Abstract
In this chapter I explore connections between my ideas on the non-cancellability of explicatures (in general) and the explicatures of attributions of propositional attitudes. Since I claim that here opacity is created pragmatically through explicatures, the onus is placed on me to show that such explicatures are non-cancellable. In fact, I show that non-cancellability in several places is the consequence of the fact that the explicature is required to make the proposition conveyed logical. Nevertheless, I consider certain cogent objections and I claim that it is the semantics of the discourse that overrides the application of certain pragmatic principles.
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Notes
- 1.
Given that a theory of communication is also a theory of how knowledge is transmitted, by implication an a priori theory of communication is also an a priori theory of knowledge. This point seems to me not to be unimportant, although voiced in passing.
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Capone, A. (2016). Attributions of Propositional Attitude and Pragmatic Intrusion. In: The Pragmatics of Indirect Reports . Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41078-4_13
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