Abstract
Decoy or fake I/O devices can thwart malware attacks by incorporating diversity, misdirection, and confusion into an operating system, while preserving system usability and manageability. The idea is to display on a computer system evidence of the decoy I/O devices following Chap. 7 ideas. Their projection would make them appear as valid targets of interception and malicious modification, or as means of propagation to target machines. Good candidates for decoy I/O devices could be:
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Rowe, N.C., Rrushi, J. (2016). Decoy I/O Devices. In: Introduction to Cyberdeception. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41187-3_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41187-3_14
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