Abstract
In this essay, I provide a general overview on some of the main solutions offered to the never-ending problem of the semantic meaning of imperatives. After a short introduction (Sect. 1), I focus on legal theory, considering both the current trend (Sect. 2), and the prominent accounts developed in the period comprised between the late sixties and the early nineties (the “heydays” of linguistic analysis). I use a similar scheme also for the analysis of some of the main theories developed by philosophers of language (Sects. 3 and 4). Each section contains a few objections to the accounts under consideration: in this way, it will be possible for the reader to get a “balanced assessment” of the theoretical models at stake. The chapter ends with a couple of concluding remarks.
I would like to thank Damiano Canale, Alexis Galán, Francesca Poggi and Giovanni Tuzet for their precious comments to a precedent version of this work. I would also like to thank Alejandro D. Calzetta, Mauro Barberis, Alessandro Ferrari, Riccardo Guastini, Andrej Kristan, Nicola Muffato, Stanley L. Paulson and Giovanni Battista Ratti for our long discussions on this topic.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
It’s definitely worth noting that this assumption is now commonplace in philosophy of language.
- 3.
To be more specific, for Austin, a command is a psychological entity that can be linguistically expressed.
- 4.
Marmor 2011, 84: “At least three levels of content can be conveyed by an occasion of speech: communicative content may consist of semantic content, assertive content, and some further content that is implicated by the speech in the particular context of its utterance. The semantic content consists of the content that is determined by the semantics and syntax of the expression uttered. Normally, this would consist of the literal meaning of the words used and the syntactical structure of the sentence. The assertive content is the content of the truth-evaluable proposition that is conveyed by the speaker in the particular context of the utterance. […]” Marmor 2011, 85, assumes that laws have (also) an “assertive content” (when he considers that the Gricean notion of conversational implicature can be applied to legal communication). Implicatures are considered as rules that, applied to the relevant speech situation, along with a specific contextual knowledge, enable us to “understand content of expressions beyond their assertive content” (Ross 1968, 89).
- 5.
- 6.
Ross does not assume that a semiotic theory has to distinguish a full range of different contents – one for each function of our language. If he were to assume the controversial view that every function of language points to a corresponding kind of content, he would expose his theory to the strong objection of “hypostatized-functions”, which, armed with Ockham’s razor, goes directly to the jugular of an excessively crowded metaphysical constellation. Moreover, Ross analysis is deeply behavioristic. We cannot consider meaning as something that could be fixed by the power of mind alone.
- 7.
- 8.
Ross 1968, 50: These entities (or abstractions) are similar to propositions under the following respects: (i) they are language-dependent; (ii) they shall not be confused with the sentence that expresses them; therefore, (iii) their existence depends on two linguistic facts: formulation and interpretation; (iv) in order to be correctly produced they have to respect syntactic rules; (v) both can be mentioned without making use of them; (vi) both of them can be used in therapeutic speech exercise; (vii) both of them can be considered without being used.
- 9.
It’s worth noting that this is a controversial assumption: on the one hand, it seems plausible to maintain that also indicative contents play an action-determining role, just because they could change the context of practical reasons; on the other, we have to concede the possibility that a normative content might offer only a pro tanto reasons for action.
- 10.
On the negation of conditional norms see Ratti 2013, 81 ff.
- 11.
On this point, see Muffato 2007.
- 12.
See Kristan 2015 for a defense of the expressive conception.
- 13.
Calzetta and Sardo 2014; in our demonstration we assume the validity of conglomeration’s principle.
- 14.
Searle 1969; Searle and Vanderveken 1985; Vanderveken 1990. In recent times, several authors have also tried to explain the logical statute of this operator. See, for instance, Han 1998. Please notice that, in order to pursue the virtue of simplicity, I will not distinguish between: performative analysis, which treats the imperatives as explicit or implicit performatives; parametric analysis, which splits the imperative into a sentence type expression and a sentence-radical; operator analysis, which considers non-declaratives as type expressions that scope over a statement. This distinction can be found, for instance, in Mastop 2008.
- 15.
- 16.
See Lewis 1979, 25: “I have no real dispute, however, with anyone who finds it intolerable to say that an imperative sentence, when used to command, has a truth value. In describing the language game I did not really use any semantic terms as primitives. I could have; but the description I actually gave is related to a description using semantic primitives as the Ramsey sentence of a term-introducing scientific theory is related to the theory itself. For instance, ‘truth value’ serves only as a mnemonic label for the values of the function introduced […] by the existential quantification. If you dislike that label – or any other – feel free to substitute the euphemism of your choice.”
- 17.
- 18.
To put it in a more formal way: 〈CG, Q, T〉: C + ϕ imp = 〈CG, Q, T[addressee/T(addressee){[ϕ imp ]})]〉. See Portner 2010, 5.
