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Security Policy – The Specific Approach of Norden

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Abstract

The Nordic states are a very important element of the sub-regional and European security system. Alongside with the membership of some of them in the North Atlantic Treaty and the presence of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland in the European Union structures, since the end of the Cold War, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden have been consequently building their own “Nordic” security system (including the military security), which is in accord with the structures of NATO and EU.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    After the war, in 1945, the outgoing Swedish Foreign Minister Ch. Günther introduced the non-alliance policy called alansfri politik – very close to the concept of permanent neutrality rejecting association with any military block in order to preserve non-alliance in peace and neutrality in war. O. Undén, the next foreign minister, continued the policy and the Swedish declaration on membership in the UN reflects the concept of Undén from 1946. According to it, Sweden would only be involved in any UN sanctioned activities if the decision on the sanctions receives the unanimous support of all permanent members of the UN Security Council.

  2. 2.

    Notwithstanding formal and functional differences in the implementation of this policy, Sweden and Finland have sought to preserve the very fabric of European unity in its contemporary meaning, i.e. unity in diversity of political systems. Hence the non-alliance policy of Sweden and Finland, the guarantor of whose neutrality was the USSR, was deemed to be in the best interest of all involved parties in the changed, geopolitical situation in Europe after the Second World War.

  3. 3.

    Among others, those were Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) of 1991–1992. The PNIs were primarily unilateral and informal initiatives (“reciprocal unilateral commitments”), by which firstly U.S. President George H. W. Bush and next closely followed by the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev declared to limit and reduce their tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) arsenal. The initiatives did not include verification or data exchange mechanisms.

  4. 4.

    See: N. Petersen, Entspannungpolitik in Nordeuropa and also: Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, p. 37.

  5. 5.

    Compare: G. Politt, Zur Bündnisproblematik im Friedenskampf in Nordeuropa, p. 18.

  6. 6.

    It is worth recalling the Swedish initiative of the second half of the 1970s on establishing a security zone in the Nordic region based on guarantees of the nuclear powers not to use or threaten the use of such weapons against the states in the zone.

  7. 7.

    Compare: E. Lyth, Den nordiska balansen.

  8. 8.

    More on the subject in: Nordisk Kontakt.

  9. 9.

    See: J. Tunberger, Norden – En kärnvapenfri zon? Försvar och Säkerhetspolitik.

  10. 10.

    More on the subject in: R. M. Czarny, Niektóre aspekty kształtowania się koncepcji nordyckiej strefy bezatomowej, pp. 117–131.

  11. 11.

    The Danish government conditioned its presence in negotiations on the zone on consultations within NATO and a further progress in disarmament talks, notably in a wider European context; see: R. Popiński, Państwa nordyckie wobec bezpieczeństwa i współpracy w Europie, pp. 1191–92.

  12. 12.

    On the zone issue Norway concluded that it should be a part of a broader agreement between East and West, tied in closely with disarmament across Europe; compare the statement of Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway, for Trybuna Ludu, January 06, 1988.

  13. 13.

    The Storting resolution of 1961 in general terms banned any deployment of nuclear weapons on the Norwegian soil. Danish Parliament resolution adopted at the request of the Social Democrats in May 1985 prohibited the storage of such weapons on its territory not only in peacetime, but also in times of conflict.

  14. 14.

    Compare: N. Andrén, A. Landqvist, Svensk utrikespolitik efter 1945. Dokument.

  15. 15.

    For example, Sweden declared a strategic timeout.

  16. 16.

    See: G. Rdzanek, Współpraca wojskowa państw nordyckich w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku, pp. 193–207.

  17. 17.

    On June 13, 2013, the European Commission was informed by Iceland of its decision to suspend accession negotiations.

  18. 18.

    On the strength of a sovereign decision, Denmark is excluded from developing European defense policy which makes this country particularly attached to the collective defense system of NATO; see also: Dania wobec budowy sił zbrojnych Unii Europejskiej w latach 1992–2003, pp. 191–218.

  19. 19.

    More on the subject in: R. M. Czarny, Teoretyczne i praktyczne aspekty neutralności Szwecji.

  20. 20.

    More on the subject in: R. M. Czarny, Szwecja w Unii Europejskiej. Studium polityczno-prawne, pp. 36–55.

  21. 21.

    More on the subject in: J. Gotkowska, Szwedzki szpagat.

  22. 22.

