Abstract
In the previous chapter I argued that categorical monists have the resources to meet the allegedly fatal objection from the unpalatable consequences of Quidditism (RNDV, in my terminology). It is now time to discuss some further objections to Categorical Monism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
There exist at least two other notions of manifestation according to which there cannot be any unmanifested dispositions. According to the first notion, dispositional properties are always conjunctive properties one part of which is the property instantiated at the manifestation event. The second view construes dispositional properties as four-dimensional structural properties which ‘contain’ the manifestation-property as a temporal part. One might object to both interpretations precisely because of their incompatibility with the ‘commonplace’ that there are unmanifested dispositional properties. For details, see Tugby (2013).
- 2.
According to a non-realistic conception, talking about fields at specific locations is a convenient manner to describe possible effects of the spatial arrangement of distant property-possessors at earlier times. For a discussion of the various interpretations of the classical notion of field, see Lange (2002, Ch.2).
- 3.
Here is another challenge to the continuous-manifestation suggestion: Suppose that gravitational mass is a fundamental property of elementary objects. One might then claim that an elementary particle having that property is always manifesting gravitational attraction. But as Chakravartty (2013) rightly points out, this fact holds only at the determinable level. The determinate magnitude of the attraction depends on changeable relations to other particles and one cannot argue that all determinate dispositions of gravitational attraction are continuously manifested.
- 4.
- 5.
Martin notes that he had already devised the scenario in the mid-50s and used it against the reductive accounts of causal dispositions.
- 6.
The assumption that grounds Tooley’s possibility, namely that some particles (albeit not whole kinds of them) omnitemporally do not interact with each other, is consistent with recent scientific findings in cosmology. For instance, the causal structure of GR allows for cosmological models with particle horizons in which different portions of the universe cannot even exchange signals with one another (see Wald (1984, §5.3); for a philosophical discussion, Earman (1995, Ch.5)).
- 7.
Armstrong’s suggestion can be applied to Lewis’ (categorical monistic) framework as well; the laws, however, should be defined in this case according to the best-system account. Nevertheless, Lewis prefers to use his concrete possibilia in order to provide truthmakers for the actually unmanifested dispositions.
- 8.
In his (2004a, 136), Armstrong deviates from orthodoxy and suggests that the relation of nomic necessitation between categorical properties must be metaphysically necessary. His new view is based on the endorsement of (a modified and extended version of) Donald Baxter’s (2001) theory of instantiation as partial identity between universals and particulars.
- 9.
This view has, however, the obvious drawback that it leaves ontologically brute the dispositional-directedness-to-a-mere-possible-event fact.
- 10.
This is not to say that there is no escape route for the trope theorist as well. She may appeal to actual abstract unrealised possibilia in order to ensure that the directedness relation has two actually existing relata even if the dispositional property is unmanifested (see Bird (2006) for the relevant proposal in a universalist context). Here, I find Tugby’s (2013) criticism persuasive; positing unrealised possibilia makes genuine dispositional properties explanatorily redundant as truthmakers for various modal/causal truths.
- 11.
The immanent universalist’s response has to deal with the Tooley-Martin scenario. How can the immanent universalist cope with this case, where by definition there can be no manifestation of the dispositional properties under consideration?
- 12.
In any situation where the dispositions in question are triggered, they will give rise to the relevant forces.
- 13.
We have to clearly separate the issue of whether one is entitled to assume the existence of genuine dispositional properties from the related case concerning the actual existence of any dispositional element. It is at least debatable, however, whether one can ascribe a dispositional or a categorical character to any entities except properties. Be that as it may, a dispositional realist may claim that the argument from scientific practice can at least prove the indispensable existence of dispositional forces. I disagree, but I am not going to dwell on that here. I’ll just point out a difference in the two arguments presented in this section. In my view, the case of scientific generalisability seems to create a less favourable context for the dispositional realist. To illustrate, note that, in the case of the analytic method, a dispositional realist may claim that her argument from scientific practice, though unable to prove the existence of genuine dispositional properties, can nevertheless show that an irreducible dispositional element must be introduced in our ontology. Component forces can be prima facie regarded as capacities for manifest behaviours of actual physical systems which are parts of other compound systems. In the case of scientific generalisability, however, one cannot claim that; for, even if it is assumed that component forces are capacities, they can only be associated with manifest behaviours of systems in highly specific ‘shielded’ conditions not occurring outside laboratories (the case is even worse in scientific abstraction, where we deal with ideal physical systems).
