Abstract
Among philosophers of space and time, two aspects of Newton’s ontology of space have seldom been questioned: first, that Newton qualifies as a substantivalist, since he reckons space to be an independently existing substance or entity (see §1.1.1); and second, that Newton’s views were deeply influenced by his seventeenth century Neoplatonic predecessors, especially Henry More, whose ontology grounds the existence of space upon an incorporeal being, i.e., God or World Spirit. While the majority of the interpretations of Newton’s spatiotemporal ontology in the twentieth century supported these conclusions, a number of important investigations over the past several decades have nonetheless begun to challenge even these ostensibly safe assumptions. Among the most important of these reappraisals can be found in the work of Howard Stein (e.g., 1967, 2002) and Robert DiSalle (e.g., 2002, 2006), who both conclude that the content and function of Newton’s concept of absolute space should be kept separate from the question of Newton’s alleged commitment to substantivalism. More controversially, Stein (2002) further contends that Newton’s natural philosophy treats space as akin to a basic fact or consequence of any existing thing, a view categorized as one of the more epistemologically-oriented, third-way alternatives in Chap. 1, i.e., the definitional conception of space, and therefore non-substantivalist. A related, albeit much more nuanced, interpretation that parts company with traditional substantivalism may also be evident in an influential article by J. E. McGuire (1978a), who argues that space for Newton is “the general condition required for the existence of any individual substance” (1978a, 15). As regards the second of our traditional assumptions associated with Newton’s spatial ontology, Stein (2002, 269) forthrightly rejects any Neoplatonic content, whereas McGuire’s (1983) essay conjectures that, though “Platonic in character”, the primary influence on Newton’s ontology is “Descartes’ Meditations, rather than the eclecticism of Renaissance Neo-Platonism, of which we find little evidence in De gravitatione” (1983, 152).
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Notes
- 1.
In contrast, we will argue that Cambridge Neoplatonism and elements of the (often similar) Gassendi-Charleton philosophy are the primary influence on Newton’s ontology of space. McGuire also comments on “the question of Henry More’s influence on Newton’s doctrine of extended space”, concluding “that it is minimal in the period from 1664 to 1668” (1983, 152; where the four year span, 1664–1668, covers the then accepted period for the composition of Newton’s major treatise on the ontology of space, De gravitatione—see footnote 10 on the recent dating of this work). However, McGuire later conceded “that a possible influence” on Newton’s concept of emanation (see §2.2) “is Henry More” (1990, 105); and, in his most recent work (2000, 2007; McGuire and Slowik 2012), he successfully pursues a number of Neoplatonic threads in Newton’s natural philosophy. Nevertheless, these post-1990 reappraisals fall short of openly retracting McGuire’s earlier demotion of the Cambridge Neoplatonist influence, and thus the justified authority of McGuire’s pre-1990 work is likely to give a misleading impression of his evolving conception of these issues (if examined in isolation from the later output). In private discussion, McGuire has indeed confirmed this potential mischaracterization of his overall Newton scholarship, adding that the new dating of De gravitatione provided a crucial stimulus to the evolution of his views. Finally, unless otherwise noted, all references to Neoplatonism refer to the seventeenth century varieties then popular in England.
- 2.
To be specific, private correspondence with DiSalle (Princeton, Spring 2009) seemed to support the weak third-way interpretation, but a presentation at the 2012 meeting of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science (King’s College, Halifax) by DiSalle, entitled, “Transcendental Philosophy from a Newtonian Perspective”, appeared to favor the strong third-way reading (to be discussed below). Huggett’s analysis of DiSalle (2008, 404–405) would seem to side with the strong interpretation as well, since DiSalle claims that Newton’s concept of absolute space does not allow the material world to possess different, but uniform, positions or velocities (see Chap. 6 for these discussions). Consequently, while DiSalle’s work (2002, 2006) is open to a weak third-way construal, it is unclear if that is the position he accepts.
- 3.