    Quoted after: H. Spongenberg, Nordic countries get an international voice in the Arctic and H. Spongenberg, Nordic countries could boost regional defence co-operation.

  23. 23.

    In March 1999, the Swedish Riksdag adopted the government’s report “Förändrat värld – omdanat försvar” (‘A Changing World – A Reformed Defense’) which concluded that over the next 10 years no armed invasion threatened Sweden, Förändrat värld – omdanat försvar, Regeringens proposition 1998/99:74, 4 mars 1999.

  24. 24.

    See: Summary of the Government Bill The New Defence (Det nya försvaret, prop. 1999/2000:30) presented to Parliament on 25 November 1999, Ministry of Defence, Stockholm, 25 November 1999.

  25. 25.

    See among others: P. V. Jakobsen, The Nordic Peacekeeping Model: Rise, Fall, Resurgence? and P. V. Jakobsen, Still Punching Above Their Weight? Nordic Cooperation in Peace Operations after the Cold War.

  26. 26.

    A brigade consists of 4000–5000 troops, comprising a headquarters unit, infantry battalions, reconnaissance units, as well as medical, engineering and logistical support, of the contributing countries. The brigade should be able to deploy within 15–30 days and operate in principle for 6 months. SHIRBRIG deployed to its first mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in 2000 and 2001, see: H. P. Langille, T. Keefe, The Future of Peacekeeping: An Expert’s Discussion to Contribute to the Dialoque on Foreign Policy and the Seminar on First Use of SHIRBRIG. Highlights, Key Lessons Learned, International Peace Academy.

  27. 27.

    The EU Battlegroup Concept and the Nordic Battlegroup, http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/9133/a/82276;jsessionid.

  28. 28.

    See: B. Heurlin, The Nation or the World. The Armed Forces of the Nordic countries today.

  29. 29.

    The resumption of strategic bomber flights in the High North, cyber-attacks and violations of airspace of the Nordic and Baltic countries.

  30. 30.

    More on the subject in: R. M. Czarny, The Imperative High North: Opportunities and Challenges.

  31. 31.

    See: New threats for the Nordic armed forces, www.norden.org.

  32. 32.

    See also: Common Concern for the Arctic Conference arranged by the Nordic Council of Ministers, 9–10 September 2008, Ilulissat, Greenland.

  33. 33.

    More on the subject in Chap. 10.

  34. 34.

    Text of the report.

  35. 35.

    The NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF is a high readiness, technologically advanced and a dedicated branch of the NATO armed forces whose task is a rapid response in the event of a threat to the security of its member states, particularly within the framework of civilian crisis management. NATO Response Force (NRF) was launched at the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002.

  36. 36.

    It has been prompted by the shutdown of the American military base at Keflavik in 2006. Since then Iceland’s air space has been periodically patrolled by NATO allies.

  37. 37.

    Mutual political declarations of the Nordic states, according to T. Stoltenberg, suggest that the Nordic countries commit themselves to clarifying how they would respond if a Nordic country were subject to external attack or undue pressure.

  38. 38.

    In 2014, J. Stoltenberg became Secretary General of NATO.

  39. 39.

    The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) constitutes a formal framework for political and military cooperation in the region. In December 2013, the Nordic countries initiated work on the NOREFCO vision for 2020. http://www.nordefco.org/.

  40. 40.

    It should be added that due to those differences, the Minister’s Vision 2020 talks rather in generalities.

  41. 41.

    Iceland has no standing military force. In February 2014, air force units from Sweden and Finland for the first time took part in joint air-defense training exercises over Iceland.

  42. 42.

    The full statement by T. Stoltenberg is available at: http://www.norden.org/sv/nordiska-raadet/sessioner-moeten-och-konferenser/sessioner/66-e-sessionen-2014/protokoll-nordiska-raadets-66-e-session-2014/12.-aktualitetsdebat/thorvald-stoltenberg-hovedindlaeg.

  43. 43.

    For more on energy security, see: R. M. Czarny, Dylematy energetyczne państw regionu nordyckiego and Chap. 9.

  44. 44.

    For more on NORDEFCO, see: http://www.nordefco.org, http://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/nordiskt-forsvarssamarbete/det-svenska-ordforandeskapet-i-nordefco/ and http://www.nordefco.org/Files/NORDEFCO_arsrapport_2014.pdf.

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Czarny, R.M. (2017). Security Policy – The Specific Approach of Norden . In: A Modern Nordic Saga : Politics, Economy and Society. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42363-0_13

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