- 14.
Asymptotically free theories are the ones the coupling constants of which have zero limit as energy scale tends to infinity. Characteristic example is Quantum Chromodynamics, the theory describing the strong interaction between elementary particles. Due to its asymptotic freedom, quarks behave almost like free particles when interacting at high energy levels.
- 15.
In McKenzie’s sense, the ‘canonical’ debate (with some notable exceptions) is taking place within the context of a ‘canonical account’ which associates contingentism about laws with categoricalism about properties and necessitarianism about laws with Dispositional Essentialism.
- 16.
For McKenzie, a functional law is a law of the form a(x) = f(bi), where bi are real- (or real vector-) valued functions representing determinable physical properties and relations, and f is some functional (i.e., a function of functions).
References
Armstrong, D.M. (1983). What Is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D.M. (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D.M. (2004a). How Do Particulars Stand to Universals? In Zimmerman, D.W. (Ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 139–154.
Baxter, D. (2001). Instantiation as Partial Identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79, 449–464.
Bhaskar, R. (1975). A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds: Leeds Books.
Bird, A. (2006). Potency and Modality. Synthese 149, 491–508.
Cartwright, N. (1999). The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (2009). Causal Laws, Policy Predictions, and the Need for Genuine Powers. In Handfield, T. (Ed.) Dispositions and Causes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 127–157.
Chakravartty, A. (2013). Realism in the Desert and in the Jungle: Reply to French, Ghins and Psillos. Erkenntnis 78(1), 39–58.
Chakravartty, A. (forthcoming). Saving the Scientific Phenomena: What Powers Can and Cannot Do. In Jacobs, J. D. (Ed.), Putting Powers to Work. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Corry, R. (2009). How Is Scientific Analysis Possible? In Handfield, T. (Ed.) Dispositions and Causes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 158–188.
Crane, T. (Ed.) (1996). Dispositions: A Debate. London/New York: Routledge.
Earman, J. (1995). Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks: Singularities and Acausalities in Relativistic Spacetimes. New York: Oxford University Press.
Earman, J., Roberts, J. & Smith, S. (2002). Ceteris Paribus Lost. Erkenntnis 57, 281–301.
Ellis, B. (2001). Scientific Essentialism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ellis, B. (2002). The Philosophy of Nature. Chesham: Acumen.
Esfeld, M. & Sachse, C. (2011). Conservative Reductionism. New York: Routledge.
Heil, J. (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hüttemann, A. (1998). Laws and Dispositions. Philosophy of Science 65, 121–135.
Hüttemann, A. (2007). Causation, Laws and Dispositions. In Kistler, M. & Gnassounou, B. (Eds.) Dispositions and Causal Powers. Hampshire: Ashgate, 207–219.
Kuhlmann, M., Lyre, H. & Wayne, A. (Eds.) (2002). Ontological Aspects of Quantum Field Theory. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co.
Lange, M. (2002). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Martin, C.B. (1997). On the Need for Properties: The Road to Pythagoreanism and Back. Synthese 112, 193–231.
Martin, C.B. (2008). The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
McKenzie, K. (2014) In No Categorical Terms: A Sketch for an Alternative Route to Humeanism About Fundamental Laws. In Galavotti, M.C. et al. (Eds.) New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, Vol.5. New York: Springer, Ch.4.
Molnar, G. (2003). Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mumford, S. (2004). Laws in Nature. London: Routledge.
Mumford, S. (2006). The Ungrounded Argument. Synthese 149(3), 471–489.
Smith, S. (2002). Violated Laws, Ceteris Paribus Clauses, and Capacities. Synthese 130, 235–264.
Teller, P. (1995). An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Tooley, M. (1977). The Nature of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 667–698.
Tugby, M. (2013). Platonic Dispositionalism. Mind 122(486), 451–480.
Wald, R. (1984). General Relativity. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Livanios, V. (2017). Further Objections to Categorical Monism. In: Science in Metaphysics . New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41291-7_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41291-7_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-41290-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-41291-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)