Abstract
What can we say about reality as such, the reality of the world around us? How can we explain, understand our universe and everything in it? As argued in chapter two, human experiences are real but real on different levels. Some are merely real in a subjective way while others real in an intersubjective manner. Because humans are intertwined with the reality they live in, they cannot describe reality as it really is. They have to conceptualize reality in order to understand and describe it. It is here the philosophical question comes in, what do we mean by the concept of reality?
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Notes
- 1.
This is not to be confused with Thomas Nagel’s view of realism. He argues that we cannot grasp the world as it is due to limited knowledge as well as to what we are able to conceive. In his words: “The world extends beyond the reach of our minds” (Nagel 1986: 90).
- 2.
There are several interpretations of the Quantum Mechanical Theory: the micro-macro interpretation along the Bohr line, better known as the Copenhagen Interpretation, the mind-body interpretation along the Wigner line also known as the Princeton interpretation, The Many Worlds interpretation of Everett III, the Many Minds interpretation by Albert & Loewer and later David Deutsch. Furthermore there is the interpretation by Penrose taking gravitation as the cause of the collapse, and there is the Pilote Wave interpretation along the de Broglie-Bohm line. Furthermore, there are the more recent interpretations, for example the modal interpretation and the interpretation based on decoherence.
- 3.
The basic physical quantity used in quantum mechanics is the wave function, i.e. Ψ as described by the Schrödinger equation. The Schrödinger equation tells us that, if we know Ψ at time zero and we know the Hamiltonian, then we can calculate Ψ for all future times. The first postulate of quantum mechanics is that all information about a physical system is to be found in the wave function, i.e. Ψ of that system. If we manipulate the wave function Ψ as we measure and/or observe a particle, then we receive information about the location, energy, velocity of that particle. It might be interesting to note that Schrödinger gave the wave function Ψ an ontological meaning; he meant that the wave function Ψ exists independently of our knowledge about it. Also von Neumann had a realistic view on the wave function. Bohr and Heisenberg on the other hand had a non-realistic view on the wave function and hence avoided the measurement problem.
- 4.
Deconstructivism derives from the philosophy of language of Jacques Derrida (1982). A word receives it meaning as a function of how it differs from another word. What Derrida means is that complete meaning is always differential and postponed in language; there is never a moment when meaning is complete and total (Glendinning 2004: 7). Richard Rorty (1931–2007) argued that an “‘accidental’ feature of a text can be seen as betraying, subverting, it’s purportedly ‘essential message’” (1995). Translated to deconstructivist subjectivity of experiences this means that the reports of the experiences have little to do with reality.
- 5.
Some still seem to hold on to a Popperian view of science which stipulates that only falsifiability is a viable methodological path. While Popper’s arguments have long since been refuted, for instance by Putnam and others, they are tenacious in some quarters, because they have teamed up in an unhealthy alliance with Fisherian statistics that allow only for deductive types of hypothesis testing which in turn look similar to falsifiability. Rarely is there a critical distinction made between the theory of science type of claim Karl Popper (1902–1994) makes, and the statistical procedure adopted, let alone their relative merits critically scrutinized. Hence we still hold on to the seemingly old-fashioned view that science has to do with verification, although certainly not in its original, simplistic and naïve positivist framework. See further Popper, K., 2005.
- 6.
See again chapter two on the human experiencer.
- 7.
I changed ‘man’s’ into ‘human’.
- 8.
The Collected Works of John Dewey, Jo Ann Boydston, ed., 37 volumes (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967–1991).
- 9.
Nagel 1986.
- 10.
Hook 1961.
- 11.
Sellars 1927.
- 12.
My italics.
- 13.
What I refer to as minimalist ontological naturalism should not be confused with Griffin’s idea that naturalism can be understood in a minimal or maximal sense (Griffin 2000: 11–12. What I mean by minimalist naturalism is naturalism useful within a specific realm or scope of inquiry.
- 14.
Where ‘v’ stands for ‘inclusive v’.
- 15.
Drees calls his ontological naturalism supernaturalistic religious naturalism. Furthermore, Drees defends the view of a physically closed universe. My italics.
- 16.
My italics.
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Runehov, A.L.C. (2016). Understanding Reality. In: The Human Being, the World and God. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44392-8_4
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