A Proof Infrastructure for Binary Programs

  • Ashlie B. HockingEmail author
  • Benjamin D. Rodes
  • John C. Knight
  • Jack W. Davidson
  • Clark L. Coleman
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9690)


Establishing properties of binary programs by proof is a desirable goal when the properties of interest are crucial, such as those that arise in safety- and security-critical applications. Practical development of proofs for binary programs requires a substantial infrastructure to disassemble the program, define the machine semantics, and actually undertake the required proofs. At the center of these infrastructure requirements is the need to document semantics in a formal language. In this paper we present a work-in-progress proof infrastructure for binary programs based on AdaCore and Altran’s integrated development and verification environment, SPARKPro. We illustrate the infrastructure with proof of a security property.


Security Property Subject Program Hoare Logic Binary Program Jump Instruction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



This research was developed with funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under contract W31P4Q–14-C–0086. The views, opinions, and/or findings expressed are those of the author(s) and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. The authors thank the software engineers of AdaCore, in particular, Yannick Moy for providing support.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ashlie B. Hocking
    • 1
    Email author
  • Benjamin D. Rodes
    • 1
  • John C. Knight
    • 1
  • Jack W. Davidson
    • 2
  • Clark L. Coleman
    • 2
  1. 1.Dependable ComputingCharlottesvilleUSA
  2. 2.Zephyr Software LLCCharlottesvilleUSA

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