Abstract
If substantivalism (absolutism) holds that space is an independently existing entity, and relationism claims that space is only a relation between such entities, then what do alternative ontologies of space, which are allegedly neither substantivalist nor relationist, contend? This chapter will begin the discussion of this central question, although, as will become apparent throughout our investigation, there is much uncertainty regarding the content and scope of both substantivalism and relationism as well. In §1.1, a brief overview of the ideas and influences that have shaped the contemporary evolution and understanding of the standard dichotomy, i.e., substantivalism and relationism, will be provided, whereas §1.2 will offer a preliminary categorization of alternative spatial ontologies. In contrast, §1.3 will examine the background to the modern dichotomy at the beginning of the seventeenth century, that is, in the period just prior to the contributions of Newton and Leibniz, as well as provide a brief synopsis of the concepts that guided Descartes’ natural philosophy of space and motion. This section of the chapter will begin to reveal the extraordinary obstacles that face any attempt to draw a clear line of conceptual lineage from the natural philosophy of space typically practiced in the seventeenth century to the presuppositions that inform the modern dichotomy.
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Notes
- 1.
No references will be offered here since one cannot cite every work on the philosophy of space that postdates Newton and Leibniz’s time (or, to be a bit more careful, nearly every work). However, Descartes is often paired with Leibniz as a chief early exponent of relationism.
- 2.
The analysis of symmetries in physics is itself a contentious issue, especially in modern field theories, but the simplified description provided above is adequate apropos the relationship between the metaphysical spatiotemporal hypotheses and the type of classical mechanical concepts implicit in Newton and Leibniz’ natural philosophy. See, Earman (1989, chapter 2) for a detailed presentation of these spacetime structures, and, Slowik (2002, chapter 2), for an informal discussion that is similar to, but more elaborate than, the one offered above.
- 3.
This is, in fact, the case with Huygens, who was originally content to side with an absolutist (or non-relational) understanding of rotation, but took the challenge of Newton’s spinning bucket and rotating globes thought experiments as a motivation to develop an account consistent with relational motion; see, Stein (1977a), Bernstein (1984).
- 4.
As used in our investigation, “physical” will pertain to both matter and fields, since, for some readers, “matter” and “material” may not be associated with the modern field notion in physics.
- 5.
See, e.g., Casey 1997. One should mention Foster’s (1982) spatial idealism, or anti-realism, in this context; see, Dainton (2010, chapter 10), for a detailed overview. In short, Foster’s arguments are as plausible as Berkeley’s, i.e., not very, despite their sophistication. Foster treats space as akin to an unobservable theoretical entity whose intrinsic character is forever unknowable, a conclusion that is part of his more general anti-realism about the entire physical world. This is different from geometric conventionalism, it should be noted, where only a finite and constrained class of possible geometries plus physical theories fits the evidence (see chapter 8). As noted above, some lived-space theorists seem to favor subjectivism or social constructivism, such that physical space and its properties are purely (or largely) relative to the individual or group—but this approach leads to a spatial form of solipsism, and the embarrassing scenario whereby the flat-earth believers live on a flat earth while the round-earth believers simultaneously live on a spherical earth. The fact that there are no substantive scientific disagreements on the earth’s shape, or other empirically accessible objects, undercuts these spatial subjectivisms, as well as raises doubts for Foster’s claim that the intrinsic nature of spatial geometric structure is unknowable—and, invoking the underdetermination of geometric structure across theory change (e.g., Newton’s Euclidean geometry replaced by Einstein’s non-Euclidean) does not help, since the history of these theoretical replacements reveals that the prior theory’s geometry has been upheld as limiting cases of the successor theory’s (e.g., Euclidean geometry is accurate except near the speed of light or near massive bodies like the sun).
- 6.