Substantivalism, as noted in §1.1.1, is a complex topic, with various interpretations spotlighting different aspects of the concept. However, if forced to give a quick synopsis of the conclusions of this chapter, then Newton’s ontology of space is substantivalist if one defines substantivalism as an entity that can exist in the absence of all matter; but, Newton’s space is not substantivalist if that concept denotes an entity that is independent of all other entities—since, as the traditional accounts have correctly insisted, Newton holds that space necessarily depends on God. Additional discrepancies with the modern approaches to substantivalism will be discussed in Parts II and III. Furthermore, while a strong third-way, non-substantivalism fails (since Newton’s space is deeply metaphysical and theological), a weak third-way, non-substantivalism is nonetheless a consistent interpretation (although difficult to corroborate). Finally, as noted in Chap. 1, the pairing of Stein and DiSalle under the “definitional” label is conjectural, since Stein’s views on space are open to interpretation; but, they are clearly quite similar in their deflationist approach to spatial ontology, hence the common pairing seems warranted.
- 4.
Overall, Newton’s concept of substance is difficult to accurately fix relative to his contemporaries and predecessors, largely because he seldom provides any details when employing this term. The same is true as regards his employment of “affection” and “attribute”, which seem to denote a property that is necessary for a being’s existence, whereas an “accident” (such as red, triangular, etc.) is not. Newton refers to space as an attribute/affection of all being, while denying that it is an accident, thus (apparently) demonstrating its necessity for all being (see also footnote 20). For these metaphysical categories, see, once again, Bolton (1998), as well as Carriero (1990) for more on Newton’s use of the term “affection”.
- 5.
In a later writing, Newton does refer to infinite space and time as “modes of existence in all beings, & unbounded modes & consequences of the existence of a substance that which is really necessary & substantially Omnipresent & Eternal” (Koyré and Cohen 1962, 96–97; see, also, §2.4.1). The use of the term “consequences” in this passage might be taken to support the strong third-way, non-substantivalist interpretation—yet, it is used in conjunction with the basic ontological term, “modes”, which denotes the specific way in which a being manifests a general property (e.g., circular is a mode of shape). Consequently, it is not clear whether this passage actually assists or harms Stein’s third-way reading.
- 6.
The term “emanative effect” only appears three times in De grav. Besides Stein’s favorite of these three quotations (i.e., “space is an emanative effect of the first existing being”), there are: “[space] is as it were an emanative effect of God and an affection of every kind of being” (N 21); and, “space is eternal in duration and immutable in nature because it is the emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being” (26).
- 7.
In his depiction of the traits of infinite extension, More adds that “it is necessary that it be immobile. Which is celebrated as the most excellent attribute of First Being in Aristotle” (1995, 58). In the Metaphysics (CWA 1071b 1-1071b 10), Aristotle concludes that “it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance. For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible”.
- 8.
While providing a brief synopsis of the natural philosophy of the Cambridge Neoplatonists is difficult, the central feature is probably the rejection of a purely mechanical account of the material world (i.e., that all material phenomena can be completely explained through the interactions and impact of inert matter in motion). Rather, the Neoplatonists appealed to God, or spirit, as an active agent, or foundational basis, for all natural phenomena (see, e.g., MacKinnon’s summary in More 1925, 315). Concerning the details of Charleton’s natural philosophy, which is decidedly Gassendian at least as regards space, an incorporeal basis for space is posited, and thus it is strikingly similar to Cambridge Neoplatonism on this particular issue, although there are important differences on many other issues.
- 9.
McGuire (2007), following (1990, 105), likewise connects his earlier “ontic dependence” hypothesis with efficient causation: “It seems evident that emanative causation, as Newton understands it, reflects this relationship between God’s necessary existence and space’s uncreated nature: space exists always because God exists necessarily. Moreover, since the notion of an eternal and efficient cause does not necessarily involve activity, production, creation, or active efficacy between it and its effect, the distinction between ontic and causal dependence essentially collapses” (2007, 123–124).
- 10.
