Rafsanjani’s Nuclear Takeoff: Taking Advantage of the Weak Non-Proliferation Regime

Abstract

Ayatollah Rafsanjani, the architect of the project, run afoul of the non-proliferation regime when trying to purchase nuclear weapons. The only alternative was to launch an indigenous production—a monumental undertaking considering the devastated economy and the scarcity of technological know-how. Equally daunting was the prospect of evading the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) inspection to which Iran, a signatory of the NPT, was subject. Resisting internal pressures to quit the Treaty, Rafsanjani and the Guards decided to use the cover of the legal nuclear plant in Bushehr to launch the illicit project.

The “hiding in plain sight” plan benefited from a number of factors: (1) the willingness of countries, including some in the Nuclear Suppliers Group such as Russia and China to sell materials and technology, (2) the leading input of the rogue regime of North Korea; (3) the ability of the Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, colluding with elements of the Pakistani high command, to jump—start the project, (4) the ability of the regime to set up an extensive network of front companies tasked with purchasing of dual technology, (5) the willingness of the IAEA under Mohammed ElBaradei to certify the program as peaceful; (6) the sheer complexity of the system and the finely honed deception tactics of the regime.