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A Two- and Threefold Self

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The Human Being, the World and God

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Abstract

Before beginning this chapter, one term has to be explained, namely, ‘being’. What is meant by being? Indeed, the English term being is confusing, which has led to the problem that it is difficult to know what exactly is meant by being, especially when it comes to scientific research. Clarifying a term is important when one’s research crosses the border of other disciplines or when one tries to make scientific finding understandable for non-scientists. Terms in need of clarification are, amongst others, experience, mind, consciousness, awareness, self, intelligence, affection and emotion, what is called the ego, the self and being.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I mean after-Cartesian dualism because, Cartesian dualism is, according to me misunderstood. Furthermore it is not my aim to dig into dualism more than necessary for my purpose.

  2. 2.

    Gregersen 2008. http://www.metanexus.net accessed 27 May 2015.

  3. 3.

    To Alexander this specific complexity has the quality of consciousness.

  4. 4.

    Eccles and Popper 1981.

  5. 5.

    in Skirry 2016.

  6. 6.

    Bonaventura 1990.

  7. 7.

    Gabrielsson 1926.

  8. 8.

    To Alexander this specific complexity has the quality of consciousness. (Alexander 1920: 5).

  9. 9.

    http://mic.com/articles/91329/science-shows-how-piano-players-brains-are-actually-different-from-everybody-elses, accessed 27th May 2015.

  10. 10.

    I say ‘thus far’ because there is still more to tell about the self.

  11. 11.

    Also the right occipital region seems to some extent to have a role to play in self-experiences.

  12. 12.

    The function of the left hemisphere is associated with sequential analyses such as systematic, logical interpretation of information; interpretation and production of symbolic information language; mathematics, abstraction and reasoning and also with memory storage in a language format. The function of the right hemisphere then is associated with holistic functioning such as processing multi-sensory input simultaneously to provide a ‘holistic’ picture of one’s environment; visual spatial skills. Holistic functions such as dancing and gymnastics are coordinated by the right hemisphere. Memory is stored in auditory, visual and spatial modalities.

  13. 13.

    Hypermetabolism in the posterior cingulated gyrus was also associated with very-early Alzheimer’s disease, because this is the period when patients clearly start to show difficulties with memory. This hyperbolism was also exhibited by individuals who are at genetic risk from Alzheimer’s. Johnson et al. 2002: 1811. Stuss et al. 2001. Ochsner et al. 2004. Discussion of the results: pages: 1749–1750, 1752–1754, 1765.

  14. 14.

    This was regardless of the positive or negative input.

  15. 15.

    Sitaram 2013, http://www.bme.ufl.edu/labs/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2013/10/NeuroimagingMeditation.pdf Accessed 1 February 2016.

  16. 16.

    For a complete analysis and evaluation of these studies, see Runehov (2007) Chap. 5 and 6.

  17. 17.

    Depending on one’s personal and spiritual outlook they are regarded as potentially stabilizing or destabilizing. The crucial point seems to be that those with regular spiritual practice assess experiences of ego loss much more positively.

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  1. Department of Systematic Theology, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

    Anne L. C. Runehov

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Runehov, A.L.C. (2016). A Two- and Threefold Self. In: The Human Being, the World and God. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44392-8_1

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