More is less forthcoming on the uncreated status of space in his earlier The Immortality of the Soul, although it is strongly implied in his discussion of emanative causation: “By an Emanative Cause is understood such a Cause as merely by Being, no other activity or causality interposed, produces an Effect” (IS 32). Newton’s list of the characteristic of space versus matter in De grav thus reveals a knowledge of More’s later Enchiridion, first published in 1671, as do many of the other features detailed in our investigation (namely, the “being as being” hypothesis, in §2.4). Indeed, it is highly unlikely that Newton was not familiar with this quite important work of More’s later years. The arguments for a later dating of De grav (in Dobbs 1991, 130–146), i.e., after 1680, thereby gains support, since Newton’s treatise exhibits the influence of several of More’s major works, including the Enchiridion. McGuire (1978a, 41, n. 27) had earlier remained a bit circumspect about the influence of More’s Enchiridion based on the earlier date supplied by Hall and Hall for De grav (Newton 1962a, 90), i.e., circa 1666; but McGuire has since advocated the later date (2007, 112).
- 11.
In her collection of More extracts, MacKinnon summarizes the emanation concept as follows: “The universe of Neo-Platonism is formed by emanation from the One, through the descending stages of intelligence, the soul, and the world, with formless matter, or unreality, as the ultimate limit of the emanative power” (More 1925, 315). Needless to say, much in De grav discloses a penchant for a Neoplatonist, emanationist ontology, such as his comments on the possibility of a world soul: “the world should not be called the creature of that soul but of God alone, who creates it by constituting the soul of such a nature that the world necessarily emanates [from it]” (N 31). Throughout De grav, as will be explained, Newton places incorporeal beings (spirits, souls) at the foundation of his hierarchy, with the lesser, corporeal world emanating from these incorporeal beings. Another instance of the use of emanation that parallels Newton’s, although with respect to time, is employed by J. B. van Helmont, a natural philosopher in the early half of the seventeenth century who Newton had studied (see, Ducheyne 2008). Finally, it should be noted that this investigation does not take sides on the complex issues associated with causation in Newton’s natural philosophy, e.g., whether emanative causation more closely resembles an efficient or formal cause, or something else. The main purpose of the discussion of causation is to refute Stein’s (2002) strong third-way interpretation by disclosing Newton’s Neoplatonism. However, if forced on this issue, then we might hazard the conjecture that emanative causation is a sort of hybrid of both formal and efficient causation, inspired by More’s secondary substance concept of a being’s spatial extension in the earlier Immortality, and a property view of space that draws on More’s later view from the Enchiridion (i.e., that space is God’s attribute). McGuire’s (2007) inference that ontic and causal dependence is hard to separate in the God-space context is accurate as well (see footnote 9). See, also, Gorham (2011), for a more Cartesian interpretation of these issues.
- 12.
Translations of Patrizi’s spatial hypotheses are provided in Brickman (1943). For Gassendi’s philosophy of space, see his Syntagma philosophicum (in his Opera Omnia, 1658), parts of which are translated in Brush (1972), and Capek (1976). Gassendi’s ideas deeply influenced the content of Charleton’s discussion of space in his, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletoniana (1654), a work known to Newton (see footnote 17). As noted, Gassendi and Patrizi’s respective spatial ontologies will be examined in more depth in Chap. 9.
- 13.
A similar interpretation of Stein (2002) has been put forward by Andrew Janiak: “Stein (forthcoming)…notes…that Newton’s view is not first and foremost a theological one, for its first premise is that space is an affection of all entities. The fact that God’s infinite and eternal existence makes it the case that space is infinite an eternal is logically parasitic on this first premise. That is, given the logical structure of Newton’s view, space would emanate from the first existent, whatever that first existent happened to be, because for Newton once we posit an entity we posit space. This just means that spatiality is what we might call—following Galileo’s discussion of the primary qualities of objects—a necessary accompaniment of the existence of entities” (Janiak 2000, 222, fn.67).
- 14.
The phrase in brackets, “in some circumstances”, is excluded from Stein’s translation. The differences are not relevant to the above arguments against his overall position, however, so it will not be discussed.
- 15.
