Abstract
This chapter aims to show that the scientific approach to nature, in particular to animals and human beings, is not sufficient to understand the sense of their organism, because it does not explain the sense of their life. Furthermore for the same reason it is not possible to affirm that the human being is a machine, or that a machine could develop so that it can become like—or sometimes as the same in—a human being. To support this assumption I assume a phenomenological attitude following the analyses proposed by Edmund Husserl and some of his scholars.
Translated by Antonio Calcagno
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
- 1.
Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi develop interesting positions on this debate in their work The Phenomenological Mind (London: Routledge, 2012). Both authors emphasize the importance of the phenomenological perspective, which, in their view, is neither purely psychological nor introspective; rather, they see the phenomenological mind as central to understanding the human being. Even though they acknowledge the contribution of the cognitive sciences and neurosciences, the nature of their work remains largely phenomenological and philosophical..
- 2.
I examined these phenomenologists’ positions in “Edith Stein’s Contribution to Phenomenology,” in Analecta Husserliana, vol. 80, ed. Anna Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 232–240; “Edith Stein: Phenomenology, the State and Religious Commitment”, 648–656; and “Hedwig Conrad-Martius and the Phenomenology of Nature”, 210–232.
- 3.
Regarding the meaning of epochè and of the lived experiences I have described it in my book The Sense of Things. Toward a Phenomenological Realism, Translated by Antonio Calcagno, “Analecta Husserliana,” vol. cxviii, Springer 2015.
- 4.
Edmund Husserl Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und einer phänomenologischen Philosophie, transcribed by Edith Stein between 1916 and 1918, revised by Ludwig Landgrebe from 1924–25 and by Husserl himself until 1928, and finally edited by Marly Biemel in 1952 as volume IV of Husserliana. Volumes I and II of the Ideen were edited by Karl Schumann as volumes III-I and III-2 of Husserliana..
- 5.
Ideen, III-2.
- 6.
Ibid. § 39.
- 7.
Ms. Trans. D 10, Zur Konstitution der physischen Natur. Zuerst Leib—Aussendung; dann rückführend auf Hyle und Kinästhese, 23.
- 8.
Ms. Trans., C 10, Das gehört zum Komplex der urtümlichen Gegenwart!, 25.
- 9.
See Edmund Husserl, Ideen II, §39.
- 10.
Ibid.
- 11.
Ibid.
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
Ibid.
- 14.
See Sect. 2, Chap. 4 , §45.
- 15.
Edmund Husserl, Ms. Trans. E III 10, Vorgegebene Welt, Historizität, Trieb, Instinkt, January 1930, 3.
- 16.
Ibid., 10.
- 17.
See pages 12–17 in Ms. Trans. E III 10.
- 18.
See page 17 in Ms. E III 10.
- 19.
ParadoXa, What is Consciouness, Fondazione Internazionale Nuova Spes, Roma, October–December 2009.
- 20.
Igor Aleksander, “What Computation Can Tell Us About Consciousness,” in ParadoXa, op. cit., 77. Igor Aleksander is Emeritus Professor of Neural Systems at Imperial College, London, UK.
- 21.
Lorenzo Magnani, “L’evoluzione della coscienza e del libero arbitrio,” in ParadoXa, op. cit., 51. Lorenzo Magnani is Professor of the Philosophy of Science at the University of Pavia.
- 22.
Domenico Parisi, “Robot che “hanno la coscienza”,” in ParadoXa, 62..
- 23.
Lorenzo Magnani, L’evoluzione della coscienza e del libero arbitrio, op. cit., 56.
- 24.
Tito Arecchi, “Fenomenologia della coscienza: complessità e creatività,” in ParadoXa, op. cit., 38.
- 25.
Ibid.
- 26.
Ibid., 39.
- 27.
Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Ursprung und Aufbau des lebendiges Kosmos (Salzburg-Leipzig: Otto Müller, 1938).
- 28.
See I disturbi degli stati di coscienza, in ParadoXa, op. cit., 115. It is interesting to note that the text cited here stems from the collective work of various authors: Andrea Bosco (Researcher in Experimental Psychology), Giulio Pancioni (Professor of Psychology), Marta Olivetti Belardinelli (Lecturer of Cognitive Psychology), Michele Papa (Professor of Human Anatomy). Mario Stanziano, Andrea Soddu, and Quentin Noirhomme (researchers at the Hospital of Liège) work with Papa. Working also at the Hospital of Liège is Steven Laureys (Professor of Neurology).
- 29.
Edith Stein, Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person, in Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe, vol. 14 (Freiburg: Herder 2004).
- 30.
Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Naturwissenschaftlich Metaphysische Perspektiven (Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle Verlag, 1949).
- 31.
This position could be considered as the same as classical functionalism, but it is different from it as far as it is based on a complex anthropology. Consciousness can show itself as a function, but it refers to psychic and spiritual aspects of the human being ultimately opening the way to a metaphysical analysis of it..
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bello, A.A. (2017). Consciousness and Hyletics in Humans, Animals and Machines. In: Dodig-Crnkovic, G., Giovagnoli, R. (eds) Representation and Reality in Humans, Other Living Organisms and Intelligent Machines. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43784-2_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43784-2_12
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-43782-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-43784-2
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)