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Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption

  • Thomas UnterluggauerEmail author
  • Stefan Mangard
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9689)

Abstract

Memory and disk encryption is a common measure to protect sensitive information in memory from adversaries with physical access. However, physical access also comes with the risk of physical attacks. As these may pose a threat to memory confidentiality, this paper investigates contemporary memory and disk encryption schemes and their implementations with respect to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). It shows that DPA and DFA recover the keys of all the investigated schemes, including the tweakable block ciphers XEX and XTS. This paper also verifies the feasibility of such attacks in practice. Using the EM side channel, a DPA on the disk encryption employed within the ext4 file system is shown to reveal the used master key on a Zynq Z-7010 system on chip. The results suggest that memory and disk encryption secure against physical attackers is at least four times more expensive.

Keywords

Memory encryption Side-channel attack Power analysis DPA Fault analysis DFA Ext4 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work has been supported by the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) under grant number 845579 (MEMSEC).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Applied Information Processing and CommunicationsGraz University of TechnologyGrazAustria

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