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Netherlands East Indies’ War Crimes Trials in the Face of Decolonization

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War Crimes Trials in the Wake of Decolonization and Cold War in Asia, 1945-1956

Part of the book series: World Histories of Crime, Culture and Violence ((WHCCV))

Abstract

With the Second World War still raging on, representatives of the Allied governments gathered in a number of organizations such as the London International Assembly, the International Commission for Penal Reform and Development and the United Nations War Crimes Commission, to address the use of legal means to confront war crimes and to establish a practical scheme for the prosecution and punishment of war criminals. Through the likes of Dr. de Moor and Captain-Lieutenant Mouton, the Netherlands took an active role in these first international efforts, determined to contribute towards the adjudication of international crimes. As a result of this Allied exertion, the Axis ‘arch criminals’ were put on trial at the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo, while numerous ‘lesser perpetrators’ were sentenced in national war crimes courts. The Netherlands established national courts in Europe as well as in their colony of the Netherlands East Indies. Unlike in the motherland, where peace had been re-established, Netherlands Indies postwar justice took place in a period of great internal turmoil and fast-changing international political relations. As a result of the precarious Dutch political position and the Netherlands’ double experience with war crimes both at home and in its colony, different perceptions emerged of what was acceptable in times of war and what was indeed punishable action. Misbehavior condemned by Dutch temporary courts-martial over sentencing of Japanese war criminals, was for example displayed by the Dutch military against Indonesian forces at the same time, while war crimes trial regulations were used to convict Indonesian independence fighters. This chapter shows that in the Netherlands East Indies, postwar justice was contextualized and partial, as the political situation heavily influenced the policy and outcome of the trials.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Representatives of the Allied governments gathered in the London International Assembly, the International Commission for Penal Reform and Development, and the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) to discuss legal methods for dealing with atrocities. The Netherlands government-in-exile in London played an active and determined role, through their representatives, Dr. J. M. de Moor and Dr. M.W. Mouton, in these early international efforts.

  2. 2.

    Although official ratification of these arrangements never took place, they were later implicitly accepted by the Netherlands Indies government. Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies (NIOD), collection 400, inventarisnummer (inv. no.) 1926, ‘Voorlopige informatie van het Departement van Justitie te Batavia over de berechting van oorlogsmisdadigers’ (20 February 1946), 15.

  3. 3.

    Four of these seventeen War Crimes Investigation Teams (WCIT), were stationed in the Netherlands Indies and placed under a British war crimes coordinating officer at HQ AFNEI. While the teams were led by British officers, Dutch staff was added. Teams 1, 2 and 3 were stationed on Java, with WCIT 1 and 3 positioned around Batavia while WCIT 2 worked in the surroundings of Surabaya. WCIT 4, with Captain N. D. J. Read-Collins as C.O. was stationed on Sumatra and had its base in Medan. Teams 2 and 3 were dissolved in the beginning of 1946 and when the British withdrew from the Netherlands Indies in November 1946 their tasks were transferred to the military prosecutors of the temporary courts-martial. The registry became part of the War Crimes (Coordination) Section in May 1946.

    NIOD, collection 400, inv. no. 4526, J. Ph. Mullemeister, ‘Verslag van de werkzaamheden der Nederlandse Liaison Sectie voor oorlogsmisdaden te Singapore over het tijdvak December 1945 tot December 1947’ (Singapore, December 1947), 8–12. Bart van Poelgeest, Japanse besognes: Nederland en Japan 1945–1975 (Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers, 1999), 91–2.

    Zahar mentions eighteen SEAC war crime investigation teams. Alexander Zahar, ‘Trial Procedure at the British Military Courts, Hong Kong, 1946–1948,’ in Suzannah Linton, ed., Hong Kong’s war crimes trials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 35.

  4. 4.

    Mullemeister, ‘Verslag van de werkzaamheden,’ 2, 5.

  5. 5.

    The intelligence operations of the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) on Java and those of the Anglo Dutch Country Section (ADCS) on Sumatra had been a fiasco and also MacArthur had failed to collect any intelligence. Petra M. H. Groen, Marsroutes en dwaalsporen: het Nederlands militair-strategische beleid in Indonesië 1945–1950 (Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers, 1991), 18 and Andrew Roadnight, ‘Sleeping with the Enemy: Britain, Japanese Troops and the Netherlands East Indies, 1945–1946,’ History 87 (2002): 248. Stanley Woodburn Kirby, The war against Japan, 5 vols. (London: HMSO, 1969), vol. 5, The Surrender of Japan, 311 (hereafter Woodburn Kirby, Surrender). Jaap de Moor, Generaal Spoor: Triomf en Tragiek van een Legercommandant (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011), 163–4. See also Johannes J. Nortier, Acties in de Archipel, (Franeker: Uitgeverij T. Wever bv, 1985).

