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The Impact of the Syria Crisis on Lebanon

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Dynamics of Disasters—Key Concepts, Models, Algorithms, and Insights (DOD 2015 2016)

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Abstract

Despite popular expectations of political transition and economic development associated with the 2010 Arab Spring movement, the Arab region sees unrelenting conflict in many of its parts (for example, Libya, Syria, and Yemen). Against the backdrop of regional challenges, the present paper will discuss the impact of the Syria Crisis on its neighboring country, the Republic of Lebanon.

The Syria Crisis just entered its sixth year and the destruction of historical cities such as Aleppo and Palmyra reach unprecedented levels as international actors (e.g., Russia) enter the conflict. Streams of refugees leave the camps in neighboring Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon to embark on the very risky journey across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. Without any durable political solution anticipated to emerge anytime soon, the conflict takes uglier turns every day, for example: (1) increasing disrespect for the protection of civilians (e.g., Geneva Convention) results in a rising direct and indirect civilian death toll also affecting the few crucial health workers that still remain in country; (2) continuing geographical expansion of Islamic State militants and unsavory shifting coalitions at the national and regional level—be they political or military; and so on.

Lebanon—being an immediate neighbor of Syria—and its population have felt the brunt of the Syria Crisis. Hosting more than 1 million refugees, the economic burden is assumed to have accumulated to 7.5 billion USD. Contributing to these “costs of conflict” are the economic, social, and environmental impacts of the Syria Crisis. Setting the stage for the discussion, the present paper provides a brief history of the special relationship between the two countries in the Levant. It highlights the close political, economic, and social ties over centuries, often neither peaceful nor constructive. With an understanding for the relationship between Lebanon and Syria, the paper details the economic, social (health, education), and environmental (agriculture, food security) costs for Lebanon that emanate from the continuing Syria Crisis.

The resilience of Lebanon and its people is remarkable, though without support the impacts of the Syria Crisis could prove insurmountable. In February 2016, the London Conference brought together stakeholders that committed to substantial humanitarian and development support for Lebanon. They emphasised the importance of greater integration and cooperation among public, private, and civil society institutions to improve economic (e.g., labor market access, subsidy reform, competition, and market access), social (e.g., safety nets), and environmental (e.g., upgrade irrigation practices) policies in Lebanon with a view towards enhancing resilience and returning to a peaceful, sustainable, and inclusive development growth path.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Human Rights Watch (2016).

  2. 2.

    The Syrian Center for Policy Research (http://scpr-syria.org/publications/policy-reports/scpr-alienation-and-violence-report-2014-2/) calculated the direct or indirectly war related death toll at 470,000 people.

  3. 3.

    Continuously updated figures available from the UN inter-agency information sharing portal (UNHCR 2016).

  4. 4.

    See World Bank Development Indicators: World Bank (2016a).

  5. 5.

    Lebanon Center for Policy Studies (2016).

  6. 6.

    The Agreement, named after its authors Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, signed on the 16th of May 1916 was a secret agreement between the French Republic and the United Kingdom on the partition of the Middle-Eastern holdings of the Ottoman Empire contingent on the defeat of the Central Powers. See: Chaitani (2007), Cleveland and Bunton (2013), Fildis (2011), Khoury (1987) and others.

  7. 7.

    Kamrava (2005).

  8. 8.

    Shambrook (1998).

  9. 9.

    Faisal I bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi, an ally of British forces during the First World War, was declared King of Syria in 1920, and subsequently expelled from Syria following the French occupation of Damascus. He would later on be crowned King of Iraq in 1921 with the support of the British under their mandate of Iraq. See: Fildis (2011), pp. 40–43.

  10. 10.

    Shambrook (1998).

  11. 11.

    Henry Gouraud, quoted in Traboulsi (2007), p. 86.

  12. 12.

    There is a lot of disagreement on the methods used for this census. The authorities agreed to include the Armenian community as part of the Lebanese citizenry, while some Muslim communities in the North and South of Lebanon were excluded in an effort to minimize the existing Muslim population. Khoury and Jaulin (2012).

  13. 13.

    Khoury (1987).

  14. 14.

    Khoury (1981).

  15. 15.

