Abstract
Dutch and Japanese forces were deployed together in Al Muthanna province in Iraq from 2003 to 2005. This chapter investigates intelligence and information sharing between the forces, including during the pre-deployment phase on the Japanese side. Dutch–Japanese intelligence and information sharing remained lopsided throughout the deployment, a situation that can be attributed to Japan’s lack of readiness to conduct operations in a region remote from its direct defense interests and to the likelihood that it was not producing security-related intelligence beyond its areas of mandate and operations. The inadequacy of the campaign authority that the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) received from its political masters was such that its own effectiveness, as well as the Dutch operation, depended on the “goodwill” of the Dutch forces tasked to assist the JSDF, especially with regard to information and intelligence.
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Notes
- 1.
Although the concept derives from the British doctrine of Peace Support Operations, it remains relevant in stabilization . See Aoi (2011a).
- 2.
- 3.
Al Muthanna was one of the largest provinces in Iraq and was also sparsely populated (the population of the provincial capital, Samawah, was only 130,000). Also, the province was relatively poor, as were other Shia-held areas, having been neglected by the Baath regime.
- 4.
For a detailed account of the Dutch military’s role in crisis management, see Brocades Zaalberg (2006).
- 5.
The on-going legal revisions undertaken by the Abe administration would allow for limited JSDF security roles.
- 6.
- 7.
Iraq Special Measures Law (Iraku ni okeru Jindo Fukko Katsudo oyobi Anzen Kakuho Sien Katudo no Jisshi ni Kansuru Tokubetu Sochi Ho), enacted on H. 15.7.26 (26 July 2003). The Basic Plan based upon the Iraq Special measures Law (Iraku Jindo Fuko Shien Tokuso Ho ni Motoduku Taio Sochi ni Kansuru Kihon Keikaku), enacted on H.15, 12.9 (9 December 2003). JASDF was mandated, under the same Special Measures Law, to provide logistical support for transport (of JSDF personnel and coalition troops, humanitarian and reconstruction goods, and later including UN humanitarian goods and personnel) from Kuwait to Iraq.
- 8.
The Basic Plan stated that the GSDF would remain “within” (naka de) the multinational force.
- 9.
In one case, a riot against the GSDF broke out (JGSDF 2007, pp. 92–119, at p. 106).
- 10.
Although the GSDF was relatively spared of attacks by irregular elements, more than 10 attacks targeted its base, and some of these incidents resulted in physical damage to the base. The GSDF also endured attempts to attack its personnel using IEDs in later rotations.
- 11.
Of this, about $2.7 million U.S. in CIMIC funds and over $1.8 million U.S. from the Peace Fund (later Stability Fund) were from Dutch sources.
- 12.
- 13.
According to a press source, the GSDF completed the following reconstruction projects: total 277 treatments and medical technical assistance at four hospitals; provision of 53,500 tons of water; repair for 36 schools, 31 roads and bridges, 30 medical facilities (clinics, warehouses, etc.), 22 cultural facilities, 14 water provision facilities; total number of Iraqis employed were 488,020 (Sankei Shinbun Sha 2006). This record accords closely with the government’s response to a question in the Diet (i.e., parliament/congress).
- 14.
I was unable to find out why and how this occurred, due to the lack of access to relevant personnel on the Japanese side. For example, the GSDF would hold press conferences or school visits (which routinely were held separately) 30 min prior to those of the Dutch , and often reveal information about CIMIC projects, thereby reducing the impact of Dutch information operations.
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Acknowledgments
I am indebted to the Netherlands Defence Academy for the valuable opportunity it provided during the summer of 2014 for me to conduct research there for five weeks. I am also grateful for the cooperation provided by the members of the Netherlands armed forces who made themselves accessible for interviews. I also thank personnel in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, especially the Ground Self-Defense Force, for providing interviews on many occasions over the years.
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Aoi, C. (2017). Conditions for Effective Intelligence and Information Sharing: Insights from Dutch–Japanese Cooperation in Iraq, 2003–2005. In: Goldenberg, I., Soeters, J., Dean, W. (eds) Information Sharing in Military Operations. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42819-2_10
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