Abstract
By far, the most common (among dispositional monists) strategy for arguing against the existence of purely categorical properties (and, a fortiori, for the falsity of Categorical Monism) is to appeal to its alleged problematic modal consequences. More precisely, it has been claimed that the ‘nature’ of categorical properties commits the categorical realist to accept counter-intuitive modal scenaria. In this chapter, I argue against this recurrent objection to Categorical Monism by challenging the necessity of this commitment.
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Notes
- 1.
Vallentyne (1998, 177–8) tentatively introduced this procedure in order to define the nomic role of any property, but rejected it outright for reasons briefly presented in his paper.
- 2.
Notice that the above procedure does not result in a complete Ramseyfication of the lawbook. This can be done only when every relational and non-relational predicate is replaced by a variable (including predicates denoting causal/nomic relations). This seems a more natural procedure for anyone who thinks that there is nothing special about causality/nomicity that vindicates the decision to be left unRamseyfied.
- 3.
According to the moderate versions of NDV, the former does not determine exclusively the latter.
- 4.
Locke thinks that this feature distinguishes Austere Quidditism from both DV and Quiddity Realism (a view which I shall present in the sequel). He claims that the aforementioned views are counterpart theories grounding the de re modal representation of properties on causal/nomic role-sharing and quiddity-sharing, respectively. But this is not true at least for the case of DV; dispositional essentialists define DV as an account concerning the transworld identity of properties. One and the same property is characterised by a specific causal/nomic role in all worlds in which it exists.
- 5.
‘Nothing constitutes the fact that a certain quality playing a certain nomological role in that world is identical with a certain quality playing a different role in ours. They just are the same quality, and that’s all that can be said’. (2000, 92, my emphasis)
- 6.
- 7.
Assuming that this relationship is an ordinary relation leads to a vicious regress.
- 8.
The individuation of complex properties can be grounded in the prior individuation of their mereologically simple property-parts. P-substrata can be construed as the ultimate individuators.
- 9.
Mumford (2004, 177) also introduces relations of dispositional necessity and possibility. But only the metaphysical relations mentioned above can be considered as a ground for a version of RNDV.
- 10.
- 11.
From the perspective of the transworld identity theorist, invariance-features, which are the grounds for the intraworld identity of mass and spin and charge, can be construed as the grounds for their transworld identity too.
- 12.
Susan Schneider (2001) highlights some difficulties that emerge in the context of Armstrong’s own metaphysics as a consequence of the identification of properties with ‘thin’ quiddities.
- 13.
It might be objected that quiddity, qua entity not able for multiple exemplification, is not a property. But I think, following Rosenkrantz (1993), that the capability of exemplification by different entities is not a logically necessary condition of propertyhood (but the having the feature ‘being exemplifiable’ is a logically necessary condition).
- 14.
Lewis (2009, 208) also calls his first epistemological argument for Humility ‘The Permutation Argument’. According to Lewis, the relevant permutations concern the actual referents of the theoretical terms (T-terms) of the Ramsey sentence of the true and complete final theory. His sceptical conclusion is that those permutations generate (due to RNDV) possible realisations of the final theory distinct from the actual ones, and no possible observation can tell us which one is the (unique) actual one. In the remainder of Sect. 4.3, I’ll continue using the term ‘Permutation Argument’ for the argument as I describe it (namely, as concerning our modal intuitions and not our epistemic predicament).
- 15.
Note that this procedure does not require the permutation of properties among the places defined by the pattern of their instantiation.
- 16.
In his contribution to a recent volume (2009), Armstrong suggests that in this case we should not take our modal intuitions seriously because they rely on mere possibilities. He justifies his proposal on the basis of his ‘chauvinism’ for the actual world and declares that metaphysicians should not put much weight to arguments (such as the Permutation Argument) which rely on mere possibilities.
- 17.
Even David Lewis, who adopts the world-boundedness of individuals, assumes that natural properties are transworld entities. Lewis (1986, 205) claims that, due to the principle of recombination (i.e., a duplicate of anything can co-exist, under some restrictions, with the duplicate of anything else), there is a qualitative duplication between his concrete possible worlds. Since universals are supposed to recur whenever there is duplication, they are common parts of many worlds.
- 18.
Roughly, persistence occurs when something exists at more than one time. According to endurantism, objects persist through time by being wholly present at a succession of moments, whereas, according to perdurantism, objects persist through time by having temporal parts (just as they extend through space by having spatial parts). For details, see Hawley (2001) and Haslanger and Kurtz (2006).
- 19.
A metaphysically necessary feature of an entity is one that the latter has in each world in which it exists. This condition seems to be trivially satisfied in the case of world-bound entities and all of their features. But on closer inspection this is not true, because it presupposes a theory of de re modal representation (transworld identity theory) which, by definition, we cannot invoke in the case at issue. See also the second response to the objection.
- 20.
Fales (1993) tentatively suggests such a view when he claims that the necessity characterising causal/nomic relations is primitive and sui generis.
- 21.
Here the term ‘nature’ is not confined to the dispositional/categorical character of properties. Lewis (1986, 205) discusses the issue in the case of properties construed as universals and presents the ontological simplicity (or its opposite) as an intrinsic feature of a universal that most probably belongs to its nature. On a par with my comments, he claims that this feature seems to be an essential one.
- 22.
Of course, according to neo-Humeans, the causal/nomic role of any natural property is an accidental feature varying across worlds. Yet, it is also an extrinsic feature, because it is ‘related’ to external (for the neo-Humeans) relations between the property in question and other properties. As Lewis (1986, 201) persuasively argues, however, extrinsic second-order features do not pose any problem for the transworld identity theory of de re modal representation.
- 23.
Derek Ball (2011) claims that we may utilise Egan’s (2004) remarks to create a problem from accidental intrinsics for properties construed as universals. The alleged accidental intrinsic feature of a natural property is the (second-order) property of being instantiated. Yet, this suggestion is controversial; first, because it is not at all clear why we can think of this feature as intrinsic (can a lone natural property have it?) and, second, because according to some theories of universals (such as Armstrong’s) being instantiated is an essential feature of any natural property.
- 24.
Lewis himself (2009, 211) considers this possibility but he finds no obvious reason to block his sceptical argument.
- 25.
The only way a DV-ist has to preclude this possibility is by considering the actual causal/nomic role of a natural property as its individual essence.
- 26.
I am not sympathetic to the widely held belief that there is an intimate relationship between DV and dispositional properties and RNDV and categorical properties, respectively (see Sect. 4.4). This does not mean, however, that those identity theorists who do hold this belief cannot utilise counterpart theory for their own ends.
- 27.
The question about the legitimacy of positing the specific primitives is another matter that will be discussed in Sect. 4.3.4.
- 28.
As I have already remarked, Lewis’ objection is relevant to the plausibility of PCT1 as well. Hence addressing it removes a serious obstacle for adopting this view. Yet, PCT1 is objectionable due to its dependence on a disjointed account of the modal representation of natural properties.
- 29.
- 30.
A DV-ist may avoid the difficulty related to the ‘twin’ possibility only by embracing the view that causal/nomic roles constitute the individual essences of fundamental properties.
- 31.
The existence of a scientifically based version of RNDV undermines the popular objection that the latter appeals exclusively to controversial ontological posits (such as quiddities and P-substrata) as the sole grounds of de re modal representation of fundamental properties.
- 32.
Psillos refers to the causal roles of properties. His arguments, however, can be extended to cover their nomic roles as well.
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Livanios, V. (2017). Categorical Monism and Quidditism. In: Science in Metaphysics . New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41291-7_4
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