Abstract
There is something strangely intimate about self-deception. That is, the secrets we keep from ourselves, and our methods for accomplishing this, seem to go to the heart of who we are in an essential way. And so too is this the case for our understanding of humanity in general. For, as Fingarette has noted, ‘were a portrait of man to be drawn we should surely place well in the foreground man’s enormous capacity for self-deception’.1 Indeed, we might even say that man’s ability to deceive himself about everything from sexual desire to death is what fundamentally distinguishes him. And this is not, as Morris has suggested, merely some idiosyncrasy that might occur ‘from time to time’2. In other words, self-deception is not just a contingent ‘error’ occasionally affixing itself to the functioning of an otherwise rational self. Rather, as is the case in our own lives, the nature of what we disguise points towards something more significant about who we are. In short, in the individual case and the general, the secrets we hold from ourselves seem to offer a unique road to understanding the mysteries of the self.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 1.
- 2.
‘From time to time people “lie to themselves”, as we say.…’ (Morris, Sartre, p. 76).
- 3.
From here on BN.
- 4.
Mele, ‘Emotion and desire in self-deception’, p. 163.
- 5.
Mele, ‘Real self-deception’, p. 92.
- 6.
Freud, ‘Repression’, from Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple Truths, p. 112.
- 7.
Mele, ‘Real self-deception’, p. 91.
- 8.
Canfield and Gustafson, 35, see Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 22.
- 9.
Mele, ‘Real self-deception’, p. 93.
- 10.
Pedrini,’Self-deception: what is to blame after all’, p. 151.
- 11.
Bach, ‘Thinking and believing in self-deception’, p. 105.
- 12.
Fingarette, ‘Self-deception needs no explaining’, in Self-Deception, p. 163.
- 13.
Stevenson, ‘Sartre on bad faith’, p. 256.
- 14.
Stevenson, ‘Sartre on bad faith’, attempts in contrast to understand bad faith in terms of Sartre’s reflective pre-reflective distinction, pp. 256–257. This effort is then criticised by M. Hymers, ‘Bad faith‘, pp. 397–402.
- 15.
Also BN, pp. 58 and 63.
- 16.
Hartmann, Sartre’s Ontology, p. 56.
- 17.
Phillips, ‘Bad faith and Sartre’s waiter’, p. 27.
- 18.
McCulloch, Using Sartre, p. 58.
- 19.
Phillips, ‘Bad faith and Sartre’s waiter’, pp. 27, 24–25.
- 20.
See BN, Part III, Chapter 2.
- 21.
McCulloch, Using Sartre, p. 62.
- 22.
Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 164.
- 23.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 50.
- 24.
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, Preface, p. SS1.
Bibliography
Bach, K. (1997) ‘Thinking and believing in self-deception’, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 20: 91–136, 105.
Dostoyevsky, F. (2009) Notes from the Underground, trans. by R. Wilks. London: Penguin.
Fingarette, H. (1969) Self-Deception. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fingarette, H. (2000) ‘Self-deception needs no explaining’, in Fingarette, H., Self-Deception Berkeley: University of California Press pp. 151–160.
Freud, S. (1997) ‘Repression’, in D. Goleman (ed.), Vital Lies, Simple Truths. (London: Bloomsbury, p. 112.
Hartmann, K. (1966) Sartre’s Ontology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962) Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hymers, M.(1989) ‘Bad faith‘, Philosophy, 64(249): 397–402.
McCulloch, G. (1994) Using Sartre. London: Routledge.
Mele, A. (1997) ‘Real self-deception’, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 20: 91–136.
Mele, A. (2003) ‘Emotion and desire in self-deception’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 52: 163–179.
Morris, K. (2008) Sartre. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Nietzsche, F. (1994) On the Genealogy of Morality trans. C. Diethe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pedrini, P. (2005) ‘Self-deception: what is to blame after all’, Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia (Firenze), 11: 1–34.
Phillips, D.Z. (1981) ‘Bad faith and Sartre’s waiter‘, Philosophy, 56(215): 23–31.
Sartre, J.-P. (1958) Being and Nothingness, trans. H. Barnes. London: Routledge, 1958.
Stevenson, L. (1983) ‘Sartre on bad faith‘, Philosophy, 58(224): 253–258.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mitchell, D. (2016). What Does Self-Deception Tell Us About the Self? A Sartrean Perspective. In: Winkler, R. (eds) Identity and Difference. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40427-1_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40427-1_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-40426-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-40427-1
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)