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Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?

  • Peter HawkeEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 378)

Abstract

My topic is moderate modal skepticism in the spirit of Peter van Inwagen. Here understood, this is a conservative version of modal empiricism that severely limits the extent to which an ordinary agent can reasonably believe “exotic” possibility claims. I offer a novel argument in support of this brand of skepticism: modal skepticism grounds an attractive (and novel) reply to Humean skepticism. Thus, I propose that modal skepticism be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility as a tool for dissolving philosophical paradox.

Keywords

Rational Belief Epistemic Possibility Reasonable Belief Conceptual Possibility Green Emerald 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Stanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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