Abstract
In this chapter, it is suggested that our epistemic access to metaphysical modality generally involves rationalist, a priori elements. However, these a priori elements are much more subtle than ‘traditional’ modal rationalism assumes. In fact, some might even question the ‘apriority’ of these elements, but I should stress that I consider a priori and a posteriori elements especially in our modal inquiry to be so deeply intertwined that it is not easy to tell them apart. Supposed metaphysically necessary identity statements involving natural kind terms are a good example: the fact that empirical input is crucial in establishing their necessity has clouded the role and content of the a priori input, as I have previously argued (Tahko 2015). For instance, the supposed metaphysically necessary identity statement involving water and its microstructure can only be established with the help of a controversial a priori principle concerning the determination of chemical properties by microstructure. The Kripke-Putnam framework of modal epistemology fails precisely because it is unclear whether the required a priori element is present.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
I owe this insight to Robin Hendry and Jani Hakkarainen.
- 2.
But see also Vaidya (2010), where a more systematic theory about understanding and essence is developed. Vaidya’s account, however, may not be compatible with the type of (realist) essentialism that Lowe hopes to defend, so it represents a somewhat different approach to the topic.
- 3.
On a related point, see Vaidya (2017), in this volume. Vaidya defines what he calls epistemological entanglement, where knowledge of something’s existence is entangled with knowledge of its essence.
- 4.
Note that Lowe himself does not distinguish understanding and knowledge. This may introduce further problems, some of which are discussed in Vaidya (2010).
- 5.
We should leave aside here the problems concerning the essences of biological species, or indeed individual members of biological species. The point of the example for our current purposes is simply to get a grip on Lowe’s toolbox regarding the epistemology to essence.
- 6.
See Correia (2008) for an analysis of different kinds of ontological dependence, including essential dependence. Lowe himself defines essential dependence as follows: ‘To say that X depends essentially on Y for its existence and identity is just to say that it is part of the essence of X that X exists only if Y exists and part of the essence of X that X stands in some unique relation to Y’ (Lowe 2008, p. 38). For further discussion, see also Tahko and Lowe (2015).
- 7.
For further details on allotropy, see Addison (1964).
- 8.
I’d like to thank audiences at the E.J. Lowe Memorial Conference in Durham and the Metaphysics and Modal Epistemology Conference in Belgrade for their helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. Special thanks to Anand Vaidya for detailed comments. Thanks also to Bob Fischer. The research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the Academy of Finland (funding decision no. 266256).
References
Addison, W. E. (1964). The allotropy of the elements. New York: Elsevier.
Bird, A. (2007). A posteriori knowledge of natural kind essences: A defence. Philosophical Topics, 35(1/2), 293–312.
Bird, A. (2008). Lowe on a posteriori essentialism. Analysis, 68(1/2), 336–344.
Booth, A. R., & Rowbottom, D. P. (Eds.). (2014). Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2002). Does conceivability entail possibility? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility (pp. 145–200). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Correia, F. (2008). Ontological dependence. Philosophy Compass, 3(5), 1013–1032.
Correia, F. (2011). On reduction of necessity to essence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(3), 639–653.
Fine, K. (1994). Essence and modality. Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and Language, 8, 1–16.
Hale, B. (1996). Absolute necessities. Philosophical Perspectives: Metaphysics, 10, 93–117.
Hanrahan, R. R. (2009). Consciousness and modal empiricism. Philosophia, 37, 281–306.
Hendry, R. F. (2006). Elements, compounds, and other chemical kinds. Philosophy of Science, 73, 864–875.
Horvath, J. (2014). Lowe on modal knowledge. Thought, 3, 208–217.
Jenkins, C. S. (2010). Concepts, experience and modal knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives: Epistemology, 24, 255–279.
Krebs, R. E. (2006). The history and use of our earth’s chemical elements: A reference guide. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Lowe, E. J. (1998). The possibility of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, E. J. (2008). Two notions of being: Entity and essence. In P. Le (Ed.), Being: Developments in contemporary metaphysics (pp. 23–48). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lowe, E. J. (2011). Locke on real essence and water as a natural kind: A qualified defence. Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 85, 1–19.
Lowe, E. J. (2012). What is the source of our knowledge of modal truths? Mind, 121, 919–950.
Lowe, E. J. (2014). Essence vs. intuition: An unequal contest. In Booth & Rowbottom (Eds.) 2014 (pp. 256–268).
Lowe, E. J., & McCall, S. (2006). 3D/4D controversy: A storm in a teacup. Noûs, 40, 570–578.
Needham, P. (2011). Microessentialism: What is the argument? Noûs, 45, 1–21.
Roca-Royes, S. (2011). Modal knowledge and counterfactual knowledge. Logique et Analyse, 54(216), 537–552.
Scerri, E. (2012). What is an element? What is the periodic table? And what does quantum mechanics contribute to the question? Foundations of Chemistry, 14, 69–81.
Tahko, T. E. (2011). A priori and a posteriori: A bootstrapping relationship. Metaphysica, 12(2), 151–164.
Tahko, T. E. (2012). Counterfactuals and modal epistemology. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 86(1), 93–115.
Tahko, T. E. (2015). Natural kind essentialism revisited. Mind, 124(495), 795–822.
Tahko, T. E., & Lowe, E. J. (2015). Ontological dependence. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/dependence-ontological/
Vaidya, A. J. (2010). Understanding and essence. Philosophia, 38, 811–833.
Vaidya, A. J. (2017). Modal knowledge: Beyond rationalism and empiricism. In B. Fischer & F. Leon (Eds.), Modal epistemology after rationalism. Cham: Springer.
van Inwagen, P. (1994). Composition as identity. Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and Language, 8, 207–220.
Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of philosophy. Malden: Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Tahko, T.E. (2017). Empirically-Informed Modal Rationalism. In: Fischer, B., Leon, F. (eds) Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Synthese Library, vol 378. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-44307-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-44309-6
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)