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Theoretical Aspects of Banking Regulation

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Post-Crisis Banking Regulation in the European Union

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Abstract

The chapter reviews the theoretical aspects of banking regulation, depicts the main tasks of banks and provides arguments for the necessity of banking regulation. It analyses the role of banking regulations within the framework of the agency theory. It points out the purpose and functions of the respective elements of banking regulations and their importance in maintaining the stability of the banking sector. Importantly, the chapter focuses on the new, post-crisis paradigm of regulation. Particular attention is dedicated to the newly evolved, contradictory strands of the treatment of banking crises in regulations, the issue of the regulation of financial conglomerates and the Too-Big-To-Fail problem, the regulation of the shadow banking sector, the approach to systemic and endogenous risk and the need for international coordination in regulations.

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  1. Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland

    Katarzyna Sum

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  1. Katarzyna Sum
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Sum, K. (2016). Theoretical Aspects of Banking Regulation. In: Post-Crisis Banking Regulation in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41378-5_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41378-5_1

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-41377-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-41378-5

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

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