Abstract
This chapter examines lobbying on the road transport working time directive, which resulted in clear lobbying “winners” and “losers”. The main bone of contention was whether or not self-employed bus and lorry drivers should be subjected to the same rules on working hours as drivers employed by companies. Labour unions were vehemently against the Commission’s proposal to exclude self-employed drivers from the scope of the directive. Employers’ associations supported the Commission’s proposal. However, they faced two major stumbling blocks: lack of unity and no long-term contacts in the European Parliament's Committee on Employment and Social Affairs. This prevented them from speaking with one voice and gave rise to asymmetrical lobbying, where the labour unions had the opportunity to almost solely influence politicians’ interpretation of the issue.
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Dionigi, M.K. (2017). When Lobbying Produces Clear Winners and Losers: Regulating Working Time. In: Lobbying in the European Parliament. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42688-4_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42688-4_6
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