- 19.
A similar idea is defended by Han 1998, even though he uses the locution “Plan set” instead of “To-Do List”, considering the “Plan set” as a set of propositions about future actions of the addressee, and not as a set of potential properties of the addressee.
- 20.
Portner 2010, 6: Ordering worlds: “For any w 1, w 2 ∈ ∩ CG and any participant i, w 1 < i w 2 iff for some P ∈ T(i),P(w 1 )(i) = 1 and P(w 2 )(i) = 0, and for all Q ∈ T(i) if Q(w 2 )(i) = 1, then Q(w 1 )(i) = 1.
- 21.
Portner 2007 seemed to endorse a different solution: if two incompatible imperatives are uttered in a temporal sequence, the second must be interpreted (necessarily?) as a revision of the first. Kratzer 1981 introduces a ranking or preference structure in order to solve this kind of conflicts: a preference structure relative to a certain doxastic state W can be defined as a pair 〈P, ≤ 〉, where P ⊆ ℘(W) is a modal ordering source and ≤ is an importance ranking on P; 〈P, ≤ 〉 is consistent if and only if for any p, q ∈ P, p < q OR q < p. On this point see Condoravdi and Lauer 2012.
- 22.
- 23.
The formal system is contained in Mastop 2005, 105 ff.
References
Alchourrón, C. E., & Bulygin, E. (1981). The expressive conception of norms. In R. Hilpinen (Ed.), New studies in deontic logic (pp. 95–125). Dordrecht: Holland.
Aloni, M., & Ciardelli, I. (2013). A logical account of free-choice imperatives. In M. Aloni, M. Franke, & F. Roelofsen (Eds.), The dynamic, inquisitive, and visionary life of ϕ, ?ϕ, and ◊ϕ. Amsterdam: Onbejend.
Austin, J. (1954). The province of jurisprudence determined. New York: The Noonday Press.
Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Oxford: Claredon Press.
Baker, G. P., & Hacker, P. M. (1984). Language, sense and nonsense. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Barberis, M. (1988). Il diritto come comportamento. Torino: Giappichelli.
Barberis, M. (1990). Il diritto come discorso e come comportamento. Torino: Giappichelli.
Belnap, N. (1990). Declaratives are not enough. Philosophical Studies, 59(1), 1–30.
Bentham, J. (1945). The limits of jurisprudence defined. New York: Columbia University Press.
Calzetta, A. D., & Sardo, A. (2014). Una nueva visita a la concepción expresiva. Doxa, 37, 45–63.
Carnap, R. (1942). Introduction to semantics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Charlow, N. (2010). Restricting and embedding imperatives. In M. Aloni, H. Bastiaanse, T. de Jager, & K. Schulz (Eds.), Logic, language and meaning (pp. 223–233). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.
Charlow, N. (2011). Practical language: Its meaning and use. Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan.
Chiassoni, P. (1987). Precetti non logicamente strutturati. In margine alla teoria della norma giuridica di Giovanni Tarello. Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 17(2), 403–439.
Condoravdi, C., & Lauer, S. (2012). Imperatives: Meaning and illocutionary force. Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics, 9, 37–58.
Davidson, D. (1979). Moods and performances. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and use (pp. 9–20). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Dummett, M. (1973). Frege: Philosophy of language. London: Gerald Duckworth.
Frege, G. (1879). Begriffsschrift. Halle: L. Nebert.
Frege, G. (1918). Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, 2, 58–77.
Geach, P. (1960). Ascriptivism. The Philosophical Review, 69, 221–225.
Geach, P. (1965). Assertion. The Philosophical Review, 74, 449–465.
Guastini, R. (1982). Lezioni di teoria analitica del diritto. Giappichelli: Torino.
Guastini, R. (2008). Teoria del significato e teoria dell’interpretazione. Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 38(2), 463–471.
Han, C. H. (1998). The structure and interpretation of imperatives: Mood and force in universal grammar. Phd dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.
Hare, R. M. (1967). Some alleged differences between imperatives and indicatives. Mind, 76, 309–326.
Jackson, F. C., & Pettit, P. (1998). A problem for expressivism. Analysis, 58, 239–251.
Jørgensen, J. (1937/1938). Imperatives and logic. Erkenntnis 7, 288–296.
Kaufmann, M. (2012). Interpreting imperatives. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.
Kelsen, H. (1961). General theory of law and state. New York: Russell & Russell.
Kelsen, H. (1966). On the pure theory of law. Israel Law Review, 1, 1–7.
Kratzer, A. (1978). Semantik der Rede. Königstein: Scriptor.
Kratzer, A. (1981). The notational category of modality. In H. J. Eikmeyer & H. Rieser (Eds.), Words, wolds, and contexts. New approaches in word semantics (pp. 38–74). Berlin: de Gruyter.
