell-Phone Exports’, IT World Canada, 16th April 2001, http://www.itworldcanada.com/article/garlic-row-threatens-korean-cell-phone-exports/31303 (03.07.2015).
215.
Tsai, Ting-I (2005): ‘Korea Swallows Its Pride in Chinese Kimchi War’, The Asia Times, 22nd November 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/GK22Cb05.html (03.07.2015).
216.
Chung (2011): 141f and Kim (2014): 89.
217.
Kim, Young-ho (2012): ‘The New US Defense Strategic Guidance and its Implications for South Korean Security’, EAI Issue Briefing, 9th February 2012, p. 5, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=138017&lng=en (01.07.2015).
218.
Manyin et al. (2010): 11.
219.
Kim (2014): 97 and Heo and Roehrig (2014): 84f.
220.
Chung (2011): 140.
221.
Ibid.: 142.
222.
McDevitt (2012): 30f.
223.
Ibid.: 31.
224.
Beal (2011): 2.
225.
Kim (2014): 90.
226.
Personal discussion of the author with Bonnie Glaser at the SWP Berlin Conference on Asian Security 2010. Scalapino noted already in 2001 that it has to be assumend that Beijing is probably right when they complain about their limited influence on the Kim regime, but argues (probably correctly) that China has likely more influence in the DPRK than any other country. See Scalpino (2001): 119f.
227.
Kim (2014): 91.
228.
Scalpino (2001): 113.
229.
Chung (2011): 142.
230.
Holslag (2015): 72. Other have noted that Seoul and Beijing cooperated quite closely during the Six Party Talks. See Chung (2011): 137.
231.
Lee, Tae-horn (2011b): ‘China Agree to Annual Defense Talks’, Korea Times, 15th July 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/05/116_90989.html (01.07.2015).
232.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 84.
233.
Chung (2011): 138f.
234.
Snyder (2008).
235.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 77f.
236.
Menon (2007): 178, emphasis added.
237.
Manyin et al. (2010): 10.
238.
Kim (2014): 92.
239.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 78.
240.
Chung (2011): 139.
241.
Kim (2014): 93.
242.
Ibid.
243.
Chung (2011): 145.
244.
McDevitt (2012): 32 and Chung (2011): 144.
245.
McDevitt (2012): 34.
246.
Denmark and Hosford (2010): 14.
247.
See for instance the comment of Qin Gang, then the spokesperson of the PRC’s Foreign Ministry, quoted in Chung (2011): 147f.
248.
Jung Ho-sub cited in McDevitt (2012): 34f.
249.
Yoo, Hyon-joo (2009): ‘Is a Strategic Alignment Possible for South Korea and China?’, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 37, 25th June 2009, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/strategic-alignment-possible-south-korea-and-china (07.07.2015) and Han, Suk-hee (2012): ‘South Korea Seeks to Balance Relations With China and the United States. Current Issues in US-ROK Relations’, CfR Report, November 2012, http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/south-korea-seeks-balance-relations-china-united-states/p29447 (07.07.2015).
250.
Kim (2014): 93.
251.
Mundy, Simon (2015): ‘Naval Base Divides South Korean Holiday Island’, The Financial Times, 21st June 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c6504bf4-04f9-11e5-9627-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3eq0TV5d2 (03.07.2015).
252.
Snyder and Bun cited in Kim (2014): 93.
253.
McDevitt (2012): 38.
254.
Schriver (2009): 41.
255.
Chung (2011): 146.
256.
Lee (2011b).
257.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 83.
258.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 78 & 80.
259.
Lee, Seong-hyon (2013): ‘Will China’s Soft Power Strategy on South Korea Succeed?’, CSIS PacNet, No. 23, 8th April 2013, http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-23-will-chinas-soft-power-strategy-south-korea-succeed (07.07.2015).
260.
Chung (2011): 145.
261.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 87.
262.
Manyin et al. (2014): 19 & 21.
263.
Chang, je-soon (2013): ‘Park Says to Unveil ‘Northeast Asia Peace’ Initiative During Visit to US’, Yonhap News Agency, 24th April 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/04/24/94/0301000000AEN20130424013800315F.HTML (03.07.2015).
264.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 87.
265.
Manyin et al. (2014): 21.
266.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 85f.
267.
Chung (2011): 144.
268.
Yoon, Sukjoon (2013b): ‘Why did South Korea Need to Revise the KADIZ?’, CSIS PacNet, No. 87B, 10th December 2013, http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-87b-why-did-south-korea-need-revise-kadiz (07.07.2015).
269.
Yonhap News Agency (2013): ‘China Says ‘No Dispute’ With S.Korea Over Ieoda in New Air Zone’, Global Post, 25th November 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131125/china-says-no-dispute-s-korea-over-ieodo-new-air-zone (03.07.2015).
270.
