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Introduction to Modal Epistemology After Rationalism

  • Bob FischerEmail author
  • Felipe Leon
Chapter
  • 303 Downloads
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 378)

Abstract

We’re justified in believing some alethic modal claims: the losing team could have won; that bridge could collapse; two and two couldn’t equal five; etc. The epistemology of modality is concerned with the nature of this justification. How can we get it? How can we lose it? And what, exactly, explains why it’s available to us at all? The goal of this book is to give a hearing to those who are moving away from the purer strains of rationalism in modal epistemology, finding room for experience to play a larger justificatory role—or even the only role. At the same time, it makes room for those who want to construct modal epistemologies that answer primarily to ordinary modal claims rather than the ones that have been of interest to metaphysicians and philosophers of mind—e.g., teletransportation, disembodied minds, etc.

Keywords

Actual World Justify Belief Metaphysical Possibility Modal Knowledge Modal Claim 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas State UniversitySan MarcosUSA
  2. 2.Behavioral and Social Sciences DivisionEl Camino CollegeTorranceUSA

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