  6. 6.

    De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 139.

  7. 7.

    During the war, Sumatra was placed under control of the 25th Army, Java and Madura were under the 16th Army, while Borneo and eastern Indonesia were controlled by the Navy 2nd South Fleet. The Japanese established a military administration on Java and Sumatra and naval civil administration on the outer islands.

  8. 8.

    Elly Touwen-Bouwsma, ‘Van Banzai tot Bersiap,’ in Tussen banzai en bersiap: de afwikkeling van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Nederlands-Indië, Elly Touwen-Bouwsma and Petra Groen, eds. (Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers, 1996), 10–1. Govert C. Zijlmans, Eindstrijd en ondergang van de Indische Bestuursdienst: Het Corps Binnenlands Bestuur op Java, 1945–1950 (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1985), 28–32.

  9. 9.

    De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 148. The Dutch also benefitted from the efforts of British and Australian war crimes investigation teams who also collated information on war crimes and the identity and location of suspected war criminals in the NEI.

  10. 10.

    Van Poelgeest, Japanse besognes, 88–9.

  11. 11.

    NIOD, collection 400, inv. no. 1905, ‘Uitreksel uit het register der besluiten van den Lieutenant-Gouverneur Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië’ (Brisbane, 11 September 1945). The Bureau was initially established in Brisbane but relocated to Batavia.

  12. 12.

    On August 1, 1946 a Sub-Bureau Nederland tot Nasporing van Oorlogsmisdaden was founded at the Commissariaat voor Indische Zaken. Between August 1946 and March 1948, 447 interrogation reports were made. Members of the sub-bureau were the aforementioned reserve Captain Benders (until April 1947), W. Th. Spier, and C. S. Sant, who all had been part of the war crimes investigations teams in Medan and Singapore. A. Mieremet became head of the sub-bureau, assisted in his activities by several secretaries.

    NIOD, collection 400, inv. no. 486, A. Mieremet, ‘Verslag over de werkzaamheden van het Subbureau Nederland van het Regeringsbureau tot Nasporing van Oorlogsmisdaden’ (1948).

  13. 13.

    NIOD, collection 400, inv. no. 650, ‘Gecertificeerd verslag Nefis Balikpapan oorlogsmisdaden 1946’. Robert Cribb, ‘Avoiding clemency: the trial and transfer of Japanese war criminals in Indonesia, 1946–1949,’ Japanese Studies 31 (2011): 160–1.

  14. 14.

    Around 1000 persons had been interrogated under oath, when the NWCIT of Captain Benders was dissolved in May 1946. Mullemeister, ‘Verslag van de werkzaamheden,’ 19–20.

  15. 15.

    NIOD, collection 400, inv. no. 442, J. G. Benders, ‘Rapport uitgebracht ingevolge mondelinge opdracht van den heer Procureur-Generaal Generaal Professor Mr. Jonkers’ (8 March 1946).

  16. 16.

    Jan Bank (Introduction), De excessen nota: Nota betreffende het archievenonderzoek naar gegevens omtrent excessen in Indonesië begaan door Nederlandse militairen in de periode 1945–1950 (Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers, 1995), Annex 8, 2.

  17. 17.

    Levinus F. de Groot, Berechting Japanse oorlogsmisdadigers in Nederlands-Indië 1946–1949: Temporaire Krijgsraad Batavia, 2 vols. (Den Bosch: Art & Research, 1990), vol. 1, 18.

  18. 18.

    NIOD, collection 400, inv. no. 5325, Christoffel van den Berg, ‘Verslag werkzaamheden’ (Batavia, 19 February 1949).

  19. 19.

    Iris Heidebrink, ‘Military Tribunals in the Netherlands East Indies,’ in ed. Peter Post et al., The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 414.

  20. 20.

    The defendants had to right to choose their defense counsel; otherwise, one was assigned to them by the court. The Japanese lawyers were often assisted by Dutch-, Malay- or English-speaking interrogators.

  21. 21.

