Abstract
The definitional tenet of Categorical Monism is the following:Categorical Monism has been challenged both directly (through argumentation for the genuine existence of actual fundamental dispositional properties) and indirectly (by stressing the ‘unpalatable’ consequences of adopting the existence of fundamental categorical properties). In Chap. 1, I implicitly responded to the latter challenge by arguing that there actually exist fundamental categorical relations. Yet, this response is at best sufficient only for a defence of a kind of property dualism; for, all that (I hope) it shows is that in any case we have to allow for the existence of some actual fundamental categorical features without, however, arguing that there are no actual fundamental dispositional features. Here I wish to argue in favour of the categorical monistic view. To this end, I’ll present a novel argument which purports to show that actual fundamental properties cannot be dispositional.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Property-dualists (henceforth, dualists) argue for the actual existence of two ontologically distinct and mutually exclusive kinds of fundamental property. More precisely, the core principle of Property-Dualism is this:
The members of a subset of the set of all fundamental properties are exclusively categorical, while the members of its complement (with respect to the set of all fundamental properties) are exclusively dispositional.
Philosophers who advocated dualistic theses are Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982), Prior (1985), Place (1996), and, more recently, Ellis (2001), Molnar (2003) and McKitrick (2009).
- 2.
The renormalisation techniques are described in every textbook on QFT. See, for example, Peskin and Schroeder (1995).
- 3.
In the unified framework of the Standard Model of fundamental interactions, there exist specific relations among coupling constants. For example, in the electroweak sector of the Standard Model, the weak SU(2)L coupling g, the weak U(1) coupling gʹ and the electric charge e are related via the formulas tanθW = gʹ/g and g ⋅sinθW = e, where θW is the Glashow–Weinberg angle.
- 4.
Divergences can in principle be cancelled even in the case of non-renormalisable theories. However, in that case we need to add to the Lagrangian infinitely many counterterms.
- 5.
According to the ‘standard’ textbook account of the Higgs mechanism, the generation of particle masses is achieved through the phenomenon of spontaneous breaking of a local gauge symmetry. In that phenomenon, the laws of motion of an elementary physical system retain their symmetry, which however is absent from the solutions of the associated equations. A number of philosophers have expressed qualms for such an interpretation on the grounds that local gauge symmetries do not correspond to any empirical features of the world. The case is controversial (Earman (2004); Friederich (2014); Lyre (2008); Lyre (2012); Smeenk (2006); Wuthrich (2012)); it seems however that this does not affect the theoretical role of the Higgs mechanism which, after all, can be implemented without assuming a gauge symmetry breaking (i.e., in a gauge invariant way) (see, for instance, Higgs (1966), Kibble (1967) and Struyve (2011)).
- 6.
Analogous remarks hold for spin. If we are justified to ascribe zero spin to composite pseudo-scalar mesons, the Argument from Parity indicates that we should do so in the case of non-composite spin-0 particles such as the Higgs boson. As Balashov points out, both obey Bose–Einstein statistics and have exactly one polarisation state. Hence, they do not differ in any spin-related physical traits.
- 7.
I do not discuss the case of mass since Balashov himself acknowledges that his arguments are far from conclusive in that case.
References
Balashov, Y. (1999). Zero-Value Physical Quantities. Synthese 119, 253–286.
Butterfield, J. & Bouatta, N. (2015). Renormalization for Philosophers. In Bigaj, T. & Wuthrich, C. (Eds.) Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in Philosophy of Science.
Earman, J. (2004). Laws, Symmetry, and Symmetry Breaking: Invariance, Conservation Principles, and Objectivity. Philosophy of Science 71(5), 1227–1241.
Ellis, B. (2001). Scientific Essentialism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Friederich, S. (2014). A Philosophical Look at the Higgs Mechanism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 45, 335–350.
Higgs, P.W. (1966). Spontaneous Symmetry Breakdown Without Massless Bosons. Physical Review 145, 1156–1163.
Kibble, T.W.B. (1967). Symmetry Breaking in Non-abelian Gauge Theories. Physical Review 155, 1554–1561.
Lyre, H. (2008). Does the Higgs Mechanism Exist? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22(2), 119–133.
Lyre, H. (2012). The Just-So Higgs Story: A Response to Adrian Wuthrich. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43(2), 289–294.
McKitrick, J. (2009). Dispositional Pluralism. In Damschen, G., Schnepf, R. & Stueber, K. (Eds.) Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. New York/Berlin: De Gruyter, 186–203.
Molnar, G. (2003). Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Peskin, M.E. & Schroeder, D.V. (1995). An Introduction to Quantum Field Theory. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Place, U.T. (1996). Dispositions as Intentional States. In Crane, T. (Ed.) Dispositions: A Debate. London/New York: Routledge, 19–32.
Prior, E.W. (1985). Dispositions. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
Prior, E.W., Pargetter, R. & Jackson, F. (1982). Three Theses About Dispositions. American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 251–257.
Smeenk, C. (2006). The Elusive Higgs Mechanism. Philosophy of Science 73(5), 487–499.
Struyve, W. (2011). Gauge Invariant Accounts of the Higgs Mechanism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 42(4):226–236.
Wuthrich, A. (2012). Eating Goldstone Bosons in a Phase Transition: A Critical Review of Lyre’s Analysis of the Higgs Mechanism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43(2), 281–287.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Livanios, V. (2017). In Defence of Categorical Monism. In: Science in Metaphysics . New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41291-7_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41291-7_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-41290-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-41291-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)