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Formal Analysis of Security Properties on the OPC-UA SCADA Protocol

  • Maxime PuysEmail author
  • Marie-Laure Potet
  • Pascal Lafourcade
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9922)

Abstract

Industrial systems are publicly the target of cyberattacks since Stuxnet [1]. Nowadays they are increasingly communicating over insecure media such as Internet. Due to their interaction with the real world, it is crucial to prove the security of their protocols. In this paper, we formally study the security of one of the most used industrial protocols: OPC-UA. Using ProVerif, a well known cryptographic protocol verification tool, we are able to check secrecy and authentication properties. We find several attacks on the protocols and provide countermeasures.

Keywords

Transmission Control Protocol Security Property Formal Verification Message Authentication Code Stream Transmission Control Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work has been partially funded by the CNRS PEPS SISC ASSI 2016, the LabEx PERSYVAL-Lab (ANR-11-LABX-0025), the ARAMIS project (PIA P3342-146798) and “Digital trust” Chair from the University of Auvergne Foundation.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maxime Puys
    • 1
    Email author
  • Marie-Laure Potet
    • 1
  • Pascal Lafourcade
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.VerimagUniversity of Grenoble AlpesSaint-Martin-D’hèresFrance
  2. 2.LIMOSUniversity of Clermont AuvergneAubièreFrance

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