Relative Poverty as a Threat to Human Dignity: On the Structural Injustice of Welfare States

Abstract

In this chapter I argue that the pressing issue that wealthy societies face today is not merely economic inequality, but rather prevalent and increasing relative poverty. I will first analyze the concept of poverty with a special focus on relative poverty and not, as is common in contemporary political philosophy, with an exclusive view on absolute poverty. It will be argued that poverty should be seen as problematic from a moral point of view because it undermines self-respect and thereby violates the dignity of persons. Self-respect depends on the ability to look after oneself in important matters and the ability to respect oneself as an equal member of society. For people living in relative poverty both are impossible or at least extremely hard. In a second section, I will argue that the normatively problematic character of relative poverty as a threat to human dignity gives us a strong reason to assign the responsibility for eradicating relative poverty to the appropriate agents. As we will see in this chapter, it is the state that bears primary responsibility for enabling people to escape relative poverty. In a third part, I will argue that it is not irrelevant which measures are used to help people to get out of their poverty. Different measures are humiliating to a different degree and respect for the dignity of relatively poor people demands the choice of the least humiliating measure. In the light of this normative background, I will argue that welfare is better than charity and a reorganization of the economic structure, as far as possible, even better than welfare.