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Imagination, Possibility, and Plovers

  • Rebecca HanrahanEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 378)

Abstract

In this paper, I explore two aphorisms common in the literature on modal epistemology. The first, The imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual, I have considered before. (Hanrahan 2007, 2008a, b) From it, I generated a theory that holds that our imagination can provide us with a guide to possibility, if via our best explanation we can tell a story about the sensory images we have called forth that would justify our taking them to be veridical perceptions. Unfortunately, this theory has a limited scope. In this paper, I look to expand its scope by reconsidering this first aphorism in conjunction with the second aphorism, What is actual is also possible. While I do succeed at expanding the scope of my theory, there are still challenges to be met.

Keywords

Good Explanation Actual World Intentional System Epistemic Virtue Bald Eagle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Whitman CollegeWalla WallaUSA

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