Specifically Human? The Limited Conception of Self-Consciousness in Theories of Reflective Endorsement

  • Irene Bucelli


Human beings act, and it is intuitive to think that they are agents in a rather unique way, one that is different from other animals. Human beings can act for reasons. In particular, human actions can be subject to normative considerations, raising the issue of whether one should or should not act in a certain way under certain circumstances.


Human Agency Nonhuman Animal Conscious Activity Practical Identity Reflective Capacity 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Irene Bucelli
    • 1
  1. 1.London School of EconomicsLondonUK

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