Abstract
In this introductory chapter, I present the research question of the book and situate it in the literature. The objective of the book is to examine under which conditions interest groups shape policy outcomes in the European Parliament (EP). Even though the EP has become an increasingly important lobbying venue in Brussels due to the expansion of its powers, researchers have paid little attention to how lobbying in the EP plays out. For a long time, the EP has had a reputation as a champion of diffuse interests. This contrasts with the interest group literature’s assumption of a business bias in politics. It is, therefore, time to gain a more nuanced understanding of interest group influence in the EP. The chapter also presents the book’s key concepts, case selection, and methods.
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Dionigi, M.K. (2017). Introduction. In: Lobbying in the European Parliament. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42688-4_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42688-4_1
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