    During interrogations, some of the suspects had not been treated according to the established rules and the judges were frequently presented with unreliable witnesses and unsafe evidence during trial. Additionally, many of the jurists involved had first-hand experience with Japanese atrocities; either as POW or as civilian prisoners. A situation that in certain cases led to biased justice, as acknowledged by former Batavian Judge L. F. de Groot.

    De Groot, Berechting Japanse oorlogsmisdadigers in Nederlands-Indië 1946–1949, 376. Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, inventarisnummer. 2, nummer toegang 2.21.281.31, Collectie 584 L.F. de Groot, 1946–1991, Draft of an untitled article by P. Schumacher on L. F. de Groot (September 1989), annexed to letter from P. Schumacher to De Groot (19 September 1989), 4. Levinus F. de Groot, ‘De rechtspraak inzake oorlogsmisdrijven in Nederlands-Indië (1947–1949),’ Militair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift 78 (1985): 86. Charles van der Sloot, a former investigation officer in Morotai and substitute judge-advocate at the temporary court-martial in Makassar, acknowledged that hatred for the Japanese influenced the legal decision-making of the court. Interview with Charles van der Sloot, 13 November 2014, on file with author.

  22. 22.

    United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals, 15 vols. (London: HMSO, 1947–1949), vol. 11, 109–110.

  23. 23.

    UNWCC, Law Reports, vol. 11, 109.

  24. 24.

    Van Poelgeest, Japanse besognes, 107.

  25. 25.

    Most victims had been heiho, auxiliary soldiers that had been recruited by the Japanese army among the Indonesian population were trained under Japanese officers and integrated into the Japanese army.

  26. 26.

    Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979), 178–9.

  27. 27.

    This was the trial of Captain Sōnei Kenichi, former commander of the women’s camp Cideng. The temporary court-martial in Batavia had been established on 31 December 1945. Between March 1946 and August 1946 it had primarily tried collaboration cases. De Groot, Berechting Japanse oorlogsmisdadigers in Nederlands-Indië 1946–1949, vol. 1, 21.

  28. 28.

    However, in practice the ‘definition of war crimes degree’ did not replace but merely augmented the already existing penal code. Unlike the Netherlands, where the majority of general provisions of the penal code and the code of military justice were made applicable for the adjudication of war crimes, the general principles and rules of the Netherlands East Indies Penal Code were valid in the sphere of war crimes, as long as they did not depart from the Special War Crimes Legislation. To further enable the inclusion of sufficient provision for the sort of war crimes committed during the Asia Pacific war, several articles were suspended, including article 1 of the Indies Penal Code which described the rule Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. UNWCC, Law Reports, vol. 11, 91–2. Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1946 no. 45.

  29. 29.

    Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1946 no. 44.

  30. 30.

    No. 15031. Rechtswezen. Oorlogsmisdrijven. ‘Toelichting op de ontworpen wetgeving inzake oorlogsmisdrijven’ (also known as Bijblad op het Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 15031), 36–37.

  31. 31.

    ‘The reference to the “laws and usages of war” was at the same time a reference to the international treaties and conventions or agreements which contain the rules concerning these laws and usages and was the formal basis on which some of the Temporary Courts Martial applied relevant provisions of The Hague regulations and the Geneva Convention.’ Case of Tanabe Koshiro, Temporary Courts Martial Makassar in UNWCC, Law Reports, vol. 11, 3.

  32. 32.

    About one-third of the 1056 defendants before the TCMs were members of the Kempeitai, the army’s military police, or the Tokkeitai, its naval equivalent. Lou de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 1939–1945, 14 vols. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), vol. 12, 2, 896.

  33. 33.

    Fred L. Borch, ‘In the Name of the Queen: Military Trials of Japanese War Criminals in the Netherlands East Indies (1946–1949),’ Journal of Military History 79 (2015): 101–2.

  34. 34.

    One report from a Dutch meeting of departmental heads stated: ‘Some doubt was expressed on whether one should consider the crimes [enumerated] to be war crimes, as the Allies have also committed such acts. However, since the United Nations War Crimes Commission has laid down this list of war crimes, it seemed better to maintain them.’ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Algemene Secretarie van de Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde Archieven, nummer toegang 2.10.14, inventarisnummer 2289, ‘Kort verslag van de vergadering van den Raad van Departements hoofden, gehouden op Woensdag 29 Mei 1946 ten Paleize Koningsplein,’ 3.

  35. 35.

    The four added crimes were: ill-treatment of interned civilians or prisoners, carrying out of or causing execution to be carried out in an inhuman way, refusal of aid or prevention of aid being given to shipwrecked persons, and intentional withholding of medical supplies from civilians.