Cook, Malcom (2014): ‘Northeast Asia’s Turbulent Triangle: Korea-China-Japan Relations’, Report of the Lowy Institute, January 2014, part. p. 5, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/northeast-asias-turbulent-triangle-korea-china-japan-relations (07.07.2015).
271.
Kim (2014): 97.
272.
Chung (2009): 472.
273.
Chung (2011): 142.
274.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 84.
275.
Snyder (2014): 74.
276.
Ibid.: 79.
277.
Ibid.
278.
Ibid.: 79f.
279.
Ibid.: 80.
280.
Of course, given the likely costs of a Korean reunification, Seoul wants to avoid an early economic collapse of the northern regime, which would prevent a slow modernization and would force a united Korea to almost overnight amass huge funds to develop the northern territories and increase the living standards of the people living there within an acceptable timeframe. At least temporary such a development would likely be at the expense of the South’s living standards, which have been rising for many decades now. Obviously, this creates a conflict of objectives: Every increase of the DPRK’s living standards consolidates the power of the Kim-regime and might lead to further military threats, essentially making reunification harder to achieve. On the other hand, letting the regime derail might foster the collapse of the North, which could either lead to more aggression of the failing state’s leadership (i.e. by trying to consolidate ranks with starting a war, that is likely going to be lost yet could yield some further strategic options for the nuclear-armed regime). Of course, if the regime topples quickly enough and war can be avoided this could at the same time also open a window for Korean reunification—at least if an agreement between Beijing and Washington could be found regarding the future geopolitical state of a united Korea. Most certainly a united Korea had to considerably reduce its military profile for many decades, as the money would be needed for modernising the north. While Beijing might gladly accept such a development, this would deprive Washington of an important military ally to contain China. Thus, there has been no easy choice for Seoul vis-à-vis the DPRK, which makes the continuation of the current situation so attractive for South Korean policymakers. Only a serious strategic rapprochement between the US and the PRC could change the regional dynamics sufficiently enough to allow for a collapse of the DPRK and reunification of the two Koreas to take place. This is probably the reason why Park has consistently called for such a joint Sino-US vision at least for Northeast Asia to get started.
281.
Chung (2009): 472. Subsequent ratings have shown that the ‘history war’ was indeed a real game changer in South Korean public perception, which benefitted the US. See ibid.: 473.
282.
Sutter, Robert (2014): ‘China and America: The Great Divergence?’, Orbis, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 358–377, p. 372.
283.
This might also be seen as a hint towards the Kim regime to closer follow Beijing’s lead if it does not want to become a ‘sideline player’ in China’s Korea policy.
284.
Already in 2008, both countries had a signed such a swap agreement, which was, however, limited to 200 billion yuan. See Yongding, Yu (2015): ‘How Far Can Renminbi Internationalization Go?’, in: Eichengreen, Barry/Kawai, Masahiro (eds.): Renminbi Internationalization. Achievements, Prospects, and Challenges. Tokyo and Washington: ADB Institute/Brookings Institution Press, pp. 53–81, p. 59.
285.
Xinhua (2015): ‘S. Korea Decides to Join China-proposed AIIB’, Xinhuanet, 26th March 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/26/c_134100296.htm (07.07.2015).
286.
Jeon, Dong-hyun (2015): ‘Politischer Hintergrundbericht Korea’, Report of the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, 30th July 2014, http://www.hss.de/fileadmin/media/downloads/Berichte/140801_Korea_Gipfel.pdf (07.07.2015).
287.
Snyder, Scott (2012e): ‘Can Beijing and Seoul Become Strategic Partners?’, The Diplomat, 06th July 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/can-beijing-and-seoul-become-strategic-partners/ (07.07.2015).
288.
Snyder (2014): 79.
289.
Manyin et al. (2014): 12.
290.
Manyin et al. (2010): 10.
291.
Lee, Harry W.S. (2015): ‘America’s Frustration With South Korea’, The Diplomat, 10th March 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/americas-frustration-with-south-korea/ (02.07.2015).
292.
Kai, Jin (2014): ‘The Weakest Link: How China Seeks to Destabilize the US-ROK-Japan Triangle’, The Diplomat, 10th February 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-weakest-link-how-china-seeks-to-destabilize-the-us-rok-japan-triangle/ (07.07.2015).
293.
Lee (2015).
294.
Leaf, Paul J. (2014): ‘Promise and Potential Peril: Japan’s Military Normalisation’, The Diplomat, 04th September 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/promise-and-potential-periljapans-military-normalisation/ (26.05.2015).
295.
Kim (2014): 99.
296.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 148.
297.
Yoon, Sukjoon (2015): ‘What South Korea’s New Ambassador in China Must Do’, The Diplomat, 10th March 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/what-south-koreas-new-ambassador-to-china-must-do/ (07.07.2015).
298.
