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Capital Controls in a Time of Crisis

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Financial Liberalisation

Part of the book series: International Papers in Political Economy ((IPPE))

Abstract

The paper highlights five factors that have contributed to the evolving rebranding of capital controls during the global crisis. These include: (1) the rise of increasingly autonomous developing states; (2) the increasing assertiveness of their policymakers; (3) a pragmatic adjustment by the IMF to its constrained geography of influence; (4) the need for controls not just by countries facing fragility or implosion, but also by those that fared ‘too well’ during the crisis; and (5) the evolution in the ideas of academic economists and IMF staff. The paper also explores tensions around rebranding as exemplified by efforts to develop a hierarchy in which controls on inflows that are a last resort and are targeted, temporary, and non-discriminatory are more acceptable than those that are blunt, enduring, discriminatory, and that target outflows. In addition, tensions have increasingly emerged over whether controls should be used by capital-source rather than just capital-recipient countries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Discussion in this paper draws heavily on though extends and updates discussion in Grabel (<CitationRef CitationID="CR46" >2011</Citation Ref>, <CitationRef CitationID="CR51" >2015b</Citation Ref>) and parts of Grabel (2003b, <CitationRef CitationID="CR48" >2013b</Citation Ref>, <CitationRef CitationID="CR49" >c</Citation Ref>), Grabel and Gallagher (<CitationRef CitationID="CR52" >2015</Citation Ref>).

  2. 2.

    See Grabel (<CitationRef CitationID="CR47" >2013a</Citation Ref>, <CitationRef CitationID="CR50" >2015a</Citation Ref>) for an examination of these and other initiatives.

  3. 3.

    Fritz and Prates (<CitationRef CitationID="CR36" >2014</Citation Ref>) see controls on derivatives as distinct from (though complementary to) capital controls and prudential financial regulations.

  4. 4.

    Temporary outflow controls have turned out to be rather long lived—indeed the central bank and the Finance Ministry are planning to phase out the controls during 2016.

  5. 5.

    See Chwieroth (<CitationRef CitationID="CR17" >2015</Citation Ref>) on the process of destigmatizing capital controls.

  6. 6.

    The IEO (<CitationRef CitationID="CR56" >2015</Citation Ref>, p. 13) noted that staff did not approve of outflow and exchange controls in 2008 in Ukraine (see also Saborowski et al. <CitationRef CitationID="CR115" >2014</Citation Ref>).

  7. 7.

    Thanks to Michael Akume for research on Nigeria.

  8. 8.

    A separate annex to the TPP allows Chile alone to maintain or enact capital controls that are consistent with its own domestic laws to ensure financial stability.

  9. 9.

    NAFTA includes a balance of payments exception that allows controls when the host states “experience serious balance of payments difficulties, or the threat thereof,” but controls must be temporary and non-discriminatory (Gallagher <CitationRef CitationID="CR39" >2014</Citation Ref>, p. 181).

  10. 10.

    Korea’s 2007 free trade agreement with the US allows temporary controls under certain circumstances.

  11. 11.

    In some cases, this reframing may be less instrumental than I suggest. Chwieroth (<CitationRef CitationID="CR17" >2015</Citation Ref>) argues that Korean authorities see the measures they put in place during the global crisis as prudential and consistent with their acceptance of the norm of liberalization. I should add here that the re-normalization of capital controls may involve rebranding, the focus of this paper, and/or re-framing of capital controls as something other than capital controls. The former represents a more direct assault on the pre-existing neoliberal ideology, and is expected where states have achieved substantial policy autonomy. The latter amounts to ‘cheating’—attempting to use a strategy that is not permitted under the neoliberal rules of the game without admitting it. We should expect this strategy in cases where states have not achieved substantial policy autonomy.

  12. 12.

    Recall that (as earlier noted) Carstens (<CitationRef CitationID="CR14" >2015</Citation Ref>) spoke more catholically about controls in January 2016.

  13. 13.

    Adair Turner, former chair of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, takes note of the enduring resilience of the liberalization ideal despite empirical evidence (Turner <CitationRef CitationID="CR129" >2014</Citation Ref>). Ghosh and Qureshi (<CitationRef CitationID="CR41" >2016</Citation Ref>) root the demonization of inflow controls in a ‘guilt by association’ with outflow controls. They endorse the former, whereas they distance themselves from the latter, which they see as broad based and difficult to reverse.

  14. 14.

    See Fritz and Prates (<CitationRef CitationID="CR36" >2014</Citation Ref>) for a critique of the institutional view on these and other grounds.

  15. 15.

    Chwieroth (<CitationRef CitationID="CR16" >2014</Citation Ref>) argues that the greater equivocation on controls in the institutional view reflects the fact that official documents require member state approval, whereas reports such as Staff Position Notes do not.

  16. 16.

    Another possibility is that conflict over controls has decisively shifted from the economic to the legal arena of investment and trade agreements, as I suggested earlier.

  17. 17.

    Stiglitz and Rashid (<CitationRef CitationID="CR120" >2016</Citation Ref>) take what I see as a more modest view, such that current and coming turbulence in developing economies may necessitate quick action that includes targeted and time bound capital controls, especially on outflows.

  18. 18.

    On these views, see Horsefield (<CitationRef CitationID="CR54" >1969</Citation Ref>, pp. 31, 65) and Steil (<CitationRef CitationID="CR119" >2013</Citation Ref>, pp. 134, 150).

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Grabel, I. (2016). Capital Controls in a Time of Crisis. In: Arestis, P., Sawyer, M. (eds) Financial Liberalisation. International Papers in Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41219-1_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41219-1_5

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-41218-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-41219-1

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