  36. 36.

    In the years that the war crimes trials in the Netherlands East Indies took place Japan and the Netherlands were technically still in a state of war. Peace between the countries was officially signed in 1952.

  37. 37.

    Revised Judicial Procedures of the Army of 29 August 1945, laid down in Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1945 no. 112, and revised by Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1945 no. 126.

  38. 38.

    ‘Rechtspleging Oorlogsmisdrijven,’Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1946 no. 47, 5–6; and UNWCC, Law reports, vol. 11, 108.

  39. 39.

    Lasykar Rakyat was the Indonesian translation of Giyūgun (volunteer army), the local equivalent of the PETA (The PETA, Pembela Tanah Air, was a locally based volunteer army, officered by Indonesians) in Sumatra. From late 1945 onwards the word lasykar was generally applied to armed groups not belonging to the official republican forces. Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945–1949 (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2009), 71.

  40. 40.

    ‘Netherlands Trial Report No. 18 (Sentence against Mizuo Katsuno),’ (original translation) available via http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2bf8e6/

  41. 41.

    Research is however still in progress and the final numbers might slightly vary.

  42. 42.

    Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1946 no. 45, article 7 stated: ‘In the case that a person after a conviction for war crimes is once more found guilty of a war crime committed before the previous sentencing, this former conviction will be taken into account in the sense that besides a death penalty no other penalty may be imposed, besides a life sentence no temporary prison term can be imposed, and in the event of temporary imprisonment the joint duration of the sentences should not exceed twenty years.’

  43. 43.

    Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1946 no. 45.

  44. 44.

    See for example the trial against Miwa Keijiro et al. In this case the court-martial in Batavia declared itself incompetent because the alleged victims were of Siamese and not of Dutch nationality. NIOD, collection 400, inv. no. 379.

  45. 45.

    Utsumi Aiko, ‘Korean “imperial soldiers”: remembering colonialism and crimes against Allied POWs‚’ in Perilous memories: the Asia-Pacific war(s), ed. Takashi Fujitani et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 212.

  46. 46.

    In cases where the courts relied on concepts of conspiracy and membership of a criminal organization rather than on more straightforward attributions of personal liability, this could often be explained by the difficulties they encountered when collecting evidence against individual members of the Kempeitai, and the Tokkeitai. “‘Much knowledge had been obtained about the Kempeitai; the conclusion had been drawn that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to gather enough evidence against individual officers; the names of the perpetrators were often unknown to the victims and it was uncertain if they would recognize them during a confrontation.’ De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, vol. 12, 892.

  47. 47.

    ‘Case No. 79 (Trial of Shigeki Motomura and 15 Others),’ 13 (original translation) available via http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/952e93/

  48. 48.

    A. Zahar, ‘Trial Procedure at the British Military Courts,’ 34.

  49. 49.

    The Kempeitai and Tokkeitai were for example especially targeted during investigations by the Australians. Australian War Memorial, 619⁄7⁄52, ‘Intelligence tasks,’ 2, annexed to ‘Report on operational and administrative activities HQ Morotai Force’ (15 August 1945–31 December 1945).

  50. 50.

    During the war, various international organizations, including the UNWCC, had discussed the plea of superior orders. The members of the UNWCC unanimously agreed that in principle the mere fact of having acted in obedience to superior orders did not of itself relieve a person who has committed a war crime from responsibility. It decided, however, not to lay down any principles or rules for the guidance of the national courts due to the fact that most countries already had established legal rules on the subject, that these rules varied considerably, and that national courts could decide what weight to attach to a plea of superior orders in each separate case. UNWCC, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the development of the laws of war (London: HMSO, 1948), 274–281. Dr. Yuen-Li Liang, ‘Report on the plea of obedience to superior orders,’ UNWWC (28 August 1944), 1, 2, available via http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1e39d7/.

  51. 51.

    UNWCC, Law reports, vol. 11, 99.

  52. 52.

    UNWCC, Law reports, vol. 11, 99. International Military Tribunal, Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, ‘The Blue Series,’ 42 vols. (Nuremberg: IMT, 1947–1949), Charter, vol. 1, 12. No. 15031. Rechtswezen. Oorlogsmisdrijven. ‘Toelichting op de ontworpen wetgeving inzake oorlogsmisdrijven’ (also known as Bijblad op het Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 15031), 46–7.

  53. 53.

