Austin’s Speech Acts and Mey’s Pragmemes

Abstract

The present paper examines Austin’s (How to do things with words. Oxford University Press, Oxford. [First edition 1962], [1962]1975) speech acts theory and Mey’s (Pragmatics: an introduction (2nd edn). Blackwell, Oxford, 2001) pragmatic theory, and show their theories are based on similar understandings of how language works as a communication tool. This contention is assessed by comparing and contrasting (i) Austin’s (How to do things with words. Oxford University Press, Oxford. [First edition 1962], 1975) felicity conditions with Mey’s concept of situated speech acts, and (ii) Austin’s (How to do things with words. Oxford University Press, Oxford. [First edition 1962], 1975) distinction between illocutionary act types and actual illocutionary acts performed in real situations, with Mey’s (2001) distinction between pragmemes and pragmatic acts (i.e. practs) as instantiated, individual acts of a pragmeme. Because of their similarities, Mey’s (Pragmatics: an introduction (2nd edn). Blackwell, Oxford, 2001) pragmatic theory suggests how Austin’s speech act theory should be interpreted as a pragmatic theory. We will show that situatedness of speech/pragmatic acts does not only lie in the social, physical, and cognitive situation, but also in the discourse situation in which the expositive illocutionary act type brings about effects.