Kristan, A. (2015). In defense of the expressive conception of norms. Revus, 22, 151–172.
Lewis, D. (1979). A problem about permission. In E. Saarinen, R. Hilpinen, I. Niiniluoto, & M. P. Hintikka (Eds.), Essays in honour of Jaakko Hintikka (pp. 163–175). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Marmor, A. (2011). Can the law imply more than it says? On some pragmatic aspects of strategic speech. In A. Marmor & S. Soames (Eds.), Philosophical foundations of language in the law (pp. 83–104). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mastop, R. (2005). What can you do: Imperative mood in semantic theory. Doctoral dissertation, University of Amsterdam.
Mastop, R. (2008). Imperatives as semantic primitives. Linguistics and Philosophy, 34(4), 305–340.
McGinn, C. (1977). Semantics for nonindicative sentences. Philosophical Studies, 32, 301–311.
Muffato, N. (2007). La semantica delle norme. Genova: Ecig.
Parsons, J. (2012). Cognitivism about imperatives. Analysis, 72, 49–54.
Poggi, F. (2012). Contextualism, but not enough. Revus, 17, 55–65.
Poggi, F. (2013). The myth of literal meaning in legal interpretation. Analisi e Diritto, 2013, 313–335.
Portner, P. (2004). The semantics of imperatives within a theory of clause types. In K. Watanabe & R. B. Young (Eds.) Proceedings of semantics and linguistic theory 14 (pp. 235–252). Cornell University Linguistics Department, CLC Publications. URL: http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mJIZGQ4N
Portner, P. (2007). Imperatives and modals. Natural Language Semantics, 15, 351–383.
Portner, P. (2010). Permission and choice. Manuscript available at: www.semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jIiYjMyY/Permission_Choice_Portner.pdf
Portner, P. (2011). Permission and choice in discourse and grammar: From sentence types to lexical categories. In G. Günther & Z. Thomas Ede (Eds.), Studies in generative grammar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Ratti, G. B. (2012). Diritto, indeterminatezza, indecidibilità. Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Ratti, G. B. (2013). Studi sulla logica del diritto e della scienza giuridica. Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Raz, J. (1970). The concept of a legal system. Oxford: Claredon Press.
Recanati, F. (2013). Content, mood, and force. In E. Barnes (Ed.), Philosophy compass (pp. 622–632). Hoboken: Wiley.
Ross, A. (1968). Directives and norms. London: Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.
Schroeder, M. (2008). Being for. Evaluating the semantic program of expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. (1968). Austin on locutionary and illocutionary acts. Reprinted in I. Berlin (Ed.), Essays on J.L. Austin (pp. 141–169). Oxford: Claredon Press.
Searle, J. (1969). Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J., & Vanderveken, D. (1985). Foundations of illocutionary logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1988). Mood and the analysis of non-declarative sentences. In J. Dancy, J. Maravcsik, & C. Taylor (Eds.), Human agency: Language, duty and value (pp. 77–101). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Stalnaker, R. (1978). Assertion. In P. Cole (Ed.), Syntax and semantics 9 (pp. 315–332). New York: Academic.
Stalnaker, R. (1999). On the representation of context. In R. Stalnaker (Ed.), Context and content (pp. 96–113). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Starr, W. B. (2010). Conditionals, meaning and mood. Doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University.
Starr, W. B. (2011). A preference semantics for imperatives. Cornell University: Manuscript. http://williamstarr.net/research/a_preference_semantics_for_imperatives.pdf
Stenius, E. (1967). Mood and language game. Synthese, 17, 254–274.
Tarello, G. (1974). Diritto, enunciati, usi. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Vanderveken, D. (1990). Meaning and speech acts. Vol. I: Principles of language use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Veltman, F. (1996). Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25, 221–261.
Villa, V. (2012). Una teoria pragmaticamente orientata dell’interpretazione giuridica. Torino: Giappichelli.
Von Wright, G. H. (1963). Norm and action. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Weinberger, O. (1985a). The expressive conception of norms – An impasse for the logic of norms. Law and Philosophy, 4, 165–198.
Weinberger, O. (1985b). On the meaning of norm sentences, normative inconsistency, and normative entailment. A reply to Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin. Law and Philosophy, 4, 465–475.
Yablo, S. (2009). A problem about permission and possibility. In A. Egan & B. Weatherson (Eds.), Epistemic modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zarnic, B. (2011). Dynamic models in imperative logic. In A. Brozek, J. Jadacki, & B. Zarnic (Eds.), Theory of imperatives from different points of view (pp. 60–120). Warszawa: Warsaw University.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sardo, A. (2017). The Dark Side of Imperatives. In: Poggi, F., Capone, A. (eds) Pragmatics and Law. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44601-1_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44601-1_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-44599-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-44601-1
eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)