    Also in the case of command responsibility it was generally left to the courts to decide if an accused could be held accountable for the deeds of his subordinates. The liability of superiors could be found in the Netherlands Indies penal code; ‘as perpetrators of a punishable act (the following) shall be punished: those who commit the act, cause it to be committed, or are accessories to it.’ The term ‘cause it to be committed’ clearly covered the case of a superior giving orders upon which a crime is perpetrated. However, in the sphere of war crimes, it was thought advisable to introduce specific rules for cases in which superiors were involved other than by issuing express orders. This would, for example, be the case if persons in authority had neglected to undertake measures which would have prevented or reduced the possibilities for a subordinate to perpetrate a crime, or if they should have tolerated such crimes to be committed; ‘He whose subordinate has committed a war crime shall be equally punishable for that war crime, if he has tolerated its commission by his subordinate whilst knowing, or at least must have reasonably supposed, that it was being or would be committed.’ If the court decided that the superior had taken the necessary measures to prevent a particular war crime or the perpetration of war crimes by his subordinates, the superior should be acquitted. UNWCC, Law reports, vol. 11, 100. ‘No. 15031. Rechtswezen,’ 48.

  54. 54.

    Woodburn Kirby, Surrender, 311. De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 163–8.

  55. 55.

    De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 153–6. Wim van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië: de val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2001), 81–2.

  56. 56.

    Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind. The United States, Britain, and the war against Japan, 1941–1945 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press: 1978), 681–2.

  57. 57.

    During the Japanese occupation, a large part of the European population and a significant part of the Eurasian population disappeared in internment camps. Thirteen per cent of the civilian internees would die in these camps. Meanwhile a fifth of prisoners of war—many of whom were used by the Japanese as forced labor elsewhere—perished in their camps, on the Siam–Burma Railway and in Japan’s mines and shipyards.

    The Japanese compelled as many as 4.1 million Indonesian laborers to work as so-called rōmusha or labor soldiers. From Java alone, around 300,000 Indonesians were sent to work elsewhere; it is thought that around three quarters of this group died from exhaustion, starvation and disease. The Japanese Army and Navy also recruited some 80,000 local auxiliary soldiers, the so-called heiho, from the ranks of the disbanded Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) and from among Indonesian youth, and coerced thousands of Indonesian women into serving as the so-called ‘comfort women.’

    E. Touwen-Bouwsma, ‘Japanese minority policy: the Eurasians on Java and the dilemma of ethnic loyalty,’ Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 152 (1996): 560. L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, vol. 12, 625, 753. K. Maekawa, ‘The heiho during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia,’ in P. H. Kratoska, ed., Asian labor in the wartime Japanese Empire: unknown histories (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), 189–191. P. H. Kratoska, ‘Labour mobilization in Japan and the Japanese Empire,’ in Kratoska, Asian labor in the wartime Japanese Empire, 20. H. Hovinga, ‘End of a forgotten drama: the reception and repatriation of rōmusha after the Japanese capitulation,’ in Kratoska, Asian labor in the wartime Japanese Empire, 213–215. Y. Tanaka, Japan’s comfort women: sexual slavery and prostitution during World War II and the US occupation (London: Routledge, 2002), 82.

  58. 58.

    When command over the NEI was transferred to SEAC, Australian forces had already occupied parts of the outer islands of the NEI (outer islands: Borneo, Celebes, western New Guinea and the string of islands running eastwards of Java (except Bali and Lombok)). It was agreed between Mountbatten and Blamey that SEAC eventually would take over command from the Australian forces (except for Timor and Dutch New Guinea) Woodburn Kirby, Surrender, 224–31, 353.

  59. 59.

    Richard McMillan, The British occupation of Indonesia 1945–1946. Britain, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Revolution (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006), 2.

  60. 60.

    The complete command area consisted of 1.5 million square miles, containing more than 128 million people. Woodburn Kirby, Surrender, 230 and Roadnight, ‘Sleeping with the Enemy,’ 248.

  61. 61.

    Roadnight, ‘Sleeping with the Enemy,’ 249. Petra Groen, Marsroutes en dwaalsporen, 21.

  62. 62.

    Roadnight, ‘Sleeping with the Enemy,’ 249.