The distinction between eminent containment and emanative causation is somewhat vague in the literature, but presumably they are distinct hypotheses. For example, one can hold that God eminently contains the reality manifest in, say, a stone, but that God’s creation of a stone does not employ the emanationist model favored by many Neoplatonists. The emanationist form of explanation, such as the type encountered in More’s oeuvre (e.g., EM 135), marshals an assortment of light metaphors to describe the causal process whereby the foundational level entity (the light source) brings about the existence of lesser entities (the light itself, or the shadow), the latter additionally characterized as an image of, or a radiation from, the foundational level being. In the above quotation, Newton may be simply contending that the Cartesian dualism of mind and body undermines Descartes’ own eminent containment hypothesis, so the reference to eminent containment in this passage need not imply that Newton actually accepts this view. On the other hand, a bit earlier in De grav, Newton remarks that “created minds (since it is the image of God) is of a far more noble nature than body, so that perhaps it may eminently contain [body] in itself” (N 30)—and, importantly, the context strongly favors the view that Newton is elaborating his own view here. However, Newton’s statements employing just “emanative effect” and “emanate” are alone sufficient to demonstrate his Cambridge Neoplatonist stance (and thus uphold the argument of this chapter), regardless of whether or not he accepted eminent containment. On the vexed issue of eminent containment in Descartes, see, Gorham (2003).
- 16.
McGuire (1978a, 15) explores a hypothetical interpretation that would allow beings other than God to ground the existence of space; yet, as disclosed in personal discussion, McGuire’s purpose was only to explore the implications of an emanationist ontology, and not to put forward the view that Newton actually accepted this hypothetical scenario. Unlike Stein, McGuire has always accepted that Newton’s theology is central to understanding his theory of space (see, e.g., 1978a, 38–39).
- 17.
- 18.
More tends to complicate his hypothesis that space is God’s attribute by often referring to space as an incorporeal substance; e.g., in the ensuing section of the Enchiridion, he reasons that his theory utilizes “the very same way of demonstration which Descartes applies to proving space to be a substance, although it be false in that he would conclude it to be corporeal” (EM 57). More rejects Descartes’ theory of space for many of the very same reasons that Newton provides in De grav, for instance, that Descartes cannot account for possibility of a vacuum (which is a conceivable state-of-affairs). An early formulation of this argument appears in An Antidote against Atheism (1655): “If after the removal of corporeal matter out of the world, there will be still Space and distance, in which this very matter, while it was there, was also conceived to lye, and this distant Space cannot but be something, and yet not corporeal, because neither impenetrable nor tangible, it must of necessity be a substance Incorporeal, necessarily and eternally existent” (AAA 338). More’s penchant for conflating “space as God’s attribute” and “space as identical to God’s substance” may have prompted Newton’s more careful attempts to deny the latter (see below).
- 19.
Besides Newton’s contemporary, Joseph Raphson (see, Koyré 1957, chap. 8), another Cambridge Neoplatonist who held that space is an attribute/accident of God is Ralph Cudworth (see, Grant 1981, 230). However, the Patrizi-Gassendi solution, that space is neither accident nor substance, was quite popular in England: besides Charleton and Barrow, one should add the earlier Neoplatonic philosophies of Warner and Hill (see, Garber et al. 1998, 558–561). For additional assessments of More’s spatial theory, see, Boylan (1980), Copenhaver (1980), and, for the theological aspects of Newton’s theory, Snobelen (2001).
- 20.
That is, an “accident”, as the name implies, was often taken to be an unessential feature of a being, but space cannot be unessential given his view that all beings manifest spatial extension. Overall, it is unclear if Newton draws a principled distinction among the terms, “accident”, “property”, and “quality”, but it is highly unlikely. Furthermore, while Newton is careful to designate space an attribute and affection in De grav, and not as an accident, the Des Maizeaux draft mentions “attribute” alongside “property” and “quality”, as does the 1713 General Scholium (N 91), so it is possible that he may have abandoned his special use of “attribute” at a later date. Indeed, “mode” and “consequence” now seem to take over the special role that he had earlier accorded to “attribute”, at least in the Des Maizeaux draft (see also footnotes 4 and 5).
- 21.
Both More and Charleton believe that space is incorporeal, and this belief is based largely on the idea that the dimensions of space, like spirit, penetrate the dimensions of corporeal substance (EM 123–124; Charleton 1654, 68). Newton’s DQE hypothesis nicely captures this aspect of their philosophy, since bodies are just parts of space endowed with material properties—consequently, Newton’s reference to the extension (diffusion) of mind throughout infinite space (see §2.4.2) also follows these earlier philosophies by closely associating space with a spiritual entity. Yet, while both More and Charleton incorporate two types of extension, i.e., an incorporeal extension that penetrates corporeal extension, Newton’s DQE hypothesis is more parsimonious in that it employs only one, namely, the divine attribute of extension. Indeed, Newton never (to the best of our knowledge) refers to space as “incorporeal” (or “immaterial”), a quite significant fact that is noted by McGuire as well (1978a, 42, n.38).
- 22.
Some commentators (e.g., Pasnau 2011, 338, n.21; Reid 2007) defend holenmerism as Newton’s preferred ontology of space, but this is dubious given the paltry evidence for holenmerism and the powerful evidence in favor of God’s actual extension (for other anti-holenmerist interpretations of Newton, see Grant 1981, 253; McGuire and Slowik 2012). As argued above, since Newton, following More, makes a parallel case for the simplicity of both God and space (i.e., as beings without parts), whereas holenmerism is predicated on spatial parthood, it is extraordinarily difficult to ascribe holenmerism to Newton.
- 23.
- 24.
As noted in footnote 13, a strong third-way interpretation, similar to Stein (2002), is also adopted by Janiak, although he strives to distance his reading from some aspects of Stein’s interpretation (2008, 155–163). Janiak, however, follows Stein in running together “being as being” and emanative causation, which are two distinct hypotheses, as argued above. After claiming that “the affection thesis entails the claim that space is an ‘emanative effect’ of the first existing being” (142), Janiak concludes that “space emanates from whatever entity is the first to exist” (146), thereby sanctioning a major aspect of Stein’s strong third-way case (since space is no longer dependent on God). Yet, as we have seen, Newton’s De grav links the emanation of space to a higher, infinite incorporeal/spiritual being alone, and thus the claim that space would emanate from any type of being is simply unsupportable.
- 25.
There are a class of third-way theories that do not significantly part from the substance/accident dichotomy in certain contexts, however, such as the sophisticated relationist interpretation of general relativistic spacetimes in the work of, e.g., Dorato (2000) or Dieks (2001a). As will be explained in later chapters, if the metric field is conceived in the manner of a physical field, it thus follows trivially that the domain of spacetime, i.e., metric field, is congruent with the domain of physical fields (and thus the substance/property distinction can be claimed to have been upheld via their congruent domains). Could Newton’s theory obtain a third-way classification by association with these modern third-way conceptions? Unfortunately, if Newton’s theory were to acquire a third-way designation by this means, then the plethora of earlier theories that also posit a God-infused space, from Plotinus to More, would also obtain this same third-way label, as would any theory that links the domain of material phenomena with the domain of spatial extension (like Descartes’)—and this, of course, would trivialize the third-way classification since nearly all spatial hypotheses would now count as third-way. In short, the theories of Dorato, Dieks, et al. are merely consistent with the substance/property distinction, but it is not a necessary requirement. For Newton, the congruence of God and space, i.e., his surrogate substance/property dichotomy, is indeed a necessary component of his natural philosophy.
- 26.
It unclear to what degree Newton’s rejection of an incorporeal/corporeal distinction in De grav extends to his later published works. In Query 29 to The Opticks, Newton does describe God as “a being incorporeal” (N 130), and, in the correspondence with Leibniz, Clarke likewise deems God an “incorporeal substance” (C.IV.8). Yet, in both De grav (N 33) and the General Scholium of the 1713 Principia (91), Newton expresses skepticism regarding the concept of God’s substance, but not his attributes; and, as observed in footnote 21, Newton never refers to space as incorporeal.
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Slowik, E. (2016). Newton’s Neoplatonic Ontology of Space: Substantivalism or Third-Way?. In: The Deep Metaphysics of Space. European Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44868-8_2
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