    The revolt against the French Mandate in Syria was mainly aimed at popular dissatisfaction against the French Administration viz-a-viz economic and political appropriation. For example, the French officers and administrative attaches were meant to provide training and expertise in governance so that they may in the future be able to rule independently; however, in quick order, the French authorities placed themselves in direct control of all governmental institutions. This disdain against Syrian self-rule as well as the economic disempowerment of established Syrian elites and tribal Shaykhs are the main causes of the Great Syrian Revolt. Even though the French forces soundly put down the rebellion by 1927, French authorities were forced to compromise to maintain order. This compromise involved the appointment of Syrian urban elites and rural Shaykhs into political and economic positions, as well as the unification of Syria under a central government. See: Fildis (2011), Khoury (1981, 1982).

  16. 16.

    Lebanse Nationalists prominent among Lebanese intellectuals before and during the French Mandate supported the idea of an Independent Lebanon, distinct from Syria. Its pioneers include Adib, al-Sawada, K.T. Khaiarallah and Bulus Nujaym among others. See: Fildis (2011), Traboulsi (2007).

  17. 17.

    Cleveland and Bunton (2013).

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    Chaitani (2007).

  20. 20.

    Traboulsi (2007).

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Makdisi and Sadaka (2003).

  23. 23.

    Heydemann (1999), Krókowska (2011).

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    Syrian political and military elites felt underrepresented and their interests sidelined under the new federal arrangement. While Nasr’s popularity was waning, Syrian dissatisfaction was increasing resulting in the collapse of the UAR. For more detailed information on the UAR, see Kamrava (2005).

  27. 27.

    Heydemann (1999).

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Ibid, p. 6.

  30. 30.

    Between 1990 and 2010, Syria had an average GDP growth of 4.98 percent, while immediately after liberalization during the 1990s, Syria’s average GDP growth was 5.39 percent. In the meantime, unemployment in the country decreased by half from 1997 until 2010, from 16.761 to 8.613 (data on unemployment not available prior to 1997). International Monetary Fund (2013).

  31. 31.

    Cleveland and Bunton (2013).

  32. 32.

    There are many more nuanced reasons for the Lebanese Civil War and the sectarian conflicts in Lebanon. Beyond economic and political discrepancies, issues of identity, Lebanon’s place in the Cold War, relations with its neighbors, especially Syria and Israel formed many of the problems dividing Lebanese opinion. For more details on these issues and for a more comprehensive analysis on the Lebanese Civil war, see: Chaitani (2007), Makdisi and Sadaka (2003), Rowayheb (2011), Traboulsi (2007) among others.

  33. 33.

    For more detail on the factions and their interaction, see: Rowayheb (2011).

  34. 34.

    Rowayheb (2011).

  35. 35.

    Makdisi and Sadaka (2003).

  36. 36.

    Balanche (2005).

  37. 37.

    “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic” (1992).

  38. 38.

    Osoegawa (2013).

  39. 39.

    Alvarez-Ossorio (2012).

  40. 40.

    For details on Hezbollah’s objectives, structure, and emergence as well as involvement in Syria, please refer to Masters and Laub (2014), Norton (2014), Sullivan (2014).

  41. 41.

    Lebanon ranks 123 among 168 countries in the Transparency International “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015” (Transparency International 2015).

  42. 42.

    Government of Lebanon (2016).

  43. 43.

    Ibid.

  44. 44.

    Gebara (2015), all currency references are in USD

  45. 45.

    Banque du Liban (2015).

  46. 46.

    Chabaan (2016), Chabaan and Harb (2015) and Leenders (2016).

  47. 47.

    Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (2015).

  48. 48.

    World Bank (2016a).

  49. 49.

    Under the project “National Agenda for the Future of Syria” different political scenarios (e.g., “business as usual,” “ESCWA likely”) represent the basis for modeling socio-economic requirements for reconstruction and stabilization (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 2016b).

  50. 50.

    Merchandise trade correlation index (annual, 1995--2012)—Lebanon vis-à-vis: (1) Jordan: 0.3347, (2) Saudi Arabia: 0.2730; (3) Syria: 0.2437; (4) Palestine: 0.2438; (5) Bahrain: 0.1977; (6) Oman: 0.1844; (7) Turkey: 0.1486; (8) United Arab Emirates: 0.1432; (10) Kuwait: 0.1015; (11) Qatar: 0.0734; (12) Yemen: 0.0173; and (14) Iraq: −0.0039 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2016).

  51. 51.

    Calì et al. (2015).

  52. 52.

    Darwish et al. (2009).

  53. 53.

    Heinrich Boell Foundation (2006).

  54. 54.

    United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2015).

  55. 55.

    Calì et al. (2015), International Monetary Fund (2014), World Bank (2015, 2016a), and Yaacoub and Badre (2011).

  56. 56.

    Central Administration of Statistics and World Bank (2015), World Bank (2016a).

  57. 57.

    UNRWA (2014).

  58. 58.

    World Bank (2013).

  59. 59.

    MoE/EU/UNDP (2016).

  60. 60.

    Lyles and Doocy (2015), UNHCR (2014b), and UNICEF (2014).

  61. 61.

    World Bank (2013).

  62. 62.

    World Bank (2013).

  63. 63.

    UNHCR (2014b).

  64. 64.

    Lyles and Doocy (2015).

  65. 65.

    International Medical Corps (2013).

  66. 66.

    Lyles and Doocy (2015), p. 33.

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    Ibid.

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    UNHCR (2014b).

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    Ibid.

  73. 73.

    UNHCR (2015).

  74. 74.

    World Health Organization (2014).

  75. 75.

    Ibid.

  76. 76.

    UNHCR (2014b).

  77. 77.

    UNHCR and REACH (2014).

  78. 78.

    UNHCR (2014a).

  79. 79.

    Ibid.

  80. 80.

    UNHCR and REACH (2014).

  81. 81.

    Ibid.

  82. 82.

    Many Lebanese children are taught in either French or English, with Arabic as a separate class; Syrian children were taught wholly in Arabic, presenting an impasse to performance and integration of many Syrian children who are in the LES.

  83. 83.

    UNICEF (2014).

  84. 84.

    UNHCR and REACH (2014).

  85. 85.

    UNHCR (2014a), p. 2.

  86. 86.

    Central Administration of Statistics (2013).

  87. 87.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2014).

  88. 88.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2015).

  89. 89.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2014).

  90. 90.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2015).

  91. 91.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2014).

  92. 92.

    MoE/EU/UNDP (2014).

  93. 93.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2015).

  94. 94.

    MoE/EU/UNDP (2014).

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    MoE/EU/UNDP (2016).

  97. 97.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2014).

  98. 98.

    United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2016a).

  99. 99.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2015).

  100. 100.

    MoE/EU/UNDP (2014).

  101. 101.

    Ibid.

  102. 102.

    Ibid.

  103. 103.

    United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2016a).

  104. 104.

    WFP/UNHCR/UNICEF (2015).

  105. 105.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2015).

  106. 106.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2015), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2016a).

  107. 107.

    WFP/UNHCR/UNICEF (2015).

  108. 108.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2015).

  109. 109.

    WFP/UNHCR/UNICEF (2015).

  110. 110.

    Ibid.

  111. 111.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2015), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2016a).

  112. 112.

    WFP/UNHCR/UNICEF (2015).

  113. 113.

    Food and Agriculture Organization (2015).

  114. 114.

    Development Management International (2012).

  115. 115.

    WFP/UNHCR/UNICEF (2015).

  116. 116.

    Ibid.

  117. 117.

    United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2016a).

  118. 118.

    UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2014).

  119. 119.

    United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2016a).

  120. 120.

    MoE/EU/UNDP (2014).

  121. 121.

    Ibid.

  122. 122.

    Ibid.

  123. 123.

    BOD5 calculates the quantity of oxygen required or used for the microbiological decomposition (oxidation) of organic material in water. It is frequently used by academics and environmental agencies to measure the pollution load in water.

  124. 124.

    Ibid.

  125. 125.

    Ibid.

  126. 126.

    Ibid.

  127. 127.

    MoE/EU/UNDP (2016).

  128. 128.

    World Health Organization (2014).

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Acknowledgments

The authors thank the reviewers for their time and valuable comments. We also appreciate the editorial assistance from Ms. Rebecca Crompton.

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Correspondence to Denise Sumpf .

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A.1 Annex

A.1 Annex

Table 3 Summary timeline of events from the French Mandate onwards
Map 1
figure b

Lebanese environmental assessment of the Syrian conflict and priority intervention—distribution of informal and tented settlements on agricultural areas. Source: MoE/EU/UNDP (2016)

Map 2
figure c

Hot spot map for MSW impacts on surface and ground water. Source: MoE/EU/UNDP (2014)

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Sumpf, D., Isaila, V., Najjar, K. (2016). The Impact of the Syria Crisis on Lebanon. In: Kotsireas, I., Nagurney, A., Pardalos, P. (eds) Dynamics of Disasters—Key Concepts, Models, Algorithms, and Insights. DOD 2015 2016. Springer Proceedings in Mathematics & Statistics, vol 185. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43709-5_14

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