Abstract
The present contribution reexamines the thesis regarding the rationality of doxastic dialectics, an issue developed by us in several of our previous studies. This time our intention is to emphasize the paradoxical nature of the subjectivity (a premise grounding the belief), and to demonstrate that, in spite of this aspect, the above-mentioned thesis gets more subtle support, instead of being devaluated.
The demonstration – displayed in hermeneutical terms – will try to explain:
-
(a)
To what extent the cognitive power of subjectivity (the belief) represents an ‘original source’, and
-
(b)
To what extent the hermeneutical circle is a ‘circle’, or rather ‘a way to language’.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
In our previous studies regarding doxastic/belief thinking we have established the following things: a. The doxastic thinking represents an autonomous field of cognition that excludes any reference to the pre-epistemic stage of beliefs. b. Doxastic thinking is a subject-oriented cognition, which follows a hermeneutic procedure, interested in understanding the meaning not in knowing the truth of beliefs.
- 2.
The example is taken from van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2010: 157.
- 3.
The example is taken from a Romanian TV investigation.
- 4.
You can find more explanations in Amel (1999).
- 5.
Emmanuel Lévinas (1971: 12) emphasizes the necessity to define the concept of subjectivity by starting with the principle of reciprocity: subjectivity as the consciousness of the other. In Levinas’ definition, the theoretical frame - which is not structural (= la totalité), neither pragmatic (the communication), but transcendent (= l’ infini) – represents the dominant category. The consciousness of the other is a variable parameter on a scale continuously improved. “Ce livre présentera la subjectivité comme accueillant Autrui; comme hospitalité : En elle se consomme l’idée de l’infini : L’intentionnalité, où la pensée reste adéquation à objet, ne définit donc pas la conscience à son niveau fondamental. Tout savoir en tant qu’intentionnalité suppose déjà l’idée de l’infini, l’inadéquation par excellence”. The philosophical definition given by Levinas could be considered a response to our interpretation of the ‘original’ proof used in belief dialectics.
- 6.
A great Romanian artist said some time before his death: “Finally, I met myself ‘at the corner’”!
- 7.
- 8.
“Declar a nu avea alţi strămoşi biologici/ decât despicătura acestui poem/ cu semn de exclamare” - the last lines of the poem Genealogy, of the Romanian poet, philosopher and hermeneutist of the Bible, living now in Paris.
- 9.
References
Amel, R. (1990). Critical thinking (Review article: Walton Douglas, Informal Fallacies), Semiotica, 82(3–4), 339–348.
Amel, R. (1999). Doxastic dialectic. The persuasive truth. Revue Roumaine de Linguistique, XLIV(1–4), 3–12.
Amel, R. (2007). Dreapta potrivire a numelor (“The correctness of names, Plato, Cratylos”). In Proceedings of the 6th Colloquium of the Department of Romanian Philology, pp. 223–262. Bucharest: EUB.
Amel, R. (2008). Sign systems – Reference systems. Kodicas/Code, 31(1–2), 59–68.
Amel, R. (2011). The probable and the problem. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, J. A. Blair & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the seventh international conference ISSA, pp. 9–17. Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Amel, R. (2013). Listening and the well-tempered controversy (with reference to intercultural exchange). In XXII World Congress of Philosophy (International Association for the Study of Controversies), 4–10 August 2013, Athens.
Amel, R. (2014). The synthetic function of doxastic dialectics, communication. In Eighth international conference of ISSA, July, Amsterdam.
Eemeren van, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (2010). Argumentare, comunicare şi sofisme. O perspectivă pragma-dialectică (C. Andone & A. Gata, Trans.). Galati: GUP.
Gadamer, H. -G. (1976). Vérité et méthode (Etienne Sacre, Trans.). Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Gadamer, H. -G. (1977).Vom Zirkel des Verstehens. In Kleine Schriften, IV. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
Grice, P. (1991). The conception of value. Oxford: Clarendon.
Heidegger, M. (1957). Der Satz vom Grund. Pfullingen: Neske.
Heidegger, M. (1967). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
Heidegger, M. (1971). On the way to language (P. D. Hertz, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1976). Brief über den Humanismus, Gesamtausgabe, Band 9, 313–369. Frakfurt/M: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1977). Der Satz vom Grund. Gesamtausgabe, Band 10. Frankfurt/M: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1994). Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung. Gesamtausgabe, Band 17. Frankfurt/M: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (2006). Problemele fundamentale ale Fenomenologiei (B. Mincă & S. Lavric, Trans.). Bucureşti: Humanitas.
Levinas, E. (1971). Totalité et infini : Essai sur l’extériorité. Paris: Nijhoff.
Walton, D. (1987). Informal fallacies: Towards a theory of argument criticism (Pragmatics & beyond). Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Amel, R. (2016). Petitio Principii. With Reference to Doxastic/Belief Dialectics. In: Scarafile, G., Gruenpeter Gold, L. (eds) Paradoxes of Conflicts. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41978-7_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41978-7_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-41976-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-41978-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)