From Modal Skepticism to Modal Empiricism

  • Felipe LeonEmail author
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 378)


In this paper, I sketch and defend a thoroughgoing empiricist account of our knowledge of metaphysical possibility. I argue that our knowledge of Moorean metaphysical possibilities traces back to our knowledge of the actual world through empirical sources (such as observation and observation-sensitive theory). In this connection, I advocate a pluralist account, according to which deductive, inductive, and abductive inferences from actuality are all legitimate sources of our knowledge of possibility.


Actual World Justify Belief Positive Account Modal Knowledge Modal Claim 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Behavioral and Social Sciences DivisionEl Camino CollegeTorranceUSA

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