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Framing SOF Intelligence

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Special Operations from a Small State Perspective

Part of the book series: New Security Challenges ((NSECH))

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Abstract

Special Operation Forces are both a consumer as well as a provider of highly detailed multisource intelligence. Detailed intelligence is needed to destroy or capture high-value targets, rescue hostages, seize an objective, or conduct a high-risk raid of some sort. Usually, this intelligence is provided by the various higher echelon intelligence or intelligence services and then further developed by SOF intelligence collection elements.

The author of Chap. 10 displays the future necessity of continued Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance capabilities in complex conflicts. The author also describes how future Special Operations Forces mission and Special Operations Forces intelligence most likely will be able to contribute with a highly detailed and sought after intelligence product to the intelligence consumer.

Information and Intelligence is the ‘Fire and Maneuver’ of the 21st Century.

– (Then) Major General Michael Flynn, March 2011

(Former Director DIA and former Chief J2 ISAF)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Michael T. Flynn, Sandals and Robes to Business Suits and Gulf Streams: Warfare in the 21st Century, Small Wars Journal, Small Wars Foundation (2011).

  2. 2.

    See David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountain—The Coming Ages of the Urban Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

  3. 3.

    FÖRSVARSMAKTEN, Försvarsmaktens redovisning av perspektivstudien 2013, 54–55.

  4. 4.

    Michael T. Flynn et.al., “Employing ISR-SOF Best Practices,” Joint Forces Quarterly issue 50 3d quarter (2008.) Spencer Ackerman, How Special Ops Copied Al-Qaida to Kill it, Danger Room, September 9, 2011.

  5. 5.

    Rupert Smith, Utility of ForceThe Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 323.

  6. 6.

    Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, Intelligence Collection: How to Plan and Execute Intelligence Collection in Complex Environments, (Praeger: Kindle Ebook, 2012), location 3596.

  7. 7.

    Flynn et.al, Employing ISR SOF Best Practices.

  8. 8.

    Smith, Utility of Force, 327–329. David J. Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux,” Survival 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006/2007), 113.

  9. 9.

    For the purpose of this chapter, the following definition has been used: SR, Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance is a human intelligence function that places ‘eyes on target’ in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory. SOF may conduct these tasks unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. SOF may use advanced reconnaissance and surveillance techniques or equipment and/or sophisticated covert or discreet collection methods.” NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.5, 2–1.

  10. 10.

    Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 31–20-5 Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures for Special Forces, (Washington: Headquarters of the Army, 1995), 1–10–1–12. This manual has since been superceeded by the comprehensive Army Doctrine and Training Publication, ADRP 3–05 Special operations. However, these imperatives still apply.

  11. 11.

    Robert G. Spulak Jr “A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and use of SOF”, JSOU Report, 07–7, (October, 2007), 26–38.

  12. 12.

    Ackerman, How Special Ops Copied Al-Qaida to Kill it. Flynn et al., Employing ISR-SOF Best Practices.

  13. 13.

    William H. McRaven, “Special Operations: The perfect grand strategy,” in Force of Choice,- Perspectives on Special Operations ed. Horn et al., (McGill-Queen University Press: Defence Management Series; First Edition edition, October 14, 2004), 73. Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 4th Edition June 2015, (Macdill, FL: The JSOU Press, 2015).

  14. 14.

    Department of Defense, “Joint Publication JP 3–05,” Special Operations. (Washington, D.C. 16 July 2014). Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Operating Concept, (May 2013). Department of the Army, “Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3–05”, Special Operations, (August, 2012), NATO, “Allied Joint Publication”, AJP-3.5(A). Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations 3rd STUDY DRAFT, (undated).

  15. 15.

    Department of Defense, “Joint Publication JP 3–05,” Special Operations. (Washington D.C. 16 July, 2014). Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Operating Concept, (May 2013). Department of the Army, “Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3–05”, Special Operations, (August, 2012). NATO, “Allied Joint Publication”, AJP-3.5(A). Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations 3rd STUDY DRAFT, (undated).

  16. 16.

    John F. Kennedy, “Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the US Military Academy”, June 6, 1962, accessed July 10, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8695.

  17. 17.

    Gill Eapen, Flexibility-Flexible Companies for the Uncertain World (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 13.

  18. 18.

    Eapen, Flexibility. Preface V.

  19. 19.

    Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3–13.4”, Military Deception, (July 13, 2006). Robert R. Leonard, Surprise, accessed August 21, 2015, http://www.jhuapl.edu/ourwork/nsa/papers/surprise.pdf.

  20. 20.

    Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011).

  21. 21.

    Finkel, On Flexibility, 2.

  22. 22.

    Finkel, On Flexibility, 22.

  23. 23.

    Finkel, On Flexibility, 2.

  24. 24.

    Finkel, On Flexibility, 112

  25. 25.

    Reference to Barry D. Watts, Clauswitzian Friction and Future War (Revised Edition), McNair Paper 68 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2004) in Robert G. Spulak Jr. “A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and use of SOF”. JSOU Report, 07–7, (October, 2007), 7–9.

  26. 26.

    Spulak, “A Theory of Special Operations”, 20.

  27. 27.

    John Arquilla, Rand Blog, August 25, 2002, accessed, January 7, 2016, http://www.rand.org/blog/2002/08/it-takes-a-network.html,. Also, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt ed., Networks and Netwars-The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, (Santa Monica CA: RAND. 2001).

  28. 28.

    General (ret) Stanley McChrystal, Team of Teams-New Rules for Engagement for a Complex World (New York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2015).

  29. 29.

    Finkel, On Flexibility, 112.

  30. 30.

    See General (ret) Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task, (New York: Penguin Group, 2013 paperback edition 2014), 153. Flynn et al. Employing ISR, 57.

  31. 31.

    Headquarters Department of the Army, “ADRP 3-05”, Special Operations, (August 31, 2012), 4–6.

  32. 32.

    “ADRP 3-05”, 4–6.

  33. 33.

    “ADRP 3-05”, 4–6.

  34. 34.

    “ADRP 3-05”, 4–6.

  35. 35.

    “ADRP 3-05”, 4–6.

  36. 36.

    “ADRP 3-05,” 4–6.

  37. 37.

    “ADRP 3-05”, 4–6.

  38. 38.

    Peter Thunholm, FHS, Beslutsprocesser i tidskritiska tillämpningar, (in English, Decision making in time critical applications), 2001.

  39. 39.

    Headquarters Department of the Army, “Army Planning and Orders Production”, FM 5–0, (January 2005).

  40. 40.

    As an example, Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan 2002. See Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2004).

  41. 41.

    See Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, part 3.

  42. 42.

    Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), ch. 8.

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AWE (2017). Framing SOF Intelligence. In: Eriksson, G., Pettersson, U. (eds) Special Operations from a Small State Perspective. New Security Challenges. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43961-7_10

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