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A Dual-Role Account of Ceteris Paribus Laws

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Philosophy of Science in Practice

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 379))

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Abstract

Issues concerning the meaning and legitimacy of a ceteris paribus (cp) law statement have been heatedly debated in recent philosophy of science. I argue that a main inadequacy of some major attempts to resolve those issues derives from the failure to accommodate both the objective and subjective aspects of making a cp-law statement. I offer a dual-role account to address this inadequacy. This semantic inquiry exploits empirical studies on the actual linguistic practice of scientists in various professional communities, with the aim to better expose what a cp-law statement means and what the nature of science may be.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cartwright (1983), Hempel (1988), and Joseph (1980), etc., are among those who construe laws in physics as being implicitly imbued with cp-phrases. Earman, Roberts and Smith describe this view as accepting a thesis of “CP all the way down” (2002, p. 278).

  2. 2.

    Of course, this assertion is also based on a further assumption of individual taste and other individual-related factors’ being held constant.

  3. 3.

    Earman et al. (2002, p. 296).

  4. 4.

    This example comes from Earman et al. (2002).

  5. 5.

    A similar charge can be raised to Lipton (1999), who holds a similar view of a cp-law where a cp-law statement refers to an underlying disposition.

  6. 6.

    These examples are also cited and discussed in Horn (2001).

  7. 7.

    C.f. Horn (2001).

  8. 8.

    I thank Joel Stocker for pointing out this to me.

  9. 9.

    Note that “expose” may be too strong here. Hedging points out or highlights the structural need to claim something novel while also treating tradition with respect: It is a concession to what has come before while cautiously challenging the boundaries of that tradition. It is, therefore, inherently ironic, not only in its oedipal striving to overthrow the father figure while not alienating the birth-mother, but also because it is utterly formulaic—and so conservative—in its expressions of obeisance to the preexisting master paradigm (i.e., father figure). Thanks to Joel Stocker for this point.

  10. 10.

    This example comes from Hyland (1998, p. 4).

  11. 11.

    This example also comes from Hyland (1998, p. 4).

  12. 12.

    See Su (2005) for making this claim about some conditional statements based on a study on Chinese conditional using naturally occurring conversational data.

  13. 13.

    This example comes from Hyland (1998, p. 4).

  14. 14.

    My illustration will be brief here. A more complete treatment of Lakoff’s analysis of hedges can be found in Su and Cheng (2011).

  15. 15.

    The assessment here will be brief. The purpose is to expose its contribution and limitation in light of a dual-role account. For a more thorough examination of Morreau’s semantic account of cp, please see Cheng (2008).

  16. 16.

    See Morreau (1999, p. 166).

  17. 17.

    By “absent”, it could mean either absent in reality or absent in a model. Morreau does not specify which in his paper. Supposedly it means in a model here, since in reality certain relevant factors cannot be made absent without changing the very essence of an object figuring in a law being considered. For instance, when evaluating Newton’s second law of motion and an instance involves the movement of an electron, it is clear that the requirement that the property of being subject to a magnetic force be absent cannot be met in reality.

  18. 18.

    This is a somewhat simplified characterization of Morreau’s position, which does not say clearly enough about how to handle different parameters with dissimilar weightings in this comparative reading. For a more detailed discussion, see Cheng (2008), especially Section II.

  19. 19.

    Another major type of a generic sentence is a habitual, which describes some habit or custom, such as “Mary drinks coffee in the morning”. Both types of sentences are similar in making claims about generalizations, but different in the kind of generalizations they make.

  20. 20.

    Nickel (2010, p. 12).

  21. 21.

    Nickel (2010, p. 13).

  22. 22.

    Nickel (2010, p. 15).

  23. 23.

    Nickel (2010, p. 16).

  24. 24.

    Nickel (2010, p. 16).

  25. 25.

    Nickel (2010, p. 16).

  26. 26.

    An explanation that Nickel (2010, p. 4) accuses Pietroski and Rey (1995) of failing to offer in their semantic account of the non-vacuity of cp-laws.

  27. 27.

    Strevens writes: “I do not thereby rule out the possibility that there is something to the softening and pragmatic approaches—a hedge might have more than one function” (2014, p. 12).

  28. 28.

    Earlier drafts were presented at International Conference on Analytic Philosophy, Yonsei University, South Korea, a NTHU-Kyoto philosophy joint workshop, and International Conference on the Philosophy of Nancy Cartwright, National Tsing-Hua University in Taiwan. I thank the audiences for helpful feedback. Joel Stocker, Hsiang-Ke Chao, Szu-Ting Chen, as well as two anonymous referees, provided detailed and constructive comments, which significantly improve the quality and readability of this paper. The completion of this paper is made possible by a research grant from the Ministry of Science and Technology in Taiwan (102-2410-H-010-005-MY2).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Yang Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan

    Kai-Yuan Cheng

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  1. Economics, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu, Taiwan

    Hsiang-Ke Chao

  2. Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom

    Julian Reiss

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Cheng, KY. (2017). A Dual-Role Account of Ceteris Paribus Laws. In: Chao, HK., Reiss, J. (eds) Philosophy of Science in Practice. Synthese Library, vol 379. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45532-7_6

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