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Conclusion

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The Pythagorean World
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Abstract

On the face of it, physics and mathematics are about different things. The objects of physics are those which we causally interact with every day and which give us our sensations of heat, light, texture, smell and sound. Physicists assume their existence and try to discover their properties and how they cause the experiences that they do. In contrast, the objects of mathematics are usually deemed to be irrelevant to the causal nexus. If mathematical objects exist at all, then they exist outside of space and time in an eternal, unchanging state of pure being. We can’t interact with them in a sensual way, only by pure intellection, and any such interaction defies the laws of physical objects because it does not involve any interchange of energy, or any change at all in the grasped object, merely a change in our own mental state.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that Tarski and Corcoran show that our logic is a logic of cardinal number:

    It turns out that the only properties of classes (of individuals) which are logical are properties concerning the number of elements in these classes. That a class consists of three elements, or four elements … that it is finite, or infinite-these are logical notions, and are essentially the only logical notions on this level. (Tarski and Corcoran 1986: 151)

  2. 2.

    I shall speculate on what happens at limit ordinals in the section on laws (Sect. 7.2.3.3 below). Roughly speaking, the suggestion is that monads at a given level of the hierarchy develop an ever-improving model of the concepts and objects in their world and, at the limit ordinal, that model is encoded as an ideal Pythagorean theory of laws which starts the next level of the hierarchy.

  3. 3.

    As an aside, considering topics for future research, Peirce’s presentation of thought as a dialogue between minds links his semiotics to the fascinating area of semantic games in logic (e.g. Hintikka’s idea that any rational human activity can be played via logical games, and the computational idea of meaning as a dialogue between the system and the environment). Furthermore, if we restrict our attention to the computational (i.e. non-semantic) aspect of thought processes, then two-player games are used extensively in mathematics (e.g. to represent results in set theory such as the Borel determinacy theorem). This may provide some insight into the connection between bare mathematics and full mathematics.

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McDonnell, J. (2017). Conclusion. In: The Pythagorean World. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40976-4_7

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