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Matter, Representation and Motion in the Phenomenology of the Mind

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Representation and Reality in Humans, Other Living Organisms and Intelligent Machines

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 28))

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Abstract

Not only the classical cognitive pattern but also the classical phenomenological pattern gives rise to a problem concerning the qualitative dimension. This problem is essentially related to the notion of matter, conceived as residual with respect to the notion of form: the sensorial hyle is residual with respect to the intentional form; plena are residual with respect to the extension, and physical matter (its resistance, its non-undifferentiation, its endurance) is also residual with respect to the broad ensemble of connections where the physical thing is inscribed. The residual component which characterizes the notion of matter is simply the other side of the absolute predominance of form (representational form in the specific context of mental phenomena). This predominance gives rise to the same problem in the context of phenomenology and in philosophy of mind: the problem of the ontological status of qualitative states. This issue is a crucial one and, in order to be solved, requires a radical change of perspective. In the context of phenomenology this change depends on the concept of enactive, embodied and situated mind. This notion implies a temporal paradigm; it alludes to a dynamic, non-static pattern; that is, it alludes not to projective notions (as in the representational model), but to notions which are agentive and, ultimately, evolutive.

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  1. Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia, VIa Bolognese, 52, Florence, 50139, Italy

    Roberta Lanfredini

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  1. Roberta Lanfredini
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Correspondence to Roberta Lanfredini .

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  1. Gothenburg, Sweden

    Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic

  2. Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican City, Italy

    Raffaela Giovagnoli

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Lanfredini, R. (2017). Matter, Representation and Motion in the Phenomenology of the Mind. In: Dodig-Crnkovic, G., Giovagnoli, R. (eds) Representation and Reality in Humans, Other Living Organisms and Intelligent Machines. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43784-2_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43784-2_13

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