    The morning after Japan’s capitulation, awaiting official confirmation of the surrender, the top of the Japanese military administration and the headquarters of the Japanese 16th Army on Java held a meeting to discuss and decide on how to proceed. While Allied contact with the Japanese Supreme Commander of the Southern General Army Terauchi Hisakazu had yet to be established—this happened only on 20 August—and thus no orders had been received, those present decided to comply with the imperial broadcast. A ‘sincere’ attitude towards the Allies was adopted, while the ‘interests of Japan and the protection of the Japanese’ were to serve as guidelines for further decisions. Swift repatriation of the Japanese troops was paramount and Allied accusations of non-obedience had to be avoided at all costs. Official efforts to ‘guide’ the Indonesians to independence were therefore halted and the PETA and heiho forces disbanded and disarmed, leaving the question of Indonesian independence an issue between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Several days later, on 21 August, the 16th Japanese Army ordered preparations for confinement to areas were its troops would be able to live self-sufficiently for at least half a year. To maintain law and order, detachments would be left in the cities. Japanese women and children were sent to hospitals in the mountains while other civilians were told to stay at their posts.

    Kenichi Goto, ‘Caught in the Middle: Japanese Attitudes toward Indonesian Independence in 1945,’ Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27 (1996): 40. Willem Remmelink, ‘The Emergence of the New Situation: The Japanese Army on Java after the Surrender,’ Militaire Spectator 147 (1978): 52–4. Anthony Reid and Akira Ōki, eds., The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942–1945 (Athens, OH: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1986): 217–8. Van Poelgeest, Japanse besognes, 142.

  63. 63.

    Roadnight, ‘Sleeping with the Enemy,’ 252.

  64. 64.

    Herman Bussemaker, Bersiap! Opstand in het paradijs: de Bersiap-periode op Java en Sumatra 1945–1946 (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2005), 16–7.

  65. 65.

    The Netherlands Indies Civil Administration later changed its name to AMACAB (Allied Military Administration – Civil Affairs Branch) in January 1946 on Java and Sumatra. Zijlmans, Eindstrijd en ondergang, 37.

  66. 66.

    Woodburn Kirby, Surrender, 356–7. The situation in the outer islands was however different; notwithstanding opposition in certain areas the Dutch authorities were more successful in reconsolidating Dutch rule and a governmental apparatus was fairly quickly restored.

  67. 67.

    Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 15–7.

  68. 68.

    Han Bing Siong, ‘The Indonesian Need of Arms after the Proclamation of Independence,’ Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (2001): 799–830. Shigeru Sato, ‘The PETA,’ in Peter Post et al., eds., The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 143–4. Van Poelgeest, Japanse besognes, 35–42. Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), 129–131.

  69. 69.

    During the Bersiap around 75,000 Dutch nationals, mostly Indo-Europeans who had managed to stay outside the Japanese camps during the war, were interned by the Indonesian authorities. The living conditions in these camps, generally located in Republican-held territory on Java and Madoera, varied greatly. Historians disagree on the reasoning behind this internment policy, see for example Bussemaker, Bersiap! and Mary C. van Delden, ‘De republikeinse kampen in Nederlands-Indië, oktober 1945 – mei 1947. Orde in de Chaos?’ (PhD Diss., Universiteit Nijmegen, 2007).

  70. 70.

    Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 11, 342.

  71. 71.

    On Java alone between 8000 and 10,500 JSP served alongside SEAC forces. In Sumatra, JSP were generally deployed for financial and political reasons and less for the maintenance of law and order as was the case on Java. Roadnight, ‘Sleeping with the Enemy,’ 251–261.

  72. 72.

    Han Bing Siong, ‘The Secret of Major Kido: The Battle of Semarang, 15–19 October 1945,’ Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 152 (1996): 382. Roadnight, ‘Sleeping with the Enemy,’ 249. Also Stephen Connor, ‘Side-Stepping Geneva: Japanese Troops under British Control, 1945–7,’ Journal of Contemporary History 45 (2010): 400. Van Poelgeest, Japanse besognes, 36–8.

  73. 73.

    Bart van Poelgeest, ‘Figuranten op het Indische toneel. De Japanners in Nederlands-Indie 1946–1949,’ Elly Touwen-Bouwsma and Petra Groen, eds., Tussen Banzai en Bersiap. De afwikkeling van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Nederlands-Indië (Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers, 1996), 95–6.

  74. 74.

    Responsibility for the disarmament and repatriation of the Japanese was assigned to Lord Mountbatten’s SEAC. The Netherlands Indies government as well as the families of the Japanese troops and the Japanese government pressured SEAC for a speedy repatriation. However, as shipping availability was scarce, it took months before the first Japanese troops left Indonesia and it would eventually take years before all the Japanese were brought back to their homeland. Whereas the repatriation of the troops in Sumatra and the outer islands went swiftly once sufficient shipping was provided, on Java there existed a complicating factor as around 30,000 JSP had confined themselves in areas administered by the RI. Cooperation with the republican authorities was thus needed for the effective repatriation and disarmament of these particular JSPs. When the repatriation of Japanese through actions ‘Puff’ and ‘Nippoff’ came to an end in October 1946, around 17,000 Japanese stayed behind in Indonesia, of which 13,500 performed labor for the Netherlands Indies government. Van Poelgeest, ‘Figuranten,’ 96, 100.

  75. 75.

    Van Poelgeest, ‘Figuranten,’ 96–8. ‘Minister voor algemene oorlogvoering van het koninkrijk (Schermerhorn) aan regeringsvertegenwoordigers bij combined chiefs of staff te Washington’ (2 December 1945), in Simon van der Wal, ed., Officiële Bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen 1945–1950 (hereafter NIB), 20 vols. (Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), vol. 2. no. 138, 276. ‘Lt. gouverneur-generaal (Van Mook) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen (Logemann)’ (29 November 1945), NIB, vol. 2, no. 107, 207–9. ‘Overzicht van chief commanding officer Nica te Morotai (De Rooy) betreffende de algemene situatie in Borneo en de Grote Oost over de periode 21 t/m 30 november 1945,’ NIB, vol. 2 no. 112, 230. ‘Politiek verslag over Sumatra van gouverneur, chief commanding officer Amacab Sumatra (Spits) over de maand maart 1946,’ NIB, vol. 4, no. 5, 25. ‘Overzicht van chief commanding officer Nica te Morotai (De Rooy) betreffende de algemene situatie in Borneo en de Grote Oost over de periode 1 t/m 10 jan. 1946,’ NIB, vol. 3, no. 45, 105.

  76. 76.

    The number of Japanese casualties (in action, illness, suicide) on Java sustained by the Japanese from 15 August 1945 until the June 1946 surrender stands higher (1057) than the total number of casualties inflicted during the occupation of the island in 1942 (957, of which 255 were killed, 702 wounded). Remmelink, ‘The Emergence of the New Situation,’ 64. Goto, ‘Caught in the Middle,’ 42.

    On Sumatra, the 25th Japanese Army lost at least 626 (in action, illness, suicide) after the surrender. Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Netherland Forces Intelligence Service [NEFIS] en Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst [CMI] in Nederlands-Indië, No 109/ Geh., Gegevens uit de Intelligence Summaries van de 26th Indian Division no. 46 and 52 (31 Augustus and 12 October 1946), inventarisnummer 2156, nummer toegang 2.10.62, ‘Annex no. 1 to Dr. J.J. van de Velde, de Regeeringscommissaris voor bestuursaangelegenheden voor Noord-Sumatra aan de directeur NEFIS’ (Medan: 25 Augustus 1947).

  77. 77.

    Han Bing Siong, ‘Captain Huyer and the Massive Japanese Arms Transfer in East Java in October 1945,’ Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land en Volkenkunde 159 (2003): 311–3.

  78. 78.

    NL-HaNA, inv.nr. 2156, NEFIS en CMI, 2.10.62.

    The responsible Japanese officers had been instructed by the Allies to prevent desertion and bring deserters to justice. Japanese deserters who were caught and arrested by the Allies were transferred to the competent Japanese military command, which had them judged by a court-martial. Van Poelgeest, ‘Figuranten,’ 98. Goto, ‘Caught in the Middle,’ 42.

  79. 79.

    Van Poelgeest, Japanse Besognes, 84 Sato, ‘The PETA,’ 143–4. Goto (1996) based on Miyamoto Shizuō (Jawa Shusen Shori-Ki [An Account of the Disposition of the End of the War in Java] (Tokyo: Jawa Shusen Shori-Ki Kanko-Kai, 1973)) mentions 277 deserters on Java. Unfortunately no numbers for the outer islands are available.

  80. 80.

    ‘Overzicht van chief commanding officer Nica te Morotai (De Rooy) betreffende de algemene situatie in de Grote Oost en Borneo over de periode 10 t/m 20 jan. 1946,’ NIB, vol. 3 no. 93, 176–7. ‘Overzicht van chief commanding officer Nica (De Rooy) betreffende de algemene situatie in Borneo en de Grote Oost over de periode 16 maart-l april 1946,’ NIB, vol. 4, no. 7, 31.

  81. 81.

    ‘Memorandum on the situation in Java (Netherlands East Indies) ingediend bij de Britse minister van buitenlandse zaken (Bevin), 29 September 1945,’ NIB, vol. 1, no. 116, 188. Robert Cribb, ‘Avoiding clemency,’ 158–9.

  82. 82.

    Van Poelgeest, Japanse besognes, 35, 84. Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920–1949 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002), 174.

  83. 83.

    The ‘Great East’ (Groote Oost), was an administrative entity of the Netherlands East Indies between 1938 and 1946. It comprised all the islands to the east of Borneo (Celebes, the Moluccas and West New Guinea with their offshore islands) and of Java (the Lesser Sunda islands). The capital was Macassar on Celebes.

  84. 84.

    ‘Nota van de legercommandant (Spoor), 2 april 1946. Appreciatie van de militaire situatie in Nederlandsch-lndië op 1 April 1946,’ NIB, vol. 4, no. 14, 46.

  85. 85.

    Van Poelgeest, Japanse besognes, 67–76. Sato, ‘The PETA,’ 144, Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 309.

  86. 86.

    For newspaper articles see for example: ‘Japanse Deserteurs,’ Het Dagblad, 11 August 1947, 2.‘De Bloem der Rep. Strijdkrachten,’ De Locomotief: Samarangsch handels- en advertentie-blad, 29 October 1947, 1. ‘Japans bendehoofd gevat,’ Het Nieuws. Algemeen Dagblad, 28 May 1948, 1. ‘Japanners stonden aan hoofd van Terroristen,’ Het Dagblad, 28 October 1948, 2.

  87. 87.

    The importance addressed to the issue of Japanese deserters by the Indies authorities—especially the army and intelligence service—is reflected in the fact that the topic was placed on the agenda during the talks and negotiations that were held between the Netherlands Indies authorities and the Republic Indonesia in 1947–1948. Until the second police action (19 December 1948–5 January 1949) the Dutch used these negotiations to apprehend the Japanese war criminals still at large in republican territory. Van Poelgeest, Japanse besognes, 85–7, 111.

  88. 88.

    The number of four defendants as mentioned by Piccigallo and De Jong is thus incorrect. Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979), 183. De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 893.

  89. 89.

    The defendants who deserted were mostly privates or low ranking officers, which can be explained by the fact that these ranks had often great belief in the cause of the Greater East Asia War and had regularly been in touch with Indonesian officers and men participating in the PETA. Goto, ‘Caught in the Middle,’ 38.

  90. 90.

    De Groot, Berechting Japanse Oorlogsmisdadigers, 374–5

  91. 91.

    Han Bing Siong states that Wada Kunishige and his men broke out of prison because the Dutch military courts refused to take their actions in Semarang into account. However, the break-out of Cipinang prison Bing Siong refers to, in which—according to Vice-Admiral Shibata—most of the escaped were members of the Semarang Kempeitai, dates from 27 March 1947. Almost a year before the Semarang Kempeitai verdict was pronounced (March 1948; Kunishige was not a defendant is this trial), and half a year before the verdict was pronounced in the trial of the Djember and Bandoeng Kempetai (September 1948, in which Kunishige was convicted). The mass escape from Cipinang mentioned by de Groot and Han Bin Siong also took place before the Batavian Kempeitai trial in which the same defense argument was used. However, it could well be that earlier trial outcomes of the courts-martial or the living conditions in Cipinang prison influenced the decision of the inmates to escape. According to De Groot and Siong, Wada escaped several times from Cipinang and was eventually shot when found by patrol. Siong, ‘The Secret of Major Kido,’ 407 and De Groot, Berechting Japanse oorlogsmisdadigers, 64, 374–7.

  92. 92.

    Han Bing Siong, ‘Captain Huyer,’ 311 and De Groot, Berechting Japanse Oorlogsmisdadigers, 62–4, 377.

  93. 93.

    See Larissa van den Herik, ‘Addressing “colonial crimes” through reparations? Adjudicating Dutch atrocities committed in Indonesia,’ Journal of International Criminal Justice 10 (2012): 693–705.

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    Lisette Schouten

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Schouten, L. (2016). Netherlands East Indies’ War Crimes Trials in the Face of Decolonization. In: von Lingen, K. (eds) War Crimes Trials in the Wake of Decolonization and Cold War in Asia, 1945-1956. World Histories of Crime, Culture and Violence. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42987-8_9

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