DiSalle references Kant’s “empirical realism” about space in his interpretation of the definitional school’s metaphysical outlook, although it is unclear just what this entails as regards the standard dichotomy, or even scientific realism; see, DiSalle (2006, 67). Throughout the investigation, Stein will be listed as a member of the definitional approach, although it is unclear that he would accept this designation. But, since the conception that he advances, especially in the context of Newton (see chapter 2), seems quite close to DiSalle’s, the designation seems justified.
- 7.
Impetus functions much like an impressed force for Buridan, and is the cause of local motion, although it is ontologically distinct from local motion (see, Maier 1982, 86–87). Impetus was a commonly accepted notion in the fourtheenth century, it should be noted.
- 8.
Ockham’s nominalist conception of local motion and Buridan’s res pure successiva hypothesis can be seen, respectively, as variations on the concepts, forma fluens (that motion is the terminus or form acquired) and fluxus formae (that motion is an additional flux over and above the terminus or form acquired), put forth in previous centuries by Averroes and Albertus Magnus. In addition, Buridan’s idea was prompted by the concern over the rotation of the universe, where no new places (termini) are acquired, and thus a problem for Ockham’s nominalist account and, more generally, the forma fluens view (see, Murdoch and Sylla 1978, 215–219). Grant refers to Buridan’s res pure successiva account as establishing “the absolute nature of motion”, and as an accidental form possessed by the body (Grant 2010, 79).
- 9.
In the discussion above, the problem of the motion of the outermost sphere of the universe has not been discussed, although it was one of the motivating factors behind the debates on the status of place: since the final sphere does not have an outer boundary, and hence is not in a place, many ideas were put forward to resolve this dilemma (such as the relationship of the parts of the final sphere to the inner parts, the latter providing a roundabout way of securing the place of the former). On the influence of late Scholastic ideas of place on Descartes, see also, Des Chene (1996), Ariew (1999, chapter 2). Ariew provides a nice summary of these conceptual developments: “In sum, while later Scholastics agreed in rejecting the independence of space from body, they disagreed about other important issues. Hidden within the debate between Thomists and Scotists on the question of the mobility/immobility of place and the place of the ultimate sphere were questions about the relativity of motion or reference of motion. Some thinkers supported a Thomist doctrine in which the motion of a body is referred to place, conceived as its relation to the universe as a whole, a universe which is necessarily immobile; others supported a Scotist doctrine in which the motion of an object is referred to its place, conceived as a purely relational property of bodies” (1999, 53). By the sixteenth century, various natural philosophers, such as J. C. Scaliger, resurrected the ancient atomist’s concept of a three-dimensional void space as a means of overcoming the inherent limitations involved with Aristotle’s conception of place; see, Grant (1981, chapters 7 and 8), and Leijenhorst and Lüthy (2002, 387).
- 10.
More carefully, Descartes defines proper motion with respect to the “immediately contiguous” bodies, and does not mention the common surface between contained and containing bodies. However, as noted above, external place would seem to be implicated in this process. See, also, Zepeda (2014).
- 11.
On Descartes’ conception, a “mode” of extension is a way that extension manifests itself, or as a property of extension (Pr I 53; for instance, shape is mentioned as a mode of extension). Presumably, claiming that motion is a mode of extension eliminates the possibility that motion is a feature of a body that is separate from extension, i.e., a “substance” in extension, the latter view seemingly implicit in Buridan’s concept.
- 12.
Schmaltz (2008, 89) denies the relationist interpretation of Descartes theory of motion on these very grounds, i.e., that it is inconsistent with the details of his laws of motion. Others, such as Blackwell (1966, 227), have argued that the relational aspects of his theory of motion are not intended to be taken seriously, and are merely an attempt appease the Church’s potential condemnation of his Copernicanism (since Descartes’ puts the earth at rest in a vortex circling the sun, and so the earth does not move in the proper sense, as defined above).
- 13.