Panda, Ankit (2015): ‘South Korea, China Trade Barbs Over THAAD’, The Diplomat, 18th March 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/south-korea-china-trade-barbs-over-thaad/ (07.07.2015).
299.
Yi, Whan-woo (2015): ‘China May Retaliate for THAAD Deployment’, Korea Times, 29th June 2015, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/06/180_181807.html (07.07.2015).
300.
Tiezzi, Shannon (2015): ‘China and South Korea’s Lagging Military Ties’, The Diplomat, 13th May 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-and-south-koreas-lagging-military-ties/ (07.07.2015).
301.
NATO (2013): The Republic of Korea: A Partner in Tackling Global Security Challenges, 11th April 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_99791.htm?selectedLocale=en (07.07.2015).
302.
See US Census Bureau (2013): The 2012 Statistical Abstract. http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/foreign_commerce_aid/foreign_aid.html
(17.03.2015) as well as USAID (2015): US Overseas Loans and Grants, https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/data/explore.cfm (24.03.2015).
303.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 84.
304.
Kim (2014): 94.
305.
Menon (2007): 163.
306.
Ibid.: 164f.
307.
See for instance Kim, Choong-nam (2003a): ‘Changing Korean Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Era and the US-ROK Alliance’, Asia Pacific Issues, No. 67, April 2003, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/changing-korean-perceptions-post-cold-war-era-and-us-rok-alliance (27.06.2015).
308.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 62.
309.
Menon (2007): 166.
310.
Ibid.: 167.
311.
Heo and Roehrig (2014): 62.
312.
Cha and Katz (2011): 60f.
313.
Snyder (2012e).
314.
Cha and Katz (2011): 61.
315.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 76ff.
316.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 90.
317.
Snyder (2012e).
318.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 85.
319.
Chung (2011): 141.
320.
N.N. (2009): ‘More than 1 Million Foreigners Live in Korea’, The Chosunilbo, 6th August 2009, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/08/06/2009080600243.html (08.07.2015).
321.
Rozman, Gilbert (2014): ‘China-South Korea-US Relations’, in: ibid. (ed.): Asia’s Slippery Slope: Triangular Tensions, Identity Gaps, Conflicting Regionalism, and Diplomatic Impasse Toward North Korea. pp. 43–53, p. 50, http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/gilbert_rozman_ch_1.pdf (07.07.2015).
322.
McDevitt (2012): 38.
323.
Ibid.
324.
Suh (2007): 204. Suh has shown that this understanding of South Korean perceptions can fit into a realist ontology. He moreover noted that the two identities are not necessarily antagonistic, but that a specific strategic context can pit them against each other. Thus, while a perceived threat from the DRPK might strengthen the role of the ‘alliance identity’ (analogous to Walt’s Balance of Threat theory), the collective identity of Koreans as a unitary, yet politically divided Korean people might strengthen in case inter-Korean understanding progresses, which might undermine the importance of the alliance for South Koreans once US actions against the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang are perceived as threatening to Koreans as one people. The linking of realism and national identity by Suh also connects to Morgenthau’s and Stein’s discussion of national character and national moral touched on in Chaps. 2 and 3. The relationship between realists’ power assumptions and the relevance of national identity is further explained in Nau, Henry R. (2002): At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
325.
Shin’s analysis in his interesting book the impact of South Korea’s divided identity on the alliance with the US, yet also showed that even leaders with a ‘nationalist identity’ essentially supported the continuation of the alliance. See Shin (2010): 205.
326.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 72. Other evidence indicates that even though the South Korean media’s tone overall seems to be much more negative toward the bilateral relationship with the US compared to the US media’s coverage of the ties between Washington and Seoul, the political affiliation of the South Korean media quite strongly influences how and what is reported on the US-ROK alliance (leading to disparate and contrasting views on the same events). See Shin, Gi-wook (2011): ‘The Media and the US-ROK Alliance: The South Korean Case’, EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper, May 2011, http://www.eai.or.kr/type/panelView.asp?idx=10021&code=eng_report&bytag=p&catcode= (01.07.2015).
327.
Stueck (2012): 36.
328.
Hwang (2012): 189.
329.
Menon (2007): 178 and Kim (2012): 5.
330.
Lee (2012): 22.
331.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 1 and Choi (2013): 48.
332.
Lee, Ji-young (2010): ‘The US-ROK Alliance and China: Beyond the Sinking of the Cheonan’, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 62, 28th May 2010, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/us-rok-alliance-and-china-beyond-sinking-cheonan (07.07.2015).
333.
Kim (2014): 94f.
334.
Glosserman and Snyder (2015): 87.

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Center for Global Studies, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Enrico Fels

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Fels, E. (2017). The Republic of Korea: No Longer a Small ‘Shrimp Among Whales’. In: Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific?. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45689-8_10

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45689-8_10
Published: 04 November 2016
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
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