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Using Process Models in System Assurance

  • Richard HawkinsEmail author
  • Thomas Richardson
  • Tim Kelly
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9922)

Abstract

When creating an assurance justification for a critical system, the focus is often on demonstrating technical properties of that system. Complete, compelling justifications also require consideration of the processes used to develop the system. Creating such justifications can be an onerous task for systems using complex processes and highly integrated tool chains. In this paper we describe how process models can be used to automatically generate the process justifications required in assurance cases for critical systems. We use an example case study to illustrate an implementation of the approach. We describe the advantages that this approach brings for system assurance and the development of critical systems.

Keywords

Argument Structure System Argument Technical Argument Argument Model Argument Pattern 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was part funded by the European Union FP7 D-MILS project (www.d-mils.org).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceThe University of YorkYorkUK

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