Abstract
When Wittgenstein writes that we must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place, he is often read as advocating a commonsense view of the world (PI 109). As a result, the role or purpose of grammatical investigation becomes one of returning us to ordinary, everyday (ungrounded) activities. No twentieth century philosopher is further from a commonsense view of the world, and yet no philosopher comes into less conflict with common sense than Wittgenstein. It is important to get a clear view of this paradox in order to appreciate the complexity and subtlety of his art of investigation. Wittgenstein responds to Moore’s defence of common sense in On Certainty. He questions and challenges propositional claims with complex grammatical investigations that emphasize the use of language and ways of acting. His grammatical investigations begin where Moore’s philosophy ends, and demonstrate that philosophy is a never-ending activity.
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Notes
- 1.
The following convention has been adopted throughout this chapter, except when quoting directly from others: ‘common sense ’ is a noun and ‘commonsense’ is an adjective.
- 2.
On Certainty also responds to Moore ’s ‘Proof of an External World’. This chapter focuses on Moore’s ‘Defence of Common Sense’.
- 3.
Rhees concurs with Anscombe and von Wright in this general assessment. According to Phillips , ‘Rhees says Wittgenstein ‘used to speak of Moore ’s “Defence of Common Sense” again and again, years before that visit to Malcolm in 1949.’ He is not questioning the point that his 1949 discussions with Malcolm about Moore’s “defence of common sense ” interested him, particularly at the period he was writing the notes in On Certainty . Rhees’s point is rather that his 1949 conversation with Malcolm stimulated Wittgenstein to take up thoughts which were not new to him and to develop them further’ (Phillips 2003: 151). There are also conflicting reports concerning Wittgenstein’s interest in and assessment of Moore’s philosophical work . See, for example , Monk 1990: 262.
- 4.
Although making this claim, Stroll also warns that ‘one must, of course, not go overboard in stressing this difference’ (Stroll 1994: 7).
- 5.
This study agrees with Stroll ’s characterization of the significance of On Certainty but for very different reasons.
- 6.
Anscombe writes of her impression that these sheets were written in Vienna where he stayed from Christmas to March 1949–1950 (although she acknowledges that she is unable to account for this impression) (Preface OC).
- 7.
This claim refers to Wittgenstein and not to subsequent editors.
- 8.
Wittgenstein refers to all of these examples in On Certainty .
- 9.
These comments conclude the first major section of his paper. In Section II, Moore continues to discuss physical and mental facts, and the analysis of propositions involving sense-datum.
- 10.
He appears to beg the question and move in circles.
- 11.
It is possible to doubt whether one is a human being, or whether there exists at present a living human body which is my body. See, for example , Primo Levi ’s If this is a Man and Elaine Scarry ’s The Body in Pain. War and torture both involve the loss of meaningful language .
- 12.
It is important to note that Wittgenstein’s work does not end in nihilism or despair.
- 13.
For further discussion see Chap. 6
- 14.
Wittgenstein’s investigations begin and remain in the world. They do not merely facilitate a return to common sense . (For further discussion see Chap. 1.)
- 15.
On another occasion, Wittgenstein claims that he cannot say that he has good grounds for the opinion that cats do not grow on trees or that he has a father and a mother (OC 282).
- 16.
Also see OC 413, 441, 450, 460, and 461.
- 17.
Also see PI 112–114 and PI 134.
- 18.
He also writes that ‘when language -games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts, the meanings of words change’ (OC 65). For further discussion see OC 256.
- 19.
Also see OC 498 quoted above.
- 20.
Kraus ’s last poem , published in Die Fackel in October 1933, describes the death of language during the rise of Nazism. The metaphor he uses is that of the bedrock breaking. The original phrase is ‘die Erde krachte’ [the earth cracked] (Zohn , 1971: 127–8). It has also been translated as ‘the bedrock broke’. Wittgenstein would have been aware of such imagery , as well as the rising meaninglessness of language in Germany during the 1930s. Such events were not (and are not) inconceivable.
- 21.
For a similar philosophical move see PI 308.
- 22.
This is a modified translation of PI 599 from Kuusela , 2008: 247.
- 23.
See, for example ,‘There exists at present a living human body , which is my body’ (OC 244, 257, 258); ‘Ever since my body was born it has been either in contact with, or not far from the surface of the earth’ (OC 93, 94, 106, 108, 111, 117, 218, 222, 226, 238, 264, 269, 286, 327, 661, 662, 667); ‘The earth has existed also for many years before my body was born’ (OC 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 102,182, 188, 190, 209, 210, 231–237, 259, 262, 327); and ‘I am a human being’ (OC 4, 622).
- 24.
We are often bewitched by such words (OC 435).
- 25.
Also see OC 325, 389, 462, 520, and 521.
- 26.
Also see OC 90.
- 27.
He also writes, ‘When on the other hand, you granted me that a man can’t know whether the other person has pain, you do not wish to say that as a matter of fact people didn’t know, but that it made no sense to say they knew (and therefore no sense to say they didn’t know). If therefore in this case you use the term ‘conjecture’ or ‘believe’ you don’t use it as opposed to ‘know’. That is, you did not state that knowing was a goal which you could not reach, and that you have to be contented with conjecturing; rather there is no goal in this game’ (BB 54). Wittgenstein makes a similar point in response to solipsism. (See AWL 23, AWL 25.)
- 28.
Also see OC 7, 116, 174, 204, 344, 395, 476, 501, 524, and 601.
- 29.
Also see OC 279, 410.
- 30.
Also see OC 148, 204, 232, 395, 431 and 651.
- 31.
For additional remarks see OC 7, 14, 61, 110, 174, 204, 229, 232, 395, 426–238, 476, 501, 559, and 641.
- 32.
This demonstrates how Wittgenstein’s investigations come full circle. There is no sense of resignation or denial because philosophy leaves everything as it is.
- 33.
‘Plotinus observes that we think we know what time is until we begin to think about it in depth. Augustine ’s discussion of time contains many echoes of philosophical debates among Platonists, Aristotelians and Stoics, but is remarkable for its affinity with the Sceptical or ‘Academic’ position that for the human mind the question is unanswerable’ (Chadwick , 1998: 130–131).
- 34.
For further discussion see BB 106–9.
- 35.
See, for example , Z 111, Z 114, LWPP I 830, LPP 240, LPP 241 and LPP 244.
- 36.
For related discussions see PI 65, PI 78, and PI 610.
- 37.
‘Moore chooses precisely a case in which we all seem to know the same as he, and without being able to say how’ (OC 84).
- 38.
For further discussion, see the conclusion.
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Savickey, B. (2017). Ungrounded Ways of Acting. In: Wittgenstein’s Investigations. Nordic Wittgenstein Studies, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45310-1_7
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