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Chapter 4: Curbing Post-Communist Corruption: External Pressure vs. Domestic Commitment

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A Quarter Century of Post-Communism Assessed

Abstract

At the end of the 1990s, the World Bank rated the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) the most corrupt region in the world, while Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, though not as bad, were not far behind. Since that assessment, the situation has improved in much of the post-communist world, but not as much as would be hoped for. This chapter investigates the perceived and experienced corruption in four post-communist states – Russia, two countries admitted to the EU in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania), and one non-EU country that has been the star performer in terms of reducing corruption, Georgia. It is demonstrated that, while there is evidence that under the pressure of the EU, corruption levels did improve somewhat in Bulgaria and Romania in the years immediately preceding and after their admission to the EU, domestic political will and capacity are ultimately crucial for success.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This chapter is based in part on research generously funded by the Australian Research Council (Grants DP0558453 and DP110102854).

  2. 2.

    These concepts overlap with Arend Lijphart’s notion of ‘theory-infirming’ and ‘deviant’ case studies, though the distinction between these two in Lijphart’s analysis is opaque (Lijphart 1971, pp. 691–693).

  3. 3.

    Nowadays, the country experts that assess countries for the CPI use both business perception data and other sources in evaluating the standard of governance; for details of the 12 sources used for the 2015 CPI see Transparency International (2015).

  4. 4.

    For earlier assessments of the level and nature of state capture in both these states plus Georgia and Russia, based on the EBRD and World Bank’s Business Environment and Economic Performance Surveys (BEEPS), see Pradhan et al. (2000, pp. 13, 35); Gray et al. (2004, pp. 25, 28); Anderson and Gray (2006, pp. 18, 29). Martini (2014) provides a straightforward and up-to-date analysis of the concept of state capture.

  5. 5.

    Only 14 in 2006.

  6. 6.

    The GCR question was ‘In your country, how common is diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or groups due to corruption?’ (weighted average).

  7. 7.

    The GCR score is the mean average across the five components of the following Executive Opinion Survey question: ‘In your country, how common is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with (a) imports and exports; (b) public utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) awarding of public contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining favourable judicial decisions?’ (weighted average).

  8. 8.

    The GCR question was ‘To what extent do government officials in your country show favouritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts?’ (weighted average).

  9. 9.

    In this table, two or more countries may have the same score but be ranked differently because of rounding to one decimal place.

  10. 10.

    Unfortunately, the World Bank presented the data for three of our four countries (all except Russia) in a different format in the reports on BEEPS 2011; instead of providing the percentage of firms that identified corruption as a problem of doing business, they provided data on the percentage of firms that identified corruption as the main obstacle to doing business.

  11. 11.

    The mismatch may be less pronounced than it appears, since some analysts maintain that many respondents may not admit to having had direct experience of bribery even when they have; but see the following text concerning Bulgaria.

  12. 12.

    Unfortunately, the EU itself did not publicly reveal the figure. For its press release see European Commission (2008a), and for the report (which contains several Euro figures, but does not specify how much of each fund will be subject to delayed payment) see European Commission (2008b).

  13. 13.

    This said, in March 2016 the RAND Corporation recommended extending the CVM concept to other EU member-states (RAND 2016; Novinite 2016).

  14. 14.

    This is particularly true of the traffic police. However, it is not clear that this is a result of the police reforms that have been introduced since 2011. Rather, it seems that citizens’ increasing use of mobile ‘phone and dash-mounted cameras when stopped by the traffic police may be the principal explanation.

  15. 15.

    For a detailed analysis of the corruption and anti-corruption situation in Russia from the collapse of Communist power through most of the Medvedev presidency see Holmes (2012).

  16. 16.

    Saakashvili’s second term as president ended in November 2013; under the Georgian Constitution, no individual may run for more than two consecutive terms. Saakashvili has since May 2015 been governor of the Ukrainian region of Odessa and is now a Ukrainian citizen.

  17. 17.

    On the radical police reforms see Devlin (2010); Light (2014) – while a comprehensive analysis of almost all aspects of anti-corruption reform through 2011 can be found in World Bank (2012). For discourse analyses of Georgian anti-corruption see Di Puppo (2010, 2014).

  18. 18.

    It could be countered that Singapore, which the Democracy Index also rated until 2013 as a hybrid system, has maintained low levels of corruption for a sustained period, thus challenging our argument. However, Singapore might be the exception that proves the rule. It is also a very affluent society, and there is a strong correlation between affluence and corruption levels (i.e. wealthier societies are generally perceived to have lower levels of corruption). Moreover, Singapore just managed to slip into the ‘flawed democracy’ category in the 2014 Democracy Index.

  19. 19.

    For the record, Georgia formally began to move closer to the EU in 2006. In 2011, President Saakashvili announced that he would like to see his country join the EU, but no time frame was given. Although Georgia has yet to make a formal application to join the EU, the two sides deepened their relationship with the adoption in 2014 of an Association Agreement.

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  1. School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

    Leslie Holmes

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  1. University of California, Berkeley, California, USA

    M. Steven Fish

  2. University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia

    Graeme Gill

  3. University of Canterbury , Christchurch, New Zealand

    Milenko Petrovic

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Holmes, L. (2017). Chapter 4: Curbing Post-Communist Corruption: External Pressure vs. Domestic Commitment. In: Fish, M., Gill, G., Petrovic, M. (eds) A Quarter Century of Post-Communism Assessed. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43437-7_5

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