Modal Epistemology Without Detours

  • Scott A. ShalkowskiEmail author
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 378)


Many common approaches to modality pose problems for accounts of modal knowledge that are no less severe than those thought to plague David Lewis’s account in terms of a plurality of concrete worlds. Typically, these theories are framed in terms of the wrong kinds of thing and their defenders misdiagnose the failings of Lewis’s plurality. These considerations provide the foundations for modalist accounts of modal knowledge, where modality is not primarily a matter of recherché objects.


Modal Logic Mathematical Object Conceptual Knowledge Modal Reality Mathematical Truth 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Philosophy, Religion and History of ScienceLeedsUK

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