Abstract
In this chapter I will outline the mathematical and numerical techniques used throughout this thesis to analyse stochastic systems.
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Notes
- 1.
Rev. Thomas Bayes (1701–1761).
- 2.
Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827).
- 3.
Specifically of the matrix \(\mathbb {W}\) shown in Eq. (2.15).
- 4.
- 5.
Adriaan Fokker (1877–1972) and Max Planck (1858–1947).
- 6.
Hendrik Kramers (1894–1952) and José Enrique Moyal (1910–1998).
- 7.
Nico van Kampen (1921–2013).
- 8.
Kiyoshi Itō (1915–2008) and Ruslan Stratanovich (1930–1997).
- 9.
Enrico Fermi (1901–1954).
- 10.
Pat Moran (1917–1988).
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Ashcroft, P. (2016). Technical Background. In: The Statistical Physics of Fixation and Equilibration in Individual-Based Models. Springer Theses. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41213-9_2
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