The rejection of the idea that motion is a substance/property possessed by the moving body is also a feature of various Cartesian texts in the late seventeenth century, such as Rohault’s popular text (1969, 42–43). Likewise, various modern commentators have interpreted Descartes’ reciprocity of transfer hypothesis along these lines, e.g., Miller and Miller, in Descartes (1983, 51, n. 13).
- 14.
A God-based conception of the Cartesian conservation law has also been suggested by Hübner (1983, 130), whereas Dugas (1958, 196) favors the material world at the initial moment of creation as the preferred frame (which, of course, only God can know). It should be added, furthermore, that Slowik (2002) does not actually reject a relationist interpretation of Descartes’ natural philosophy, since the main goal is to examine the prospects for a consistent relationist reconstruction. This chapter, in contrast, develops a case against relationism.
- 15.
Given Ockham’s complex analysis of language, which employs “absolute” and “respective” in a more general sense, it is unclear how to interpret this passage as regards absolute and relative motion per se. However, the use of these terms was likely common by the seventeenth century, since one can find various natural philosophers in the first quarter of that century that refer to space/place as ens absolutum or ens relativum, such as Balthasar Meisner (see, Leijenhorst and Lüthy 2002, 392). From the perspective of our investigation, the main question concerns the specific historical source and inspiration behind Newton’s adoption of those terms and concepts, hence our treatment of this (immense) topic is fairly limited.
- 16.
- 17.
As an interesting admission of his lack of interest in theological matters, as well as a sign of the impending decline of the theological component of natural philosophy in the following century, Huygens adds in the margin: “Perhaps there is no need to involve God in this matter, after all” (H 27).
- 18.
Throughout our investigation, “center-of-mass” will be used interchangeably with “center-of-gravity”, although the two are only identical if the gravitational field is uniform in the region that the bodies occupy.
- 19.
Huygens also discovered the laws for the conservation of momentum (mv) and, roughly, kinetic energy (mv 2), the latter eventually embraced by Leibniz, of course. However, as a devotee of Descartes’ concept of speed over the concept of velocity (speed in a given direction), Huygens continued to favor the Cartesian conservation law for the quantity of motion (ms, where s is the scalar quantity, speed), via his revision of Descartes’ first collision rule and his use of the center-of-mass frame. Westfall concludes that “the concept [of velocity] did not please him greatly, however, and he continued to speak formally of quantity of motion in the Cartesian sense, a scalar quantity which is always positive in value” (Westfall 1971, 156).
- 20.
As Elzinga explains, “Ignace Gaston Pardies (1636–1673) seems to have been the first (or at least one of the first) to have applied Huygens’ relativity principle [i.e., relational motion and the center-of-mass method] to the study of impact after Huygens himself—in a work, Discours du mouvement local (1670). Edne Mariotte (1620–1684) also made use of it in, Traité de la Percussion ou Choq des Corps (1673, 1674, 1676). Huygens was suspicious of Mariotte for borrowing his ideas without mentioning Huygens [see, H 51, above]. Another who soon used Huygens’ principle and method was C. F. M. Déchales, Cursus seu Mundus Mathematicus (1674)” (Elzinga 1972, 134).
- 21.
Westfall (1983, 242–245) recounts Newton’s correspondence with Pardies on optics in 1672. Furthermore, Marius Stan, who provided the translation of Huygens’ codex 7A, comments that the term “absolute” (as regards place/space or motion) does not appear often in the fragments that comprise the codex. He adds that “[t]his suggests that [Huygens] was familiar with this notion (true motion as translation in world space) before 1687, and rejected it before the first edition of Newton’s Principia came to light”, and that Huygens “speaks of ‘they’ who explicate true motion as change of absolute place”, which “may be Borelli, Pardies, and Mariotte” (H 45). That is, Huygens had objected to the use of absolute space (or world space) prior to Newton’s more famous treatment of the concept.
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Slowik, E. (2016). A (Contrarian’s) Reappraisal of the History and Current State of the Ontology Debate in the Philosophy of Space. In: The Deep Metaphysics of Space. European Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44868-8_1
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