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Wittgenstein on Aesthetic Understanding pp 281–301Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Wittgenstein’s Criticism of a “Science of Aesthetics” and the Understanding of Music

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Part of the book series: Philosophers in Depth ((PID))

Abstract

Can aesthetics be a science? Can empirical methods explain our aesthetic judgments? The possibility of a “science of aesthetics” is one of the main focuses of Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Aesthetics. One of the topics discussed by Wittgenstein with his students—the lectures were held in Cambridge in the summer of 1938—is the idea that the aesthetic judgments can be explained by empirical methods, namely by experimental psychology. Wittgenstein was passionate about music and drew on his musical experience throughout all his writings. His remarks on music are informative on multiple levels, highlighting aspects of music that help us to better understand music itself or making music a helpful tool to clarify nonmusical questions. This essay is about music and about Wittgenstein’s contribution to one of the most debated issues in the philosophy of music, that is, musical understanding.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    LC p. 11.

  2. 2.

    On Wittgenstein’s musical background see WK, pp. 1–120 and Alber 2000, pp. 121–137.

  3. 3.

    McGinn 1997, p. 87.

  4. 4.

    CV p. 52.

  5. 5.

    LC p. 19.

  6. 6.

    Warren Goldfarb writes: “It is central to Wittgenstein’s teaching that the conceptual underpinnings to a felt need for explanation must be scrutinized, for what it is, exactly, that wants explanation may only become clear through such an investigation. This does not make him anti-scientific. It does make him anti-scientistic, against the smug and unexamined assurance that what wants explanation is obvious, and that scientific tools are immediately applicable” (Goldfarb 1992, pp. 111–112).

  7. 7.

    PU 138–142.

  8. 8.

    PU 139.

  9. 9.

    PU 139.

  10. 10.

    PU 139.

  11. 11.

    PU 139.

  12. 12.

    PU 141.

  13. 13.

    PU 142. See McGinn 1997, pp. 82–88.

  14. 14.

    PU 151–155.

  15. 15.

    PU 151.

  16. 16.

    PU 152.

  17. 17.

    See Glock 1996, pp. 373–374.

  18. 18.

    PU 154.

  19. 19.

    PU 150.

  20. 20.

    PU 138.

  21. 21.

    McGinn 1997, p. 94.

  22. 22.

    PU 154.

  23. 23.

    PU 151, footnote, p. 59. See also PU 148.

  24. 24.

    Glock 1996, p. 376.

  25. 25.

    Glock 1996, p. 376.

  26. 26.

    See also Z 157–175.

  27. 27.

    Alessandro Arbo notes that knowing the rules is not enough to understand music, whether you play or listen to it, as a person should be able to apply or follow the rules (see Arbo 2013, p. 195). Arbo mentions the difference between knowing what a deceiving cadence is and being able to feel it “by ear, not (only) on paper” (Arbo 2013, p. 195).

  28. 28.

    LC p. 6.

  29. 29.

    LC p. 6.

  30. 30.

    LC p. 6.

  31. 31.

    CV p. 51.

  32. 32.

    CV pp. 51–52.

  33. 33.

    On the manifold ways music can represent aspects of the world, on the definition of representation and on the importance of loosen the distinction between musical and nonmusical world, see Bertinetto 2012, pp. 49–98.

  34. 34.

    CV p. 52.

  35. 35.

    As previously mentioned, Arbo specifies that while “a certain training is necessary” to “experience a conclusion as a conclusion, a phrase as articulated with two points, a song as a waltz, etc. […], it is also true that this practice, in and of itself, is not enough: I can very well know what a conclusion or an introduction is, but still not be able to hear it (to hear the musical conclusion)” (Arbo 2013, p. 195).

  36. 36.

    Szabados 2006, p. 657, my italics.

  37. 37.

    CV p. 52.

  38. 38.

    CV p. 52.

  39. 39.

    See Lewis 1977, pp. 119–120.

  40. 40.

    CV p. 52.

  41. 41.

    PU 531.

  42. 42.

    See PU 532.

  43. 43.

    See Arbo 2013, p. 197.

  44. 44.

    The flexibility of the concept of understanding in Wittgenstein’s thought is emphasized in Soles 1998.

  45. 45.

    See Goldfarb 1992.

  46. 46.

    PU Part II, xiv, p. 232.

Bibliography

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Applied Psychology, University of Padova, Piazza Capitaniato 3, 35139, Padua, Italy

    Alessandra Brusadin

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  1. Bard College, US, Rhinebeck, New York, USA

    Garry L. Hagberg

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Brusadin, A. (2017). Wittgenstein’s Criticism of a “Science of Aesthetics” and the Understanding of Music. In: Hagberg, G. (eds) Wittgenstein on Aesthetic Understanding. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40910-8_9

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