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What Does Self-Deception Tell Us About the Self? A Sartrean Perspective

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Abstract

There is something strangely intimate about self-deception. That is, the secrets we keep from ourselves, and our methods for accomplishing this, seem to go to the heart of who we are in an essential way. And so too is this the case for our understanding of humanity in general. For, as Fingarette has noted, ‘were a portrait of man to be drawn we should surely place well in the foreground man’s enormous capacity for self-deception’.1 Indeed, we might even say that man’s ability to deceive himself about everything from sexual desire to death is what fundamentally distinguishes him. And this is not, as Morris has suggested, merely some idiosyncrasy that might occur ‘from time to time’2. In other words, self-deception is not just a contingent ‘error’ occasionally affixing itself to the functioning of an otherwise rational self. Rather, as is the case in our own lives, the nature of what we disguise points towards something more significant about who we are. In short, in the individual case and the general, the secrets we hold from ourselves seem to offer a unique road to understanding the mysteries of the self.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 1.

  2. 2.

    ‘From time to time people “lie to themselves”, as we say.…’ (Morris, Sartre, p. 76).

  3. 3.

    From here on BN.

  4. 4.

    Mele, ‘Emotion and desire in self-deception’, p. 163.

  5. 5.

    Mele, ‘Real self-deception’, p. 92.

  6. 6.

    Freud, ‘Repression’, from Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple Truths, p. 112.

  7. 7.

    Mele, ‘Real self-deception’, p. 91.

  8. 8.

    Canfield and Gustafson, 35, see Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 22.

  9. 9.

    Mele, ‘Real self-deception’, p. 93.

  10. 10.

    Pedrini,’Self-deception: what is to blame after all’, p. 151.

  11. 11.

    Bach, ‘Thinking and believing in self-deception’, p. 105.

  12. 12.

    Fingarette, ‘Self-deception needs no explaining’, in Self-Deception, p. 163.

  13. 13.

    Stevenson, ‘Sartre on bad faith’, p. 256.

  14. 14.

    Stevenson, ‘Sartre on bad faith’, attempts in contrast to understand bad faith in terms of Sartre’s reflective pre-reflective distinction, pp. 256–257. This effort is then criticised by M. Hymers, ‘Bad faith‘, pp. 397–402.

  15. 15.

    Also BN, pp. 58 and 63.

  16. 16.

    Hartmann, Sartre’s Ontology, p. 56.

  17. 17.

    Phillips, ‘Bad faith and Sartre’s waiter’, p. 27.

  18. 18.

    McCulloch, Using Sartre, p. 58.

  19. 19.

    Phillips, ‘Bad faith and Sartre’s waiter’, pp. 27, 24–25.

  20. 20.

    See BN, Part III, Chapter 2.

  21. 21.

    McCulloch, Using Sartre, p. 62.

  22. 22.

    Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 164.

  23. 23.

    Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 50.

  24. 24.

    Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, Preface, p. SS1.

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Mitchell, D. (2016). What Does Self-Deception Tell Us About the Self? A Sartrean Perspective. In: Winkler, R. (eds) Identity and Difference. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40427-1_3

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