Abstract
This report presents the results of a survey on competition law compliance in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland in which 86 large companies participated. The study shows that 80 % of the firms have implemented measures to identify and mitigate the risks of violating competition laws. The majority of firms and measures concentrate on legal risks (e.g. insufficient awareness of the content and scope of competition laws), whereas risks related to changes in the economic environment (e.g. entry into the market, competition by imports, and more intense competition) are rarely addressed. Risk mitigation heavily relies on competition law training, even though these measures hardly seem sufficient. This is obvious from the fact that 71 % of the firms whose employees had violated competition laws in the past had already trained these employees before the misconduct occurred. We conclude from our study that those measures should be improved that help to detect cartelisation risks at an early stage. Furthermore, sanctions imposed by the firms on the offenders of competition laws require a clearer design and more systematic communication.
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Notes
- 1.
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB, Act Against Restraints on Competition), Kartellgesetz (KartG in Austria or KG in Switzerland, Anti-Trust Law).
- 2.
Note that five of them had quit the survey before answering the detailed questions on risk identification. Another 12 firms quit during the process of answering these questions.
- 3.
As before, we calculate the percentage shares of the answers yes and no while excluding ns and qs. This ensures the comparability of percentages even when the firms quit the survey. To provide an example, consider two situations A and B:
A: yes = 40 no = 40 qs = 6
B: yes = 30 no = 30 qs = 26
Our calculation ensures that yes and no are assigned a percentage share of 50 % in both cases.
- 4.
Paha (2014) provides a theoretical foundation of the decision behaviour in situations where agents possess imperfect information about competition law enforcement.
- 5.
Similar developments can be seen among others in the following law proceedings: Zinc phosphate (COMP/E-1/37.027), monochloroacetic acid (COMP/E-1/C.37.773), fittings (COMP/F-1/38.121) organic peroxide (COMP/E-2/37.857).
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Cases
European Commission (22.11.2001), Case COMP/E-1/37.027
Zinc Phosphate
Decision of 11.12.2001, Reference number K(2001) 4237
European Commission (30.10.2002), Case COMP/E-2/37.784
Fine Art Auction Houses
Decision of 30.10.2002, Reference number COM(2002) 4283
European Commission (27.11.2002), Case COMP/E-1/37.152
Plasterboard
Decision of 27.11.2002
European Commission (17.12.2002), Case COMP/E-2/37.667
Special Graphite
Decision of 5.12.2001, Reference number K(2001) 3923
European Commission (10.1.2003), Case COMP/E-1/37.512
Vitamins
Decision of 22.11.2001, Reference number K(2001) 3695
European Commission (19.8.2003), Case COMP/C.38.279/F3
French Beef
Decision of 2.4.2003, Reference number K(2003) 1065
European Commission (2.4.2003), Case COMP/E-2/37.857
Organic Peroxide
Decision of 10.12.2003, Reference number K(2003) 4570
European Commission (21.4.2004), Case COMP/E-1/36.212
Carbonless Paper
Decision of 20.12.2001, Reference number K(2001) 4573
European Commission (3.9.2004), Case COMP/E-1/38.069
Copper Plumbing Tubes
Decision of 3.9.2004, Reference number K(2004) 2826
European Commission (29.9.2004), Case COMP/C.37750/B2
French Beer Market
Decision of 29.9.2004
European Commission (29.9.2004), Case COMP/C.37750/B23l
Sodium Gluconate
Decision of 29.9.2004, Reference number K(2004) 3598
European Commission (29.9.2004), Case COMP/E-1/C.37.773
Monochloroacetic Acid,
Decision of 19.1.2005, Reference number C(2004) 4876
European Commission (19.9.2005), Case COMP 38.337 PO
Thread
Decision of 19.1.2005, Reference numbers C(2005) 3452, C(2005) 3765
European Commission (21.12.2005), Case COMP/F/C.38.443
Rubber Chemicals
Decision of 21.12.2005, Reference number (2005) 5592
European Commission (20.9.2006), Case COMP/F-1/38.121
Fittings
Decision of 20.9.2006, Reference number C(2006) 4180
European Commission (20.11.2007), Case COMP/38.432
Professional Videotapes
Decision of 20.11.2007, Reference number K(2007) 5469
European Commission (28.11.2007), Case COMP/39.165
Flat glass
Decision of 28.11.2007, Reference number C(2007) 5791
European Commission (5.12.2007), Case COMP/38.629
Chloroprene Rubber
Decision of 5.12.2007, Reference number K(2007) 5910
European Commission (19.10.2013), Case COMP/39.437
TV and computer monitor tubes
Decision of 5.12.2012, Reference number C(2012) 8839
Acknowledgments
We are thankful to a number of people and organizations, private and governmental. The questionnaire was designed with the help of members of the German monopolies commission and the competition authorities in Germany and Switzerland. Equally important were the additional comments made by the members of the German Netzwerk Compliance. Our online survey was distributed to the members of, e.g., Netzwerk Compliance, Deutsches Institut für Compliance DICO, Compliance Praxis AT, Compliance—Die Zeitschrift für Compliance-Verantwortliche. Without the assistance of these organisations we could not have conducted this research project. The same is true for our student assistants Stefanie Bartz, Marie Koch, Bastian Krieger, and Maurizio Strazzeri. We very much appreciate the work of the participating companies that spent often more than 45 min to answer our extensive questionnaire. Thank you.
This chapter is supposed to inform the reader about the results of our survey. Although the presentation of these results has been done thoroughly, we cannot guarantee completeness and correctness. In particular, the content of the chapter is neither legally binding nor does it provide any legal advice.
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Götz, G., Herold, D., Paha, J. (2016). Results of a Survey in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland on How to Prevent Violations of Competition Laws. In: Paha, J. (eds) Competition Law Compliance Programmes. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44633-2_3
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