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Australian National Security Intelligence Collection Since 9/11: Policy and Legislative Challenges

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National Security, Surveillance and Terror

Part of the book series: Crime Prevention and Security Management ((CPSM))

Abstract

A key lesson from 9/11 was that intelligence agencies could no longer simply wait for information to arrive. The enhanced threat from Al Qaeda and their global franchises required an extensive and ‘real-time’ collection of intelligence. This new operating environment has refashioned Australian and other Five Eyes countries, therefore, to be more active ‘hunters’ of information. This chapter examines both policy and counter-terrorism legislative landmarks underpinning intelligence collection since 9/11, and the many challenges Australian agencies have faced managing policy and legislative reform. The Australian counter-terrorism response is then compared briefly to the Canadian policy and legislative context to identify common and unique challenges by policymakers.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In Canada there were some early periods of terrorism primarily perpetrated by groups such as the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors, a Russian religious sect, and the Front de Liberation Quebec (FLQ)—the violence of the latter peaking in the mid-1970s. In the main, Canada was used as a base to support terrorism groups planning attacks elsewhere in the world such as the Air India Flight 182 bombing by Sikh separatists. See Mullins 2013.

  2. 2.

    While writing this chapter, Prime Minister Tony Abbott was deposed in a Liberal Party leadership challenge by his Communications Minister, Malcolm Turnbull. In September 2015 Mr Turnbull became the fifth prime minister since 9/11. It is still early days for the new Turnbull Government and there has been no major departure on counter-terrorism and intelligence policy or legislation from his predecessor to date.

  3. 3.

    The ASD or Australian Signals Directorate is Australia’s sigint collection agency. Until May 2013, it was known as DSD or the Defence Signals Directorate. The government changed its name to reflect a desire to see it have a more ‘whole of government’ function in Australia’s national security beyond the defence portfolio. Its Canadian counterpart is the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC). ASIS or the Australian Secret Intelligence Service is Australia’s foreign intelligence collection agency. It does not have an exact equivalent in the Canadian intelligence community.

  4. 4.

    There is insufficient space to provide detailed discussion of both the Arar and Charkaoui cases. In brief, Maher Arar was detained in the USA on his way home to Canada in 2002 based on information provided to US officials from Canadian authorities. The USA then renditioned Arar back to Syria (the country of his birth), where he was again detained and tortured for a year by the Syrian Military Intelligence Agency. The Arar case demonstrated several procedural problems during Arar’s investigation in Canada particularly with sharing intelligence and its accuracy (see Walsh 2011, 154–155). Adil Charkaoui’s case related to an adverse security finding against him under Canada’s security certificate legislation (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001), which enables usually the Ministers for Public Safety and Immigration to arrest, detain and eventually deport a person named in a security certificate, if the ministers have reasonable grounds to believe a person is a danger to national security. In 2009, a federal court declared the security certificate against Charkaoui null and void as the government failed to meet its burden of proof once it removed disputed material gathered by wiretaps (see Walsh 2011, 230–231).

  5. 5.

    In June 2016, however, the new Trudeau Government introduced Bill C-22 into parliament to create a new national security and intelligence committee.

  6. 6.

    There are some differences in the mandate and operations of Canada’s SIRC and IGIS in Australia. SIRC only has review and audit responsibilities for CSIS while Australia’s Inspector-General is responsible for reviewing all agencies in the Australian Intelligence Community. SIRC tends to do historical, ‘retrospective’ reviews while IGIS does regular inspections seeking to remedy an issue before it requires a more major intervention.

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Walsh, P.F. (2016). Australian National Security Intelligence Collection Since 9/11: Policy and Legislative Challenges. In: Lippert, R., Walby, K., Warren, I., Palmer, D. (eds) National Security, Surveillance and Terror. Crime Prevention and Security Management. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43243